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Summary
The effect of the digital revolution on citizens’ ability to voice dissatisfaction
with their government and to coordinate dissent via social media has been
the subject of much recent research. Optimistic accounts have so far failed to
address the salient fact that the state maintains de facto control over the access to
social media, which means that new digital technology also provides abusive
governments with tools to repress challengers. This dissertation investigates
how states’ strategies of violent repression are informed by the use of these
opportunities to control the internet.
I identify two main forms of control, which are the restriction or disruption
of the internet on the one hand, and digital surveillance on the other hand.
States face a trade-off: they can either restrict access to the internet and with it
diminish opposition groups’ capabilities, or they can permit the digital exchange
of information and monitor it to their own advantage. I argue that the choice
of internet control affects the type and scale of state-sanctioned violence used
against perceived domestic threats. The choice of digital surveillance as a form of
control is likely to be used in conjunction with targeted acts of localised violence
against those identified as critical to the future success of opposition movements.
The availability of highly specified intelligence on the intentions and location of
opposition leaders enables states to use targeted violence.
Where states have chosen to respond to critical domestic threats in the form
of censorship, they will also be more likely to visibly demonstrate their authority
through a heightened use of violent repression. In addition, censorship severely
limits the choices for violent action on the side of the government, by restricting
the state’s own access to the required intelligence for selecting precise targets.
Consequently, during periods of censorship, state-sanctioned violence is likely
to affect the domestic population indiscriminately.
I present a global analysis of the relationship between internet disruptions
and the level of state-sanctioned violence, confirming that states who use net-
work disruptions are also more likely to abuse the rights of their citizens.
Evidence presented in case examples provides contextual understanding for the
variety of different digital control tools which states have at their disposal.
The full implications of the theoretical argument are tested by moving
to the sub-national level, and investigating the relationship between internet
control and state violence, spatially and temporally in the Syrian conflict. I
present a new integrated database on incidences of state killing in Syria, as
well as disaggregated measures of network accessibility. First, I show that
internet shutdowns occur in conjunction with significantly higher levels of state
violence, most notably in areas where government forces are actively challenged
by opposition groups. Second, I use supervised machine-learning to analyze
over 60,000 records of state killings by the Syrian regime, and classify them to
distinguish between targeted and untargeted acts of repression. I show that
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higher levels of internet accessibility are consistently linked to an increase in
targeted repression, whereas areas with little or no access to the internet witness
more indiscriminate campaigns of violence. I conclude the dissertation by
discussing the implications of the theoretical argument and the results, which
have important ramifications for research and policy attempting to limit state
abuse in the twenty-first century.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Question
A few weeks before the first mass protests ensued across Syria in March 2011, the
regime led by President Bashar Al-Assad lifted a large number of bans on social
networking platforms, including Facebook and Youtube. Up to that point, the
Assad regime had controlled the most regulated media and telecommunications
landscape in the Middle East (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). The removal of such
restrictions was a step that other repressive states, including China, considered
unthinkable. Suddenly Syrian citizens were free to digitally voice their anger and
resentment towards a despotic regime with an appalling human rights record.
From the state’s point of view, this would appear to be a recipe for disaster.
Why, after years of extreme censorship, would a deeply autocratic government
suddenly permit unrestricted access to, and exchange of, information?
The ability to connect via large social network platforms has been celebrated
by social scientists, policy makers, and human rights groups across the world as
an empowering new way for ordinary citizens to collectively mobilise against
repressive rulers (see e.g. Cohen, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Castells, 2012; Bennett
and Segerberg, 2013). In fact, the US State Department perceived the role of
social media platforms in the fight for democracy to be so crucial in 2009, that it
officially requested Twitter to reschedule planned maintenance work in order to
provide full accessibility to activists during Iran’s post-election protests (Landler
and Stelter, 2009). A former deputy adviser to the White House National
Security Council went so far as to suggest that Twitter should receive a Nobel
Peace Prize for being one of the crucial ‘soft weapons of democracy’, and a
‘megaphone’ for citizen movements across the world (Pfeifle, 2009).
Two years later, when civilian uprisings spread like wildfire across the
Middle East and North Africa, social media was declared the principal tool
of the protest movement, with journalists and researchers proclaiming that
in the twenty-first century, ‘the revolution will be tweeted’ (Hounshell, 2011;
Lotan et al., 2011; Rasha, 2011; Else, 2012). In consequence, the opportunities
offered by the digital media to previously marginalised voices of dissent, and
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the role they play in facilitating protest and resistance, have become the subject
of extensive systematic research (see Garrett, 2006; Aday, Farrell and Lynch, 2010;
González-Bailón et al., 2011; Lynch, 2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Howard and
Hussain, 2013a). The fact that anyone with a working internet connection can
now access, generate, and exchange content on the internet has been termed
a real ‘game changer’ (Bellin, 2012: 127) for authoritarian regimes intent on
maintaining control during mass popular protest.
Amidst all the euphoric accounts of the digital revolution, a crucial question
remains unanswered: why power-hungry states, with de facto control over
citizens’ access to social media, should appear to impassively concede to defeat
by these new tools. The simple answer is: they do not. Public attention has
been focussed on the protest-enhancing elements of social media, but behind
the scenes, governments across the world have been extremely active across
the past two decades. They have been continuously developing and refining
a whole arsenal of tools to surveil, manipulate, and censor the digital flow of
information in the realm of their authority (see Deibert, 2008, 2010; Howard and
Hussain, 2013b). How these tools of digital control inform states’ larger strategies of
repression is the subject of this dissertation.
This dissertation attempts to answer the question of how states’ repressive
strategies are affected by the digital revolution. I investigate how the opportu-
nities and challenges of internet control affect the most widely-used tactic of
repression, which is state-sanctioned violence. Governments intent on maintain-
ing power over all adversaries, have long since combined the use of information
control and restriction with the use of violence against those deemed threatening
to their authority. Dictatorial regimes in the twentieth century, from Germany’s
Third Reich under Adolf Hitler to the military juntas waging Argentina’s Dirty
War, were masters in the art of influencing public opinion via the censoring and
manipulation of mass media. The politics of media control are thus inadver-
tently linked to governments’ concerted strategies of repression; restrictions on
the media enable the use and justification of state violence (Davenport, 1995;
Van Belle, 1997).
Digital communication technology has fundamentally altered the opportu-
nities and benefits of information control, and the role it plays in strategies
of state repression. As social media enthusiasts have rightly noted, the digi-
tal revolution has given individuals all over the world a platform to amplify
their political claims and make themselves heard. The fact that states from
Bahrain to Vietnam have invested enormous resources in censoring content
and arresting digital opposition activists speaks volumes about the threat they
perceived it to be. In September 2014, when protests erupted in central Hong
Kong, Chinese authorities quickly blocked access to the picture-sharing service
Instagram. In May 2014, Turkey’s prime minister effected a ban on Twitter after
it had become widely popular in the Gezi Park protests eight months earlier.
State authorities from Egypt to Iran have shut down all internet services in
response to internal unrest. At the same time, it would be naive to assume
that repressive states would generally permit and support the expansion of the
internet if they did not anticipate clear advantages for their own survival (see
Rød and Weidmann, forthcoming). A former head-of-department in the Ministry
for Staatssicherheit recently contended that the current United States National
Security Agency’s surveillance techniques would have been a ‘dream come true’
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for the secret service of the German Democratic Republic, where the number
of wiretapped phones was restricted due to the country’s limited technological
capacity (Schofield, 2013). The digital age has made these surveillance tasks
more affordable and precise.
In February 2011, after decades of controlling a highly censored media
landscape, the Syrian regime realised that it had manoeuvred itself into an
informational vacuum concerning the identity and extent of internal dissent
simmering within its borders. Assad’s clan was in dire need of a way to identify
potential opposition, their location, and planned protest behaviour, in order to
effectively eliminate threats to the status quo. Allowing the population to freely
converse on Facebook and Twitter offered a low-cost and effective way to expand
surveillance and gain a clearer picture of state enemies (see MacKinnon, 2012:
64). Across the next three years, it then went on to periodically shut down the
country’s entire access to the internet, at points where it deemed this necessary.
In short, Syria’s government decided to provide access to social networking
sites, but it simultaneously increased its own intelligence for counterinsurgency
operations, while also providing the opposition with new ways of organising of
collective action.
1.2 Main theoretical argument
The digital age presents governments who fear for their political survival with a
dilemma. On the one hand, dissidents and opposition groups are empowered
through the use of social media; on the other hand these platforms offer them-
selves to previously unseen levels of surveillance and manipulation. States face
a trade-off: they can either restrict access to the internet and with it diminish
opposition groups’ capabilities, or they can permit the digital exchange of infor-
mation and monitor it to their own advantage. Both strategies of internet control
- censorship and surveillance - cannot be implemented at the same time.1
This trade-off informs states’ use of violence. I argue that the choice of
internet control affects the type and scale of state-sanctioned violence used against
perceived domestic threats. Choosing either censorship or surveillance as a form
of digital control inevitably limits the use of some forms of violence and enables
the use of other forms. Where states have chosen to visibly respond to critical
domestic threats through a demonstration of control in the form of censorship,
they will also be more likely to visibly demonstrate their authority through a
heightened use of violent repression. Second, censorship severely limits the choices
for violent action on the side of the government by censoring its own access to
intelligence on precise targets. During periods of censorship, state-sanctioned
violence is likely to affect the domestic population indiscriminately.
The choice of digital surveillance is likely to be used in conjunction with
targeted acts of localised violence against those identified as critical to the
future success of opposition movements. The availability of highly specified
intelligence on the intentions and location of opposition leaders enables states
to use targeted violence. Digital surveillance measures are likely to be linked to
the use of targeted, individualised state-sanctioned violence.
1There are a few exceptions, such as methods used by the Chinese government. This anomaly
is addressed in Chapter 4.
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1.3 Empirical approach
Empirically, I expect state forces to employ targeted campaigns of coercion in
areas where they grant citizens free access to information through the internet.
Where connectivity is limited, I expect to observe less targeted, and higher
intensity strategies of violence. I test these implications in a variety of ways, and
present a number of solutions to empirical challenges related to the measurement
of both internet control and state violence.
Measuring internet control and state violence is highly challenging, because
both phenomena, by the nature of their subject, are not intended to be fully
observable. Sometimes, states want their citizens to know they are controlling
the internet, and sometimes they do not. States sometimes want their citizens to
witness state violence, and sometimes not. To empirically test the relationship
between internet control and state violence, I present systematic cross-national
evidence over time, as well as two distinct quantitative sub-national case studies,
and four short qualitative case examples.
The observable implication that can most reliably be measured at a global
level is the implementation of restrictions on the internet, and the associated
increase in state-sanctioned violence. I present evidence from a global analysis
of the relationship between internet disruptions and the level of violent state
repression, confirming the hypothesised positive relationship. Taking into ac-
count the most important determinants for violent state repression, the evidence
suggests that the implementation of internet disruptions is systematically linked
to higher levels in rights abuses. Contextual evidence presented in the individual
case examples combines qualitative evidence on the link between surveillance
and state violence; it also reveals the variety of different means for digital control
which states have at their disposal.
The full implications of the theoretical argument are tested by moving to the
sub-national level, and investigating the relationship between internet control
and state violence, spatially and temporally. The case selected for this analysis is
the Syrian Arab Republic (known as Syria). I present a new integrated database
on incidences of state killing in Syria, as well as disaggregated measures of
network accessibility. The first study investigates the logic of internet outages
for state killings. Network shutdowns occur in conjunction with significantly
higher levels of state violence, most notably in areas where government forces are
actively fighting violent opposition groups. To eliminate competing explanations,
I estimate the number of undocumented killings prior to and during outages,
to test whether disruptions are implemented to hide atrocities from outside
observers. I find no support for this hypothesis. In the second study I use
supervised machine-learning to analyze over 60,000 records of state killings by
the Syrian regime, and classify them according to their event circumstances, to
distinguish between targeted and untargeted acts of repression. To account for
reporting biases, I estimate the actual number of incidences in each category.
The results reveal that higher levels of internet accessibility are consistently
linked to an increase in targeted repression, whereas areas with little or no
access to the internet witness more indiscriminate campaigns of violence.
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Case Selection
Syria was selected as the main case study for this dissertation, as it has been
termed ‘the most socially mediated civil conflict in history’ (Lynch, Freelon
and Aday, 2014: 5), with events being painstakingly captured, documented
and communicated via the internet. Thousands of Youtube videos record the
images of killed and injured people in morgues, hospitals and market places,
and activists within and outside the country use countless Twitter and Facebook
accounts to inform each other about military operations and massacres, and
to organize and coordinate the revolution (see Youmans and York, 2012). The
Syrian government has made use of a multitude of internet controls: it has fully
disrupted all access, it has regionally limited the accessibility, and it has used an
array of spying software to surveil its entire population. The regime employs an
Electronic Army to enforce the regime’s message throughout the virtual world.
Under the banner of the ‘Syrian Presidency’, President Bashar Al-Assad also
maintains a lively Instagram account with no discernible sign of the ongoing
war.2
Social media use in Syria and events surrounding the Arab Spring indicate
that the central role of the internet will only increase in future conflicts. For this
reason, understanding the motivation behind network manipulations instituted
by regimes fearful of their political demise will become an indispensable tool
for our theoretical and practical understanding of conflict dynamics. Learning
from current cases such as Syria is an important place to start.
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 provides a brief discussion of the main theoretical and empirical con-
tributions made by this dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews existing approaches to
the study of state repression and research on the role of the digital media and
contentious politics. Research on the effects of the digital media revolution on
state repression in the digital era is an area that has remained totally underdevel-
oped. The missing link between communication technology and state violence
is particularly astonishing given the growing body of research on the occurrence
and variation in the use of digital censorship (e.g. Deibert, 2010; Howard, 2010).
The chapter discusses digital censorship and surveillance in detail, addressing
possible reasons for the lack of research on the link between internet control and
state violence.
Chapter 3 sets out a first theoretical framework linking the logic of state-
implemented internet controls to the use of strategic, violent coercion. The
costs and benefits of both censorship and surveillance are discussed and their
implications for state-sanctioned are considered.
Chapter 4 offers four distinct case examples of countries that have made
use of network restrictions and surveillance techniques, in conjunction with
clamping down on groups and individuals deemed threatening to them. It
then presents systematic global evidence on the relationship between state-
implemented network disruptions and the level of violent state repression
between 1995 and 2010.
2See http://instagram.com/syrianpresidency.
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Chapter 5 presents a new database on state killings in the Syrian Arab
Republic (between March 2011 and April 2014). It addresses one of the main
challenges faced by those collecting event data on violence: the over-counting
of incidences. The second main challenge, namely, the under-counting of
incidences, is addressed in Chapter 6. It presents an estimation solution to
fluctuating dark figure of unreported violence, by modelling the reporting
process, and predicting what went unreported.
Chapter 7 investigates the military strategic advantages of internet disruptions,
and makes use of the just presented data and estimation strategy. Governments
have a strategic incentive to implement internet blackouts in conjunction with
larger repressive operations against violent opposition forces. Short-term inter-
missions in communication channels are expected to decrease opposition groups’
capabilities to successfully coordinate and implement attacks against the state,
allowing regime forces to strengthen their position. A competing explanation
is that states implement blackouts to commit atrocities that are hidden from
international scrutiny. I compare the level of underreporting before and during
disruptions and find no evidence for this alternative hypothesis. In addition, the
analysis implements a series of placebo tests to rigorously test the actual causal
effect of the argument.
Chapter 8 looks at the full continuum of possible internet controls and analy-
ses the link between the type of network control and the type of coercion used.
I use supervised machine-learning to classify state killings into targeted and
untargeted acts of repression. Using this classified data, and the estimation strat-
egy presented in Chapter 6, I find that higher levels of information accessibility
are consistently linked to an increase in the proportion of targeted repression,
whereas areas with little or no access witness more indiscriminate campaigns of
violence.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation by highlighting the main findings of the
different chapters and discussing the main implications for future research and
policy.
1.5 Central contributions
This dissertation breaks new grounds in investigating how states digitally inform
their strategies of violent repression through the use of internet control. By
doing so it contributes to the literature on state repression and the literature on
the role of the internet in contentious politics, in a number of important ways.
1.5.1 Theoretical and conceptual contributions
Linking digital network control to state violence
To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to theoretically
and empirically investigate the link between state-implemented internet control
and state-sanctioned violent repression. With the growing role of the new
digital media in protest and opposition movements across the world, answers to
the question of how states digitally inform their strategies of violence provide
a crucial contribution to our understanding of the contemporary and future
dynamics of protest and conflict.
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Disaggregating digital information control
In looking at information control, the literature on state repression has focused
on the causes and effects of traditional media censorship. The role of digital
information control has received little attention, and has tended to be equated
with internet restrictions. The logic of state surveillance has remained altogether
under-researched. In this dissertation, I make the crucial differentiation be-
tween digital network restrictions, leading to censorship, and network provision
needed for digital surveillance. Together, censorship and surveillance form the
integral parts of states’ options for internet control. This dissertation contributes
significantly to our understanding of how states make use of these tools, and
what costs and benefits are associated with them.
1.5.2 Empirical and methodological contributions
Integrating high-quality event data from multiple sources
Event data on political violence has recently been subject to substantial, impor-
tant criticism. Quantifying violence is extremely challenging, and two of the
main problems researchers face are the over-counting and the under-counting of
events. This dissertation presents a newly integrated database on state killings in
the Syrian conflict; it also addresses the fundamental problem of over-counting
through the process of record-linkage. The new data offer the most complete
and high quality assembly of reported state killings for the current conflict. By
design, the database allows researchers to trace each recorded victim of state
killing back to its original source, which makes it possible to investigate the
actual process of reporting.
Accounting for unreported incidences in event data
The second problem in the collection of event data on violence is the under-
counting of incidences. Empirical analyses using incomplete, unrepresentative
data on violence run the risk of modelling the process by which violence was
reported, not the dynamics under which it was perpetrated. Research on the
relationship between information control and violence is particularly susceptible
to this problem, as changes in information availability can affect our knowledge
of violence, leading to problems of endogeneity. The main research question
of this dissertation could not be addressed without a means of accounting for
this problem. A statistical solution for predicting the under-counted incidences
is presented in this dissertation. It is one of the first studies to use corrected
statistical predictions of violence in multivariate analyses.
Supervised machine-learning classification of repressive strategies
Research on state repression and political conflict has made significant advances
in disaggregating strategies of violence, yet the overwhelming majority of
theoretical concepts are translated into a measure of ‘body counts’. High levels
of killing are automatically equated with indiscriminate violence, while low
numbers are assumed to be selective. This dissertation contributes a new
measure of repressive strategies by combining information on the circumstances
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of each killing recorded in the new database and using supervised machine-
learning algorithms to classify each incident as either targeted or untargeted.
The opportunities for machine-learning techniques to be used in the analysis of
large amounts of data are truly immense. The classifications presented in this
dissertation exemplify the potential they offer for improving the overall quality
of measures of political violence.
2
Broadening the repressive toolkit in the
digital age
2.1 Introduction
The toolbox of instruments that states can use to repress their citizens has broad-
ened dramatically with the rise of digital media and communication technology.
Governments now have the option of controlling whether and in what form
citizens are able to connect online, as well as the ability to extensively surveil
peer-to-peer communication. Consequently, these measures provide efficient
new methods for governments to effectively repress their citizens (Howard and
Hussain, 2013b).
However, so far there has been a lack of research on how the state’s use of
violence is affected by these changes – despite the fact that there has been ample
research demonstrating how the dramatic increase in collective organisation via
social media platforms has made states more susceptible to both internal protest
and dissent (Garrett, 2006; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013).
In this dissertation, I argue that the information age has vastly increased
opportunities for governments to gather detailed information on which to
base their strategies for violent repression in response to these new forms of
resistance. Faced with increased organizational abilities by the opposition via
online communication, states will be more likely to disrupt network access in
conjunction with a broad campaign of violent coercion. Conversely, where states
perceive the threat of internal dissent to be low, they will likely maintain access
to the internet in order to gain information on crucial opposition figures, who
can then be targeted individually.
Classic literature on the determinants and dynamics of state repression has
principally been concerned with the relationship between varying forms of
state violence and domestic dissent (e.g. Lichbach, 1987; Mason and Krane,
1989; Davenport, 2007a). On the other hand, research on protest has principally
focused on the ways in which individuals overcome coordination and collective
action problems in order to organise sustained and effective resistance (e.g.
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Lichbach, 1995; Wood, 2003). For more than a decade, studies concerned with
the representation of individuals’ grievances and the organisation of protest have
intensely discussed how digital communication technology has changed the
nature of contemporary protest movements, and asked to what extent previous
theoretical models need to be updated or amended, given the social and political
potential of the internet (see e.g. Surowiecki, 2005; Shirky, 2008, 2011; Earl and
Kimport, 2011; van Dijk, 2012). The effect of the new digital media on citizens’
involvement in contentious politics has thus become a crucial part of theoretical
models on protest, perhaps most famously reflected by what has been termed
the ‘logic of connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 19).
In contrast, research on state violence in the digital era remains scarce. The
missing connection between digital communication technology and state vi-
olence is particularly astonishing given the growing body of research on the
occurrence and variation in the use of digital censorship (Deibert, 2008, 2010;
Howard, 2010; Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011; Howard and Hussain,
2013b; King, Pan and Roberts, 2013). This chapter reviews the current state of
research on state repression, and provides an overview of how digital communi-
cation technology has influenced the dynamics of contentious politics.
I begin with a discussion of the definition and scope of state repression in
general, and provide an overview of research on the main predictors for state
violence. This is followed by an analysis of the research on the role of the digital
media in contentious politics, and I address possible reasons for the lack of
existing research on the link between internet control and state violence.
Chapter 3 then introduces the main theoretical argument of the dissertation,
namely how differing forms of internet control, through the use of both surveil-
lance and censorship methods, are linked to different strategies of coercive state
violence.
2.2 State repression: what it is and how it works
Definitions of state repression vary in scope (for a full discussion see, e.g.
Davenport, 2007a; Earl, 2011), but in general, this can be defined as:
‘[the] use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization
[...] for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging
to government personnel, practices or institutions’ (Goldstein, 1978:
xxvii, cited in Davenport, 2007a: 2).
State repression is generally understood to be the violation of one or more
of the basic human rights written into the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Nowak, 1993). The types of sanctions applied by states can
broadly be divided into civil liberty rights and physical integrity rights (Earl,
2011; Escribà-Folch, 2013). Civil liberty rights, sometimes also referred to as first-
amendement type rights in the US context (see Davenport, 2007a: 2), include
basic human rights such as the right to free speech, freedom of association,
freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. Physical integrity rights are
rights that are meant to ensure every person’s bodily integrity, including freedom
from torture, freedom from being imprisoned for holding opposing political
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views, freedom from execution by the state, and from being disappeared by
force (Davis and Ward, 1990). The violation of physical integrity rights is also
referred to as violent state coercion, and the terms will be used interchangeably
in this dissertation.
The relationship between civil liberty rights and state coercion
In contrast to the above relatively broad definition, the majority of those doing
empirical research investigating the determinants and dynamics of state repres-
sion have defined it as a narrow set of physical integrity rights violations, such
as state killings, torture, political imprisonment and disappearance (e.g. Mc-
Cormick and Mitchell, 1997; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Moore, 2000; Danneman
and Ritter, 2014; Fariss and Schnakenberg, 2014). The reason for this is that
physical integrity rights violations on the one hand, and civil liberty violations
on the other hand follow different dynamics, and can therefore not be used as
substitutable indicators for repression.
The scope of targets which governments aim at varies substantially across
different forms of repression. States can repress all citizens indiscriminately, or
they can target specific individuals or groups, and the effects of repression can
be either direct or indirect. In general, the violation of physical integrity rights
directly affects a selected target population, namely those individuals who are
directly harmed. Thus, if a prominent state dissident is detained and killed, she
is the direct target of coercion, even though a broader group of activists with
whom she previously worked might also be indirectly affected. In a similar way,
if hundreds of protesters are killed in a state-perpetrated massacre, the direct
targets are the protesters killed, even if the indirect targets might constitute
other citizens subsequently deterred from taking to the streets.
In the case of civil liberty rights violations, such as the denial of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press, the situation is different. This form of
repression generally affects an entire population, even if individual perceptions
on the severity of censorship can vary. For example, if the media is prohibited
from publishing anything that is critical of the government, then theoretically
this constitutes the denial of every citizen’s freedom of expression, even if not
everyone will perceive this to be a problem (Van Belle, 1997). Civil liberty
violations are therefore usually visible for a broad audience, as everyone is
affected by them. In contrast, states have the potential to hide physical integrity
rights violations from the broader population, in particular when they are only
targeting specific individuals (Davis and Ward, 1990; Pion-Berlin and Lopez,
1991).
For this reason, research on the determinants of state violence has treated
violations or provisions of civil liberty rights as a key explanatory factor for the
level and nature of coercion used by the government (Cingranelli and Richards,
1999, 2010; Conrad and Moore, 2010; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). Conrad
and Moore (2010: 46) investigate the conditions under which governments
that have used torture in the past, will refrain from doing so in the future,
and argue that the willingness of governments to grant their citizens freedom
of expression will act as an indicator for the presence of important checks
and balances, that should help monitor whether, and to what extent, states are
abusing their monopoly over the use of force (see also Davenport and Armstrong,
2004; De Mesquita et al., 2005).
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Online platforms granting ordinary citizens the ability to voice their dis-
satisfaction with government actions have turned the internet into an integral
part of civil liberty provision across the world (Howard and Hussain, 2013a).
At the same time, increased communication opportunities between individ-
uals has facilitated mobilization, and with it, increased the risk of domestic
dissent (Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013).
State coercion and domestic dissent
It has been both theoretically and empirically established that the most impor-
tant predictor for increased state coercion is the presence of domestic dissent,
the most extreme form of this interaction between government and opposition
manifesting itself in civil war (Lichbach, 1987; Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996; Poe,
Tate and Keith, 1999; Poe, 2004; Carey, 2009).1 Poe (2004) provides a compre-
hensive theoretical account of the rationalist decision-making model underlying
government repression. His work builds on the ‘Most-Starr Decisionmaking
Model’ (Poe, 2004: 17), referring to early work by Most and Starr (1989) dealing
with the cost-benefit calculations governments perform when faced with internal
dissent. The model identifies two key factors that governments – assumed to
be unitary and utility-maximising actors – take into account when deciding
whether the use of coercion is a rational policy option or not. The first factor is
the government’s perceived domestic strength (S), and the second factor is the
perceived threat (T) of the domestic challenge to destabilise the political status
quo. Poe (2004: 17) demonstrates that governments will have an incentive to be-
come active when a) the perceived threat T is larger than the state’s own strength
S, or when b) the perceived threat is increasing relative to the state’s perceived
own strength between t-1 and t (see also Most and Starr, 1989: 126-28). Poe
(2004: 19) stresses that violent coercion is but one option for governments to
deal with a (perceived) unfavourable Strength-Threat inequality, and that other
factors - such as the regime type of a country - affect the willingness and ability
to actually use violence against domestic threats.
Directly related to the determinants of state coercion is the question whether
and under what circumstances violent coercion has in fact proven to be effective
at suppressing and deterring further protest or rebellion (Lichbach, 1987; Moore,
1998; Carey, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Siegel, 2011; Davenport, forthcoming). Siegel (2011)
contends that violent ‘repression acts to disrupt the mobilization dynamic [in
individuals’ social network pathways] by removing participants and cutting
these pathways’ (Siegel, 2011: 997). Whether the coercive disruption of collective
mobilization processes is successful or not depends on the reaction of those who
are affected by it (Schutte, 2014). Groups enduring or witnessing coercion will
either become fearful of further reprisals and reduce their activities (Lyall, 2010),
or they will be motivated to increase their anti-government activities and rally
further supporters for their cause in the same process (Lichbach, 1995; Kalyvas,
2006; Downes, 2008). For coercion to effectively work, governments have a
1The list of studies confirming and qualifying this relationship is long, including: Mitchell and
McCormick (1988); Mason and Krane (1989); Poe and Tate (1994); Davenport (1995); Moore (1998);
Poe, Tate and Keith (1999); Moore (2000); Zanger (2000); Regan and Henderson (2002); Poe (2004);
Davenport (2007b); Pierskalla (2009); Carey and Gibney (2010); Carey (2010); Conrad and Moore
(2010); Earl (2011); Conrad (2011); Danneman and Ritter (2014); Escribà-Folch (2013), to name just
a few.
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vested interest in using sufficient coercion to deter further dissident actions,
while at the same time not motivating previously uninterested (or ambiguous)
citizens to solidarise with the opposition.
To counter perceived domestic threats without alienating impartial citizens,
governments need to be able to distinguish between threatening dissidents and
the remaining, non-threatening population (Kalyvas, 2006). Where individual
threats are identified, state forces will attempt to target and ‘remove’ those
individuals, while leaving the remaining population unscathed. Where, however,
the majority of the domestic population has been identified as threatening,
violent coercion is likely to be wide-spread and indiscriminate (see Valentino,
Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004).
Regime type and state coercion
In addition to the presence of dissent, the type of regime in power has been found
to be robustly associated with differing levels of state coercion. Governments
that operate in the domain of strong democratic institutions are the least likely
to perpetrate violence against their population (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999;
Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). The presence
of democratic institutions does, however, not necessarily mean that no acts of
state violence will be committed. De Mesquita et al. (2005) show that physical
integrity rights only benefit from fully developed democratic structures, and
that political participation is the most crucial aspect for the respect of these
rights. Democratic states are also more likely to use coercive measures that are
less visible than autocracies, as they have an invested interest in being perceived
as human rights protectors (Rejali, 2011; Conrad and Moore, 2012).
The relationship between regime types and physical integrity rights viola-
tions is, moreover, not linear. What has been termed the ‘more murder in the
middle’ (Fein, 1995: 170)-hypothesis purports that regimes that are neither fully
democratic, nor fully autocratic are the most coercive states, as they face the
highest degree of insecurity, or perceived threat (Regan and Henderson, 2002;
Carey, 2009).
The list of factors influencing state repression is much longer, including a
country’s previous level of rights abuse (Sullivan, Loyle and Davenport, 2012),
economic wealth and population size (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999), international
human rights norms (Hathaway, 2007), trade agreements (Hafner-Burton, Tsut-
sui and Meyer, 2008), naming and shaming campaigns (Murdie and Davis, 2012),
inequality (Landman and Larizza, 2009), and state-imposed sanctions (Peksen,
2009), to name but a few. What still remains unclear is how digital communica-
tion technology has affected the basic decision-making of when, and how, states
use coercion.
2.3 Communication technology and contentious politics
The expanding use of social media platforms to organize and internationally
amplify domestic protest has spurred a vast new literature on the importance of
new media for citizens to voice grievances and advance democratic processes
from the bottom upwards (for an overview, see Castells, 2012). At the same
time, governments are becoming increasingly sophisticated in controlling the
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domestic internet infrastructure to their own advantage. While government-
led censorship of the internet is starting to receive increased attention, the
pervasiveness and effects of network surveillance on repression remain largely
under-researched. More generally speaking, the current literature has failed to
theoretically or empirically address the link between forms of state-implemented
network control and violent state coercion.
2.3.1 Revolution technology?
Recent civilian uprisings from Burma to Iran, to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ have
inspired an exponential increase in research on the role and general significance
of modern communication technology for non-state actors in contentious pol-
itics (see e.g. Rheingold, 2008; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Lotan et al., 2011;
Dewey et al., 2012; Howard and Hussain, 2013a; Browning, 2013). Within this
body of research, digital communication technology and new digital media are
seldom clearly defined, but generally they include the usage of peer-to-peer
online platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, Youtube, and Twitter, and voice
over internet provider services (VoIP, such as Skype), as well as platforms that are
used to collect and aggregate information relevant to protesters (crowd-sourcing).
Mobile phone technology, while pre-dating New Media, is generally included
in this definition, since the appearances of mobile phones capable of accessing
the internet and providing location-based services (known as smartphones) has
somewhat blurred their distinction.
The majority of research forming our current understanding of social media
and civil unrest is based on the analysis of individual cases. Questioning groups
who took part in the Egyptian Tahir Square protest in 2011, Tufekci and Wilson
(2012) find that the majority of participants had learned about the protests via
digital peer-to-peer communication. Furthermore, they find that 48% of all
participants had ‘produced and disseminated video or pictures from political
protest in the streets’ (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012: 373) via social media. They
conclude that organization via new media platforms, most notably Twitter
and Facebook had a profound impact on the propensity of individuals to join
protests. In a study on the recent Tunisian revolution, Breuer, Landman and
Farquhar (forthcoming) identify a number of reasons for why social media acted
as an important ‘catalyst’ for mobilizing protesters. The new media provided
an opportunity for digitally active users to maintain a constant information
supply when the traditional media was being censored by the government, and
it also acted as an important platform for different protest groups to coordinate
and structure their anti-government campaigns effectively. In addition, posting
invitations and successes of the protest movement online attracted further
supporters, and lastly, documenting the government’s coercive response led to a
consolidation of domestic and international sympathy for the protesters. The
availability of social media platforms is thus assumed to be an essential tool for
effectively overcoming collective action problems and coordinating sustained
protests against the backdrop of government-induced information shortages
(Breuer, Landman and Farquhar, forthcoming: 1).
Chowdhury (2008: 8) analyses the crucial role online platforms played in
ensuring the dissemination of critical information during the Saffron revolution
in Burma, where the Burmese government heavily censored conventional news
outlets. He emphasises the importance of citizen journalists in countries where
2.3 Communication technology and contentious politics 15
the traditional media is heavily censored and controlled by the government. Up-
holding the flow of information is not only crucial for the domestic population,
it also keeps the international community informed. He argues that:
‘[t]here were far fewer deaths in [Burma in] 2007 than there were
in 1988. It is possible that the Internet saved the lives of many
protestors, because the Junta feared even greater criticism from
images of troops killing monks and civilians. The presence of the
Internet in a dictatorial regime may save lives.’ (Chowdhury, 2008:
14).
Howard and Hussain (2011) review the role of the digital media during the
first uprisings of what has become known as the Arab Spring, and conclude that
modern communication technology provided the means for localised grievances
to gain a collective and structured momentum that helped mobilise hundreds
of thousands of people. Furthermore, they conclude that opposition groups
are dependent on the international recognition, and access to the internet has
facilitated the task of reaching out to foreign governments and international
NGOs considerably (Howard and Hussain, 2011: 44). The role of information
technology thus moves beyond being an aid for revolutionary ignition, it is
assumed to also help legitimise such processes in the long-run by providing
platforms for opposition groups to position themselves favourably in front of
the international community (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).
Moving from protests to armed rebellions, Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013)
study cross-sectional effects of mobile network availability on the propensity for
regional violent events. Analyzing cell phone coverage across African countries
they find that locations with better access to wireless phone networks display
higher numbers of violent events.2 Taking a closer look at the insurgent side
of internal conflict, the authors argue that cohesive rebellious activities are a
challenge to coordinate – especially when groups are secretly operating across
different locations – and therefore strongly benefit from the availability of cheap
communication tools (Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013: 210).
Evidence from the violent unrests following the 2007 elections in Kenya
adds a further explanatory layer of understanding to this process. Goldstein
and Rotich (2008) investigate the use of mobile phones in the aftermath of the
elections and find that they were not only used to coordinate violent events,
they were also used to incite ethnic hatred. All across Kenya, citizens received
text messages on their mobile phones motivating them to stand up and voice
their dissatisfaction with the way the elections had been conducted. Goldstein
and Rotich (2008: 8) recall one of the messages, which read:
“Fellow Kenyans, the Kikuyu’s have stolen our children’s future...we
must deal with them in a way they understand...violence.” (Goldstein
and Rotich, 2008: 8).
The use of media platforms to incite ethnic hatred is nothing new, one of the most
prominent examples being the role of radio announcements in the Rwandan
genocide (Kellow and Steeves, 1998), but the degree of precision with which
individuals can be targeted by messages sent directly to their mobile phones is,
2Shapiro and Weidmann (forthcoming) highlight a potential weakness: Violent events are
equally more likely to be reported where communication is facilitated by mobile networks.
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however, new. Goldstein and Rotich (2008) also discuss the critical role citizen
journalists took on during the crisis, by providing uncensored information when
the national newspapers ceased to report about events on the ground.
Shapiro and Weidmann (forthcoming) argue that from the position of
governments, increased networking opportunities also increase the possibility
of civilians unwittingly sharing knowledge about planned opposition attacks
with state forces, thus throttling rebellious actions. Analyzing cell phone usage
in the Iraqi conflict, they find that insurgent violence is significantly lower
where increased mobile communication is available. The availability of digital
communication technology thus affects the information flow of both government
and non-government actors. It can help non-traditional citizen journalists to
have their voice heard in larger contentious discourses, where state forces are
censoring traditional media outlets. It can also assist governments in gathering
information shared by ordinary citizens concerning the location and planned
activities of armed non-state actors or terrorist organizations.
The recent popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have
generated enormous interest in the role being played by new digital media in
organizing local protest and rebellion. However, very little is known about how
the regimes facing such challenges to the status quo use these new technologies
to their own advantage.
2.3.2 Censorship in the digital age
Censorship, generally defined as the prohibition or partial suppression of the
freedom of expression and freedom of the media, forms an integral part of
restrictive and repressive state behaviour (Van Belle, 1997; Shadmehr and Bern-
hardt, 2013; Lorentzen, 2014). The focus in this dissertation is on censorship
- restrictions, disruptions, and filtering - of the internet, and with it the new
digital media.
Repressive governments have a long history of using nuanced, proactive
methods of censoring online content that is deemed hazardous to maintaining
their status quo (see MacKinnon, 2012). Case evidence indicates that incumbent
regimes try to limit the potential for collective organization via the internet by
manipulating and censoring information. For example, during the 2009 uprising,
the Iranian government allegedly disrupted internet access in the immediate
aftermath of the elections (Aday, Farrell and Lynch, 2010: 20-21). Furthermore,
SMS text-messaging was blocked during the entire election period (ibid.).
More recent examples of this process can be found in Libya and Egypt,
where the internet was cut off in response to anti-government demonstrations
in 2011 in both countries (Edmond, 2011). In September 2013, in the midst of
anti-government protests which were sparked over fuel prices, Sudan responded
by disconnecting its citizens from the internet (Madory, 2013), and the Central
African Republic witnessed brief intermissions of all internet connections in the
midst of ongoing violent clashes in December 2013. Burma’s regime shut off all
connections in response to the monks’ protests in 2008, and China proceeded to
take its Xinjiang province offline during ethnic riots in 2009 (MacKinnon, 2012:
51). The use of internet limitations and outages by Assad’s regime in Syria adds
yet another case to the list of governments busy tightening the screws on their
control of digital networks.
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State control of the internet is widespread and growing, and can broadly be
divided into three categories, or generations of control (Deibert and Rohozinski,
2010). The first generation presents the most basic form of consistently blocking
content, while the second generation is more dynamic, case-specific, and the
third generation involves more subtle ways of warantless surveillance and
normative campaigns against critical information (ibid.). These three generations
of network control types are not mutually exclusive, and can all occur within
the same country, albeit at different points in time. First-generation controls are
generally understood as the constant, static form of blocking full or partial access
to the internet (Deibert, 2008). Examples of countries known for this type of
censorship are Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia. In technical terms, these persistent blocking efforts are implemented by
‘blocking access to servers, domains, keywords, and IP addresses’ (Deibert and
Rohozinski, 2010: 22).
In contrast, second-generation controls lend themselves to a more dynamic
management of internet control. Deibert and Rohozinski (2010: 24-25) contend
that many states have taken to implementing legal standards as to when, and
under what circumstances, content can be blocked in the domestic cyberspace.
The means by which second-generation controls are implemented are frequently
not that different from those used in the first generation, but the blocking
now occurs under political pretense, such as national and technical security
interests. However, these pretense controls tend to require a higher level of
technical sophistication, as they are implemented dynamically , termed “‘just-
in-time” or event-based denial of selected content or services’ by Deibert and
Rohozinski (2010: 25). What this means is that most of contemporary online
censorship springs into action when and where the state perceives itself to
be under imminent threat, such as during protests, strikes, or in post-election
periods.
Event-based disruptions in response to perceived threats bring with them
a range of strategic advantages, which will be discussed in more detail in
section 3.2. One basic advantage these second-generation disruptions have over
the static first-generation disruptions, is that because they are shorter in terms
of duration, they can more easily be passed off as technical errors, or at least
provide governments with grounds for plausibly denying active involvement in
the disruption (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010: 25). Nevertheless, in the majority
of cases, specialists have been able to uncover the link to the government (Deibert,
2008, 2009, 2010).
The number of countries using second-generation internet controls is grow-
ing (Deibert, 2009), and in general these appear to also be the ones most afraid
of their control being challenged through online protest mobilization, although
the evidence collected to date is neither systematic nor complete (Deibert and
Rohozinski, 2010: 28-29). These findings are reinforced in recent research
by Lorentzen (2014), who provides a formal model for the logic of strategic
censorship in authoritarian regimes, and asserts that such governments will only
be motivated to censor the news when domestic unrest is prevalent, whereas
censoring can be relaxed in peaceful times (Lorentzen, 2014: 403).
The risk of virtual communication inciting political unrest is corroborated by
the behaviour of other non-democratic governments, the most prominent being
China. In a large-scale quantitative analysis of social media censorship, King,
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Pan and Roberts (2013) find that censoring in China is only aimed at comments
and posts that could motivate collective action or advance the coordination
of protests. In contrast, content criticising the government or its policies is
not censored as it is not deemed threatening to the status quo. The level of
sophistication involved in capturing and removing these specific statements
suggests that the Chinese government perceives action-inciting comments as an
actual threat to the regime’s stability.
Third-generation network controls diverge fundamentally from the idea
of actively censoring information, and instead focus on ‘counterinformation
campaigns [as well as the] active use of surveillance and data mining’ (Deibert
and Rohozinski, 2010: 27). Analyzing the modes of control in Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the afore-mentioned authors find that
highly authoritarian states are more likely to use traditional content-blocking
to censor their cyberspace, whereas more democratic countries opt for less
intrusive, surveillance-based approaches. The surveillance-based approaches
will be discussed in more detail in the next section on digital state surveillance.
An extreme form of digital government censorship is the practice of shutting
down entire domestic internet and cell phone services for shorter periods
of time (see Deibert, 2008). Since these short-term disruptions are generally
intended to address a specific political or social issue considered threatening to
the government, they can be understood as part of second-generation internet
controls. Howard, Agarwal and Hussain (2011) document 556 network outages
between 1995 and 2011, across the world, with more than half of them occurring
in authoritarian regimes. Their analysis suggests democratic governments
generally shutdown internet access in an attempt to combat child pornography
or other forms of overtly sexual online content. Authoritarian regimes, on the
other hand, most frequently disrupt their networks in response to perceived
national security issues, such as social and political unrest, or under the banner
of moral or religious integrity and modesty (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain,
2011: 225). Since the regime type of a country is not directly related to the level
of violent abuse the state exercises against its citizens, it is not entirely clear how
the implementation of internet disruptions is related to the use of violence.
2.3.3 Digital surveillance, or ‘dataveillance’
With the rise of peer-to-peer communication, digital control of the internet has
taken on an important additional dimension, which is the extensive use of state
surveillance of online communication and content exchange (Deibert, 2010).
State surveillance can be defined as:
‘the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for
purposes of influence, management, protection or direction. Surveil-
lance directs its attention [...] to individuals [...] it is deliberate and
depends on certain protocols and techniques. [...] digital devices
only increase the capacities of surveillance or, sometimes, help foster
particular kinds of [it]’ (Lyon, 2009: 14-15).
The rise of digital technologies has profoundly changed the capacity of
states to surveil individuals, groups, and now even entire populations. The
changes in state surveillance have gone so far, that they have on occasion been
termed ‘dataveillance’ (Lyon, 2009: 16), referring to the large amounts of data
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that are generated and stored in the process of surveilling individuals and their
interactions with each other. Governments now have the ability to digitally
register and store extensive details about individuals, such as their location,
their friends, colleagues, consumption histories, fingerprints, and more recently,
even DNA and fingerprints (Lyon, 2009). Monitored communication via SMS,
email and social media platforms furthermore allows governments to not only
construct dynamic profiles of individuals, but also to build a dynamic network
model of groups and their information exchange across spatial, temporal, and
topical dimensions.
The growing prevalence of invasive, warantless digital surveillance prompted
the United Nations General Assembly to adopt Resolution 68/167 on the right
to privacy in the digital age (UN, 2013). In June 2014, the United Nations
Human Rights Office (OHCHR) issued an extensive report on the human rights
implications of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance (Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014). The report reiterates the
growing ability of governments and companies to digitally monitor citizens all
over the world:
‘The State now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, in-
vasive, targeted and broad-scale surveillance than ever before’ (Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014:
3).
Although the topic of unlawful interceptions and digital state surveillance
of individuals and groups has received increased attention at the level of in-
ternational human rights law, the subject remains largely under-researched in
the field of state repression and political violence. The opportunities for states
to use (or abuse) the information they gain from digital surveillance to target
individuals and groups they deem threatening to the political status quo are,
however, more than evident. In fact, the information exchange observable via
social media platforms allows governments to not only identify those deemed
most threatening to their own political survival, it also offers them informa-
tion about the friends, followers and fellow activists who are most likely to
sympathise with the dissidents’ actions and beliefs.
Given all the advantages of internet surveillance in identifying targets, it has
at least one major drawback for governments. In order to successfully monitor its
citizens, a state needs to provide a high degree of internet accessibility for online
interaction to actually take place. This in turns opens up the opportunity for
citizens to use the connective strengths of social media to their own advantage.
2.4 Summary
Existing approaches to explain the occurrence and nature of state coercion in
light of domestic dissent have failed to integrate the use of digital control into
their theoretical models. This is particularly astonishing given the vast increase
in literature on the way in which the new digital media has altered the dynamics
of contemporary protest movements.
This chapter introduced definitions of state repression, coercion, and the char-
acteristics of internet control through censorship and internet control through
surveillance. I reviewed the literature on the main explanations for when and
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why states use coercion against their own citizens. The role of the digital me-
dia in affecting contentious politics was discussed, focussing on research that
demonstrates how non-state actors have benefitted from increased coordination
and collaboration opportunities. I then presented an overview of different forms
of internet control currently used by governments, and suggested how they are
linked to states’ goals of consolidation and maintenance of political power.
The next chapter introduces the main theoretical framework of the dis-
sertation, which investigates the logic of digital censorship, through internet
restrictions vs. the use of digital surveillance, through internet provision. It
concludes with a discussion of the implications for state-sanctioned violence




In this chapter, I present a theoretical framework that links the logic of state-
implemented internet controls to the use of strategic, violent coercion. The
theoretical approach is built on the assumptions made by existing rationalist
decision-making models concerning state behaviour (Lichbach, 1987; Most and
Starr, 1989; Poe, 2004). Governments faced with a domestic threat that is
perceived to be either greater to their own perceived strength, or growing in
comparison to their own perceived strength, will have an incentive to take action
in order to regain control and maintain the status quo of political authority. The
two policy options available to governments that are under consideration here,
are the use of internet controls and the use of violent state coercion. Both policy
options can be used to affect a behavioural change in the individuals or groups
perceived to be threatening. For example, states can cut all domestic internet
access (which means censorship), or they can choose to maintain internet access
and monitor a specific group of individuals assumed to be dissidents (which
means surveillance). Likewise, they can opt for an escalation of violence, by
attacking and killing protesters indiscriminately, or they can choose to single
out specific individuals deemed threatening and eliminate them in a targeted
manner. In responding to perceived domestic threats, the government’s choice of
coercive strategy is unavoidably linked to the choice of internet control strategy.
As will be discussed in more detail later, the two are linked because the choice
of internet control strategy (censorship vs surveillance) inevitably limits the use
of some forms of coercion and enables the use of other forms.
I argue that the violent implications of state-led internet controls can only be
fully investigated if we differentiate between different types of network control
and different types of strategic coercion. In short, modern-day governments faced
with digitally mobilized citizens are presented with a fundamental trade-off:
they can either censor their citizens’ access to digital channels of mobilization, by
restricting internet access, or they can provide this access and use the information
gleaned from surveilling these channels to their own advantage. Both strategies
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provide attractive benefits, but also come at considerable cost. I argue that the
implications for a state’s coercive strategy will be dependent on this tradeoff.
Where governments restrict network access, they will also be more likely to
employ broader, more indiscriminate campaigns of violence against their own
population. In contrast, maintaining network connections in order to digitally
surveil citizens will more likely be used where states are interested in identifying
specific, individual threats, and therefore incidences of highly targeted state
terror will be more prevalent.
Unlike the more traditional notion of restricting content through censorship,
digital surveillance is based on the idea of gathering critical content through
free-flowing information exchange among individuals. This distinction is both
conceptually and empirically important, and has received much less attention in
the literature on state-implemented internet control than the traditional forms
of content blocking and filtering. Conceptually, state censorship rests on the
idea that certain forms of information need to be banned from the public due
to their potential for inciting dangerous actions among the population. Digital
surveillance, in contrast, pre-requires a certain level of network access so that
individuals can exchange their ideas and plans online, which the state then
monitors and analyses.
To give an example, assume that a group of activists are planning an anti-
government demonstration. A censorship strategy would assume that the protest
can only be successful if the activists are able to reach out to fellow citizens via
online social media platforms, and motivate them to join the demonstrations.
Shutting down accessibility to these platforms should – according to this logic –
reduce the successfulness and size of such a demonstration. Alternatively, states
might decide to make use of digital surveillance. For surveillance to work, the
activists would have to reach out to their fellow citizens via social media in order
for the state to monitor the potential number of protesters, and register each
individual’s name, location, level of motivation to participate, and – if possible –
history of anti-government activities. In the following section, I discuss the logic
of these two different strategies of network control in more detail, and provide
arguments about their constraining and enabling effect on the choice of violent,
coercive strategy.
3.2 The logic of internet censorship
Disrupting full or partial access to the internet is, in itself, a policy that is low-
cost, and quick to implement. Temporary digital blackouts can be excused as
technical failures, giving governments – at least for a short time – the possibility
to plausibly deny active involvement.
The benefits of this low-cost policy option are manifold. First, cutting digital
communication channels is likely to significantly complicate the exchange of
information that is critical of the government, making it increasingly hard for
individuals to assess the extent to which fellow citizens are also frustrated with
the political status quo. Second, the sudden absence of previously employed
social media platforms means the collective organisation of dissent must revert
back to slower forms of communication, which can lead to significant delays
and inefficiencies for protest movements. Additionally, short-term disruptions
of what citizens have come to regard as an integral part of a state’s information
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infrastructure provide an unmistakeable signal of ‘who is in charge’ of state
power and control. Where governments make no secret of their censoring
activities, timely disruptions (and the subsequent lifting thereof) also act as a
punishment for a population that has dared to challenge the status quo. Lastly,
in situations where governments are faced with armed internal challengers, such
as an insurgency, or a terrorist group, the unexpected interruption of internet
access can stifle these groups’ military capabilities, by cutting off their access to
important geographical services, such as Google Earth (see e.g. Keating, 2013).
Inhibiting information exchange
A principal reason why states censor information exchange is their fear that in-
dividuals may realise that a sufficient number of their fellow citizens are equally
unsatisfied with the status quo. This in turn could lead to a lowering of any
inhibition in joining anti-government activities, eventually resulting in serious
challenges to state authority. The ‘informational cascade model’ formalised
by Lohmann (1994: 49) assumes these events to unfold across different stages:
‘(1) People take costly political action to express their dissatisfaction
with the incumbent regime. (2) The public then takes informational
cues from changes in the size of the protest movement over time. (3)
The regime loses public support and collapses if the protest activities
reveal it to be malign.’ (Lohmann, 1994: 49).
States have a vested interest in making the display of these informational cues
as costly as possible, in order to inhibit the occurrence of such cascades (see also
Kuran, 1989), but the rise in information exchange across social media platforms
has evidently dramatically lowered these costs for anyone connected to the
internet (Edmond, 2011; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Little, 2014). Restricting
the exchange of information to avoid widespread diffusion during the critical
second stage identified by Lohmann, can be a rational and easily implementable
strategy for governments.
Inhibiting collective organisation
Collective organisation and coordination, as the previously discussed studies
show, have dramatically been facilitated through the help of the interactive ‘2.0’
internet. Evidence by King, Pan and Roberts (2014) on digital censorship in
China also demonstrates that the power of ‘connective action’ (Bennett and
Segerberg, 2013) is something governments fear even more than the mere
exchange of information.
Thus, shutting down the internet for short periods of time not only stifles
the spread of anti-government information, it also prevents individuals from
collectively organising themselves, and from maintaining order and discipline
during concerted protest actions. In addition, this disorder can give governments
a reason to violently intervene to ‘restore’ order. If the disruption of digital
communication channels is unexpected, governments have the advantage of
surprising their opponents who have to regroup and coordinate activity via
channels not dependent on the internet.
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Signalling power and immediate punishment
The denial of basic services, such as electricity, water, waste removal and policing,
can be an effective way to demonstrate governments’ position of power towards
political challengers. In the digital era, internet access has joined the list of basic
services now open to state manipulation.
Where political challengers are gaining momentum in voicing their concerns
about the legitimacy and credibility of incumbent regimes, displays of power and
control can be an effective way to remind the domestic population of who has the
capability to deny them basic infrastructural needs. Shutting down the internet
in light of oppositional threats can thus act as an impressive demonstration of
power, and equally important, of willingness to use it if need be.
Restriction of access to basic services also serves as a form of punishment for
the broader population for allowing and possibly even supporting the formation
of an opposition group that threatens the government. As with declarations
of states of emergency, such as the Emergency Law under which Egypt was
ruled for almost half a decade prior to the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, the denial
of basic infrastructure can be blamed on threats to national security and the
necessity for preventing any further harm.
State-imposed internet shutdowns are timely reminders of the de facto power
of ruling governments, and can send a clear signal to the domestic population
that further opposition activities are seen as a threat and will, in return, be
heavily punished.
Inhibiting opposition capabilities
Governments faced with armed internal rebellion have a particular incentive
to cut internet connections, and that is the stifling of the opposition’s military
capability. Recent conflicts in Libya and Syria provide extensive footage of
opposition fighters using online mapping services, such as Google Earth and
Google Maps, to accurately locate military targets, and to calibrate weapons
to effectively reach said targets (Miller, 2012; Brownstone, 2011; Keating, 2013).
New developments in geographical location systems made for personal use on
devices such as smartphones and tablets have revolutionized the capacity to
locate and target regime forces, with a level of precision that was not available a
decade ago.
Cutting these connections will provide an operational advantage for state
military and pro-government militas over oftentimes less well-equipped and
ill-trained insurgent groups.
The cost of censorship
After demonstrating their ability and willingness to shut down internet services,
states might perceive themselves as being powerful. However, a population
that relies on the internet for both personal and professional reasons might
soon become increasingly skeptical of a government that cuts them off from
these channels. Worse, the denial of these basic services might even make a
government appear to be somewhat desperate. Evidence suggests that following
the outages which Egypt faced in 2011, an increasing number of protesters took
to the streets all across the country, in order to demonstrate against Mubarak’s
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regime (Hassanpour, 2013). When Turkey’s government decided to merely block
access to Twitter in April 2014, the response was a national and international
rallying of protests against Prime Minister Erdogan (Tufekci, 2014). Obstructing,
or even just partly restricting accessibility can actually provide incentives for a
neutral population to participate in anti-government protest. Ethan Zuckerman
describes this effect in his ‘cute cat theory’, which suggests that:
‘[i]nternet tools designed to let ordinary consumers publish non-
political content are often useful for activists because they are difficult
for governments to censor without censoring innocuous content;
because censorship of inoffensive content can alert non-activist users
to government censorship.’ (Zuckerman, forthcoming: 2).
Overly ambitious network disruptions to prohibit the organisation and
coordination of a few select dissidents, may quickly dispel the illusion of freedom
for the majority of internet users, in turn reinforcing the attention given to
activists and broadening their platform. The restriction on network access might
in effect provide the final impetus for ordinary citizens to take to the streets and
protest against repressive government policies.
A further important drawback to shutting down the information access for
the opposition, is that it also affects the state’s own ability to gather intelligence
about the nature and characteristics of the protesters. To effectively target inter-
nal threats, governments are largely dependent on intelligence that they collect
through tip-offs from their civilian supporters, and through the monitoring of
the actions and declared intentions of dissidents. As soon as these dissidents
are no longer able to communicate online, states automatically have a harder
time monitoring the opposition’s plans and location. Furthermore, the lack of
network access prevents supporters from providing critical information to the
government.
Network disruptions can quickly attract huge international interest, as hap-
pened during the recent banning of Instagram in Hongkong, and the short-term
ban on Twitter in Turkey. The outcry across the world, in particular on social
media, was enormous when the internet was shut down in Syria, Libya, and
Egypt. If social media is prohibited with the aim of reducing collaboration
and coordination among domestic elites, then shutting down the entire internet
supply might have the reverse effect of rallying further anti-government sup-
porters. Since the international elite are connected around the globe via social
media, the sudden blackout of information from a certain country might even
produce a boomerang effect, whereby elites in other countries pressure their
own government to condemn the actions in the repressive state (see Keck and
Sikkink, 1998).
Lastly, but no less important are the economic losses that are associated with
internet outages. When the Mubarak regime shut down internet services for
five days in 2011, the Egyptian economy lost an estimated $90 million worth of
revenues (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011: 231). This figure only includes
direct losses in revenues due to the absence of internet and phone services, it
does not include the shutdown of general communication services, such as those
generated by tourism cites, call centers and e-commerce, as well as potential
losses on investment in the aftermath of the blackout (see OECD, 2011).
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Implications for coercive strategy
While the technical implementation of disruptions provides a relatively cheap
policy option, the repercussions of cutting off internet access can clearly prove
to be dangerously costly for the government. There are two main arguments
that suggest why governments using internet disruptions in light of domestic
threats will implement them in conjunction with violent coercive strategies that
are larger in scale and indiscriminate in terms of whom they target.
First, from a government’s perspective, the benefits of disruptions – namely
gaining organisational and operational advantages over the opposition – will
only be worth the costs, in situations where it perceives the domestic political
threat to be large. Where a critical mass of citizens has already taken to the
street and collectively organised a substantial amount of internal resistance and
support, disrupting the internet can act as an immediate attempt to limit further
diffusion of the protests, and prevent them from turning into population-wide
uprisings. Where only a small portion of a domestic population is seen as
challenging the status quo, the disruption of the internet would likely only lead
to increased attention for those waging the anti-government campaign, and
the disruptive response by the state could even lead to further support and
solidarity with the protest movement.
Clearly, restrictions to digital communication only make sense if the ex-
pected support and solidarity that might possibly be generated towards anti-
government groups in light of disruptions is negligible, when compared to
the damage it is expected to cause to the opposition’s capabilities to organise.
This will most likely occur where the opposition has already reached a critical
size and requires reliable communication channels to maintain its strength and
momentum. The decision to visibly respond to critical domestic threats via
a demonstration of control in the form of internet restrictions, suggests that
a government is resolved and willing to counterattack the opposition with a
heavy hand. As research on the logic of violence in civil conflict has revealed,
state violence is likely to be indiscriminate in terms of who it targets where the
state perceives the majority of its population as a threat (Valentino, Huth and
Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Kalyvas, 2006).
The second reason that suggests internet disruptions will be accompanied by
larger, indiscriminate campaigns of coercion relates to the constraining effects
of the outage itself. Where a government has opted for the use of internet
disruptions to avert further spread of unrest, it has simultaneously limited its
own access to crucial intelligence significantly. Not only are anti-government
groups barred from organising online, state forces now also lack access to
this information. In addition, loyal civilian supporters of the government are
prohibited from sharing knowledge about developments on the ground with
them. In short, states sabotage their own access to information on the identity
and location of the most ‘dangerous’ dissidents. The use of violence will
inadvertently become increasingly indiscriminate.
Where states perceive the threat from opposition movements - regardless
of whether these are armed or not - to be large, disrupting internet accessi-
bility presents a somewhat desperate measure to avert further damage. Once
the choice for active network disruptions has been made, and the technical
implementation is completed, the options for using violence will be severely
limited: without up-to-date intelligence on the developments of anti-government
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activists, the government has less opportunity and capability to locate and target
those individuals deemed most threatening. Strategies of violence employed by
the state are then more likely to affect the domestic population indiscriminately,
than to target dissidents individually.
3.3 The logic of internet surveillance
The technical means available for states to digitally surveil their population are
manifold. Specialised software that allows governments to remotely intercept
all online traffic by individual users (or groups) is sold by a variety of different
companies, many of which are based in Europe and North America. For
example, the Gamma International Group is based in the United Kingdom and
Germany, and is best known for selling a product called FinFisher that provides
governments around the world with a full surveillance toolkit (Wagner and
Guarnieri, 2014).1 Some governments employ their own software writers (or
‘hackers’) to produce spying software, also known as so-called spyware. Spyware
is software that is designed for the use of spying on individuals or organizations.
Governments also make use of software which is referred to as ‘trojans’ or
‘trojan horses’, which is generally distributed in the form of files or website links
that, when executed, grant remote (and usually hidden) access to the user’s
device and information (see, e.g. Galperin, Marquis-Boire and Scott-Railton,
2013; Marczak et al., 2014).
The rising prevalence of surveillance being used for political purposes was
discussed in a recent report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, which states that digital surveillance is frequently used to
specifically target political dissidents and members of the opposition (Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014: 3). To
achieve full surveillance, some countries have even passed mandatory laws for
all owners of personal computers to install special software intended to filter
politically sensitive content (ibid.).
Digital surveillance of entire populations, in particular of those identified as
potential threats, is a highly rational policy option for governments who fear
for their political survival. The fact that a vast amount of communication and
generated information has been relegated to the digital world has made this
form of surveillance increasingly lucrative in terms of the quality and quantity of
information governments are able to track and (ab)use. The data gleaned from
tracking online conversations can help identify dissidents in an early and precise
way, providing governments with an opportunity to ‘scotch’ dissidents’ activities
before they grow and diffuse. Where protest does erupt, surveilling the entire
population’s response to it can help anticipate the potential for future dissent
1Global Voices Online reports that a recent inquiry to the German parliament revealed
that between 2003 and 2013, German surveillance software was officially sold to Albania,
Argentina, Chile, India, Indonesia, Qatar, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco,
Mexico, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Singapore, Taiwan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, the United States of America, and the United Arab Emirates (see Wagner
and Guarnieri, 2014). A detailed overview of German surveillance technology exports, can
be found in a recent report in Der Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
deutsche-spaehtechnik-gabriels-ausfuhrkontrollen-bleiben-wirkungslos-a-987555.
html.
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and assess how the protests are received at large. In contrast to the censorship
methods previously discussed, surveillance requires internet accessibility.
Yet another aspect which states may consider: consistently ensuring access
to a medium that is actively used for entertainment purposes, and that can be
influenced by government ideology, is likely to foster a certain complacency
about political issues in the broader population. Instances where states partially
reveal their monitoring activities – in an attempt to signal their capacity – can
also deter collective action by encouraging self-censorship.
Identifying dissidents
Knowing where the perceived threat is coming from, and who constitutes the
most ‘dangerous’ members of it is a crucial component for governments who
are resolved to stay in power. For this reason, autocratic regimes build extensive
and powerful intelligence branches within their security services, such as the
Staatssicherheit in the former German Democratic Republic, or the KGB in the
former Soviet Union. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation,
prior to the expansion of mobile communication technology and the internet,
the surveillance capacities of governments, while frequently pervasive, were
very costly as they required an intense usage of human resources. Only a
limited number of wiretaps were technically feasible, and secret service agents
were frequently relegated to physically eavesdropping on those identified as
potentially threatening.
The digital revolution has vastly shrunk the costs in this field, which means
that states can now follow the communication and production of online commen-
tary by a far greater number of people than was previously possible. Individuals
who are active in writing critical articles about the government and posting
them online can now be identified almost immediately, and their interaction and
connection with other activists recorded and analysed. Geographically locating
individuals through tracing their IP addresses or the signals from their mobile
phones has become a routine operation, and frequently leads to the arrest of
online activists. State authorities across the world, including in countries such as
Vietnam, Russia, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia, routinely harass and arrest bloggers
for voicing critical opinions on government policies or conduct. In many cases,
these arrests occur before any of these activists have even launched activities
outside of the digital world (see Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014).
It is clear that in today’s world, digital surveillance offers important and
tempting opportunities for governments to gather timely and precise information
on the identity of potentially threatening activists and dissidents.
Anticipating future dissent
The production of social media content has, to a certain extent, become a mirror
of real-life, in that the number and nature of online commentaries tends to vary
with actual events happening on the ground (Zeitzoff, 2011). Challenges to a
state’s political authority, for example through the display of riots or protests,
will quickly become the subject of discussions in the online world. Using digital
surveillance to closely monitor the attitudes of the broader population towards
both the challenger’s actions, and the government’s initial reaction, offers an
important barometer of a society’s general disposition towards the contemporary
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political climate. Use of the information exchanged on social media to build
network models of interaction between current and potential dissidents has been
a strategy used by governments in countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Egypt,
to name a few.
A principal problem for authoritarian regimes is that they tend to suppress
mass opinion for so long that they end up without a clear understanding of
the political attitudes held by the majority of their population. Lorentzen (2013)
argues that consolidated authoritarian regimes actually have an incentive to
permit local protest at fairly regular intervals in order to gather information
about political dissatisfaction. In a simliar way, monitoring the broader public’s
reaction towards minor protests can significantly enhance the governments
understanding of potential grievances simmering at the surface of the population;
discontent might turn into a critical threat if not countered in a targeted way.
Opium for the masses
The arguments presented up to this point have largely been concerned with the
political potential of the internet, but it should not be forgotten that the majority
of users across the world use it as a source of entertainment (Zuckerman,
forthcoming). Research on the consumption of Western media in the German
Democratic Republic demonstrated that citizens in authoritarian regimes may,
to a large extent, be perfectly content so long as they are permitted to use
these ‘controversial’ media sources and modes of entertainment (Kern and
Hainmueller, 2009), something Kern and Hainmueller (2009: 377) refer to as
‘Opium for the masses’. In a recent study on the power of mass media in stifling
the risk of civil war, Warren (2014: 112-113) argues that regimes intent on staying
in power can use mass media platforms to advance their own political ideology,
and hereby make use of a wide array of tools, such as images signalling powerful
leaders, that should increase popular support among the broader population.
Although the internet can also be used as a tool to transport state-controlled
media content, it is far from being as streamlined as traditional mass media.
However, research suggests that a large proportion of autocratic regimes have
been able to consolidate their power with the expansion of internet accessibil-
ity (Rød and Weidmann, forthcoming); an indication that political elites seem to
have been successful in transmitting their political agenda via these channels.
When faced with the trade-off between internet restrictions and surveillance
through network provision, the importance of internet accessibility to foster
complacency should not be under-estimated.
Signalling power
Lastly, states can partially reveal their surveillance capabilities to selected parts of
the population in order to communicate their ability and power. When in January
2014 protesters on Kiev’s central independence square Maidan Nezalezhnosti
received a text message that they had been recorded as participants in a mass
disturbance (Murphy, 2014), the government was sending a clear signal of power
by revealing that they were monitoring their challengers.
In short, the partial revelation of surveillance techniques in and of itself be-
comes a repressive measure meant to threaten and deter further anti-government
activity. The message sent implies that the government not only knows who
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is challenging it, but that it has identified these challengers as a threat, and is
willing and able to take action against them. The knowledge of surveillance and
its consequences is intended to actively encourage self-censorship among the
population.
The cost of surveillance
Digital surveillance is evidently a powerful tool that has the potential to coun-
teract anti-government activity before it diffuses extensively, and at the same
deter action by those who know they are being watched. Digital surveillance,
however, comes at a high price: it cannot be effective where the internet is
excessively restricted. Unrestricted access to the internet, in turn, provides
opposition groups with all the advantages and potential so heavily discussed by
Social Media enthusiasts (see Diamond and Plattner, 2012).
States are faced with a trade-off of either restricting and censoring the
internet, or permitting access to it while monitoring all content creation and
exchange for potential threats.
Implications for coercive strategy
Digital surveillance via the internet is powerful, but can heavily backfire in
cases where the strategic advantages gained by opposition groups outweigh the
usefulness of the information gleaned from monitoring them. Two arguments
suggest why governments making use of digital surveillance will likely make
use of targeted, individualised strategies of violent coercion.
First, monitoring and identifying dissent is useful when and where govern-
ments perceive a threat to be increasing without having reached a full critical
momentum. Where the threat is not yet fully visible, surveillance data can
play a critical role in identifying and locating those initiating dissenting action.
Once opposition groups have become institutionalised with accepted leaders
who speak freely and openly for the entire group, covert information becomes
openly available; the added value of surveillance decreases in comparison to the
benefits gained from disrupting network accessibility. In concerted efforts to
counter growing domestic threats, digital surveillance is likely to be most effec-
tive when used in conjunction with targeted acts of localised violence against
those identified as critical to the protesters’ future success.
Second, during periods of intense surveillance, the collection of highly
specified intelligence on the intentions and location of critical players in anti-
government movements enables state violence to be more targeted and tailored
towards individuals. Digital surveillance during full internet accessibility is












Network Restriction Network Provision
inhibit collective organization identify targets (precise & early)
Benefits for the inhibit capability analyse networks of dissidents/protesters
government inhibit information cascades survey attitudes (potential threats)
punishment (access denial) foster complacency
Potential costs depreciated credibility information exchange & collective action
economic loss (international & domestic) audience costs
full network shutdown spyware (trojans & malware)
Technical means* partial restrictions remote control systems (interception)
[*non-exhaustive list] content filtering & blocking geographical (locating & tracking)
network analysis, change detection
⇓ ⇓
Implications for high-intensity, indiscriminate (untargeted) targeted, individualised use of force
coercive strategy display of force
Table 3.1. Network control and implications for coercive strategy
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3.4 Summary: Network control and violent coercion as
concerted strategy
The choice between internet restrictions, leading to active censorship, and
internet provision, which can be used for digital surveillance purposes presents
states with a fundamental trade-off that ultimately constrains them in their
choice of coercive strategy. This chapter has provided a first theoretical entry
point to investigating the logic of either of these strategies of internet control,
and has suggested a mechanism by which they are both linked to different types
of strategies of violent coercion.
The costs and benefits of both censorship and surveillance that were dis-
cussed in detail above, are summarised in Table 3.1, to provide a brief overview.
The rising importance of the digital sphere for individuals and groups in
organising protest against de facto state authority, has turned the internet into
a dangerous tool for governments who are fearful for their own survival. It
has, however, also turned the internet into a powerful source of control for the
government itself. As explored in this chapter, strategies of internet control are
increasingly informing the strategies of state coercion, and the importance of
further research in this field will be critical to understanding repression in the
future.
4
Global evidence: internet control and
coercion
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter established the theoretical underpinnings of this disserta-
tion: states make use of a variety of different forms of network control, which
are subsequently integrated into their larger repressive strategy. I argue that
the choice between network restriction, with its censoring consequences, and
network provision, with its opportunities for surveillance, affects the choice of
coercive strategy used by governments to throttle perceived threats, ranging
from protests, to opposition movements and armed insurgencies.
The current chapter reconciles two empirical approaches to establish prelimi-
nary support for this argument. Section 4.2 presents four brief case examples of
government use of network control. Egypt, Bahrain, Ethiopia, and China were
selected so as to represent a broad variety of government types and varying
successes of securing political stability. Egypt’s government under Mubarak was
overthrown in the wake of protests that largely commenced via social media
organisation. Bahrain’s regime also faced protests, but managed to maintain
its power, not least by using dissidents’ online activities to collect information
on their networks and contacts, which was then used to enforce further arrests.
Ethiopia’s level of internet penetration is among the lowest in the world, and yet
the government has invested significant resources in controlling its network, and
the people using it. Lastly, China’s online infrastructure represents one of the
most sophisticated and resource-intensive systems of closely-linked censorship
and surveillance.
In order to establish the general scope and relevance of network controls in
explaining state’s coercive behaviour, Section 4.3 provides a systematic analysis
of the relationship between internet shutdowns and physical integrity violations
across 171 countries between 1995 and 2010.
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Figure 4.1. Egyptian internet traffic during the shutdown, Jan 25-Feb 5, 2011
(A= 28 January, B= 2 February).
4.2 Four case examples
Egypt
The ousting of Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 has
generally been attributed to the civilian uprisings that commenced in Cairo
in January of the same year (Lynch, 2011). Social Media platforms such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube were heavily frequented by activists and citizens
to facilitate organizing and coordinating protest (Hounshell, 2011; Lotan et al.,
2011; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012).
The Egyptian government’s response to this new ‘threat’ changed from
surveillance to full censorship. To surveil activists, it made use of so-called
deep packet inspection (DPI) technology (Singel, 2011) provided by the US-based
Narus company, which allowed it to monitor all internet traffic throughout
the protests in 2011, including Skype conversations, browsing histories and
electronic messages (ibid.). Digital surveillance was conducted by the Egyptian
State Security Investigation’s Emergency Unit. In a report for Global Voice
Online, Ramy Raoof writes that the Emergency Unit was regularly in charge of
shutting down internet, mobile phone, and sms services in different cities or
regions, blocking access to selected content, monitoring the activities of digitally
active citizens, and of ensuring the swift cooperation of telecommunication
providers (Raoof, 2011: online content).
Details of protesters’ planned activities and locations gleaned from these
data were repeatedly used to arrest and imprison opposition activists. The most
prominently covered case was that of online activist and Google executive Wael
Ghonim, who was arrested and secretly detained by the Egyptian authorities in
January 2011 after being identified as the anonymous administrator of the ‘We
Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook Page (Youmans and York, 2012: 318). Ghonim’s
Facebook Page had been one of the central communication platforms during the
early days of the anti-regime protests in 2010.
On January 28 the regime changed its tactic of surveillance and implemented
a country-wide shutdown of all internet connections. The blackout was imme-
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diately picked up by a number of different services, including Google Traffic.
Figure 4.11 shows the absence of traffic during this five day period. Connections
were supposedly cut in an attempt to quell the spread of growing protests, and
campaigns of violence against anyone participating in the unrest were inten-
sified. The strategy quite obviously backfired and destabilized Mubarak even
further, until he was forced to resign from office (Hassanpour, 2013). While the
protests effected a change of power, the new government continues to arrest and
detain online activists deemed threatening to the new political order (Mackey,
2014).
Bahrain
Despite initial large-scale protests in Bahrain’s capital Manama in 2011 that
were inspired by neighbouring revolutions, the Bahraini Al-Khalifa regime has
managed to maintain its political power. Censorship of the media, as well
as surveillance and arrests of dissidents and human rights activists form a
central part of the Regime’s repressive strategy (HRW, 2014a). Recent research
by Marczak et al. (2014) identifies two types of attacks used against activists
suspected of being involved in dissenting behaviour:
‘The first involved malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a “lawful
intercept” trojan sold exclusively to governments. The second in-
volved specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails designed to reveal
IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous accounts. Some indi-
viduals who apparently clicked on these links were later arrested
[...]’ (Marczak et al., 2014: 3).
The authors were able to identify networks of attacks carried out by the govern-
ment, where the Facebook user credentials from arrested activists were adopted
to access and contact affiliated journalists and campaigners, who were then sent
trojans containing spyware to facilitate targeted surveillance (Marczak et al.,
2014: 5). The Bahraini regime has thus instrumentalised dissidents’ online
support networks as a referral-based information repository to target and arrest
related activists. Figure 4.2 presents the network of surveillance and arrests
identified by Marczak et al. (2014), which exemplifies how such attacks directly
led to arrests of and house raids on government critics.
Ethiopia
Although less than one per cent of more than 90 million Ethiopians have access
to the internet, the government has put in place a sophisticated system to control
all online traffic. In 2011, it created the Information Network Security Agency
(INSA), a part of the national security infrastructure that is steadily gaining
discretionary power (HRW, 2014b: 29). Reporters Without Borders has accused
INSA of being an ‘NSA copycat’2, referring to the agency’s goal of accessing and
monitoring all information Ethiopians exchange in the internet. To do this INSA
has made use of an array of different spying software, including Remote Control
1Google Traffic Transparency Report: https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
traffic/disruptions/30/
2see http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/2014/03/06/ethiopia-full-online-powers/
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Figure 4.2. The ecosystem of Bahrain’s “IP spy” attacks (Figure 2 by Marczak
et al. (2014: 5)).
Systems (RCS)3 and FinSpy interception software also used by the Bahraini
government.
Parallel to its attempted overall surveillance, the Ethiopian government has
repeatedly shut down cell phone and internet access in different regions of
the country. As the state continues to exert full control over the country’s
telecommunication sector, selective disruptions or restrictions in anticipation
of unrests can easily be implemented. In July 2013, Human Rights Watch
interviewed a former Ethiopian government employee who reported:
‘Whenever a demonstration is planned, the telecom service in eastern
Harerghe is cut. During local elections it was cut. During recent
Muslim protests it was cut. It is usually cut from 6 a.m. until
after 2 p.m. Message I would get in Amharic is “for time being
there is no service.” Our network comes and goes all the time, but
as soon as there is a problem for government there is no service
whatsoever.’ (HRW, 2014b: 50).
Human Rights Watch further reports incidences where individuals were geo-
graphically located through their cell phones and arrested for participating in
protests. The location is frequently identified by locating the closest mobile tower
utilised by the individual’s phone to place the last call. Security officials are also
known to harass suspected protesters by calling them multiple, successive times
on their phones to determine which phone tower is receiving quick, successive
phone calls (HRW, 2014b: 52).
3http://www.hackingteam.it/index.php/remote-control-system
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It is clear that such locating strategies only work where the phone net-
work has not previously been disrupted by the government, which means that
potential protesters can either be located and surveilled, or prevented from
communicating with each other, but not both at the same time. The Ethiopian
government has evidently alternated between these two strategies on a frequent
basis.
China
The People’s Republic of China hosts one of the most sophisticated and all-
encompassing systems for content-filtering, surveillance, and censorship in the
world (OpenNet Initiative, 2012). Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other
major websites are blocked, but this does not mean that Chinese citizens do not
make use of Social Media. On the contrary, the country boasts a large number
of domestic networking platforms that are used by the majority of the online
population, including Sina Weibo (offering services similar to Twitter), and
Youku (offering services simliar to YouTube).
The scale of resources that has gone into building a domestic cyber-infrastructure
makes China somewhat ‘irregular’ in its use of strategic censorship and surveil-
lance. While most governments, at least to a certain degree, face a trade these-off
between surveilling and censoring their population, the Chinese government
has built its own infrastructure that allows for surveillance and subsequent
censorship.4 Research by King, Pan and Roberts (2013, 2014) demonstrates
nevertheless that the Chinese government follows a highly strategic and careful
logic of only censoring content that is intended to incite collective organization
or action among the Chinese population. Content that directly criticises policies
or state activities is, in contrast, censored at a much lower rate. The Chinese
government’s careful selection of content to be filtered and its reluctance to
filter criticism against itself (where it involved no ‘calls to action’), offers further
support for the potential drawbacks of censoring content discussed in Chapter 3.
Full censorship of information concerning the government, in particular in
situations where the population is expecting critical discussions of certain events
or policies, is likely to backfire and lead to a loss of credibility on the side of the
state (see also Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2013). Granting citizens a platform to
exchange non-threatening criticism principally supports an illusion of free ex-
pression, strengthening the credibility of the government. The level of criticism
posted online also acts as a barometer for the general level of (dis)satisfaction in
the broader population.
On occasion, the government has, however, taken to more extreme mea-
sures than mere content censoring. In 2009, it proceeded to take its Xinjiang
province offline during ethnic riots (MacKinnon, 2012: 51). Government officials
contented:
‘[w]e cut Internet connection in some areas of Urumqi in order to
quench the riot quickly and prevent violence from spreading to other
places.’ (Official in Xinhua News, quoted in OpenNet Initiative, 2012:
274).
4The simultaneous use of surveillance and censorship by the Chinese authorities is also likely
to increase self-censorship (see Roberts, 2014).
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Others contended that the government had cut the information flow to prevent
reports of widespread arrests and interrogations (OpenNet Initiative, 2012: 274).
The case evidence set out above offers preliminary support for the arguments
put forward in this dissertation: First, governments face a trade-off between
digital censorship and surveillance. Second, digital censorship and surveillance
are integrated into larger strategies of repression, and thus affect the nature of
violent state coercion. The types of internet controls used vary widely across
the cases, and yet all share a certain trait: surveillance methods and disruptions
are linked to the use of violent coercion.
In the next section, I focus on the one observable proxy of internet control
that can most reliably be measured at a global level: the implementation of
restrictions on the internet. To establish the external validity of the main
argument set out in this dissertation, I present evidence from a global analysis
of the relationship between internet disruptions and the level of state-sanctioned
violence.
4.3 Internet disruptions and coercion: a global analysis
Are governments that frequently disrupt domestic network services also more
likely to use state-sanctioned violence against their own citizens? The evidence
presented in this section suggests that in years where governments implement
full or partial network disruptions, they are also significantly more likely to
violate their citizens’ physical integrity rights than in years where they permit
uninterrupted internet access. The relationship is significant, even when taking
into account the most commonly accepted confounders influencing state respect
for human rights.
Internet shutdowns present a visible measure of de facto government net-
work interference, and therefore open themselves to systematic cross-national
analysis. In contrast, surveillance efforts during times of normal network pro-
vision can be conducted in secrecy, making global comparison a challenging
task. The above-mentioned four case examples demonstrate the use of such
surveillance technology in conjunction with state coercion, but since the ma-
jority of spyware and interception tools are, by definition, intended to work in
secrecy, any quantitative cross-national comparison would be seriously flawed.
Consequently, the following analysis aims at establishing empirical support for
theoretical argument that network disruptions are likely to occur in conjunction
with larger, indiscriminate campaigns of coercive violence exercised by the
government against its population, as presented in detail in Chapter 3:
Empirical Expectation: All else equal, governments that implement net-
work disruptions are likely to abuse citizens’ physical integrity rights at a
higher level than governments that do not implement network disruptions.
4.3.1 Data and empirical strategy
The global prevalence of internet shutdowns
To assess the global prevalence of digital network disruptions, I construct
different indicators that are based on an event-dataset collected by Howard,




Figure 4.3. Major government-directed internet disruptions (full and partial
disruptions), 1995-2010.
.
Agarwal and Hussain (2011).5 Building on an analysis of news sources including
international and domestic news sources, as well as expert sources such as
information security blogs and specialised internet fora (Howard, Agarwal and
Hussain, 2011: 221), a catalogue of all major disruptions and shutdowns of
national digital networks was constructed. An event is defined as an instance
of government-led disruption of the internet, leading to the shutting down of
connections between the domestic and the international cyberspace, thus fully or
partially disconnecting domestic network users (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain,
2011: 221).
The dataset distinguishes between four types of disruptions, but the present
analysis only looks at the two types that represent the most severe forms of
disruptions: complete shutdowns of all networks, and partial shutdowns that involve
the shutdown of individual sites or subnetworks. The data range from 1995 to
2010, and within this time period offer details and circumstances of network
shutdowns and disruptions in 101 countries (Howard, 2010: 222).
For the present analysis, I aggregate the events to the country-year level
and match these to a panel dataset of all countries with a population larger
than 500,000, in order to allow for a cross-national comparison between 1995
and 2010. Two disruption measures are extracted, hereby making use of the
auxiliary information provided in the dataset. The first variable is a binary
indicator that measures whether the government of a country implemented
a full or partial shutdown of its digital networks in a given year (labelled as
full/partial disruptions dummy). The second measure counts the number
of full or partial disruptions by country and year (labelled as full/partial
disruptions count).
5The dataset is provided by Howard (2011).
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Figure 4.3 maps major government directed internet disruptions that oc-
curred across the world between 1995 and 2010.6 For the time period under
consideration, network disruptions are a pervasive phenomenon across all parts
of the world. The countries with the highest number of disruptions are China,
Tunisia, Turkey, Iran, Vietnam, and India.7 All of these countries have a history
of repressing civil liberties, imprisoning political dissidents, and have struggled
with armed internal opposition groups. Governments in the Middle East and
North Africa made extensive use of internet disruptions during this time period,
which pre-dates the start of the Arab Spring. The start of the region-wide
uprisings have been traced back to the self-immolation of a Tunisian street
vendor in December 2010, becoming a symbol of the civilian struggles across
Arab countries. As the map shows, up until then, the Tunisian government
had already implemented one of the most disruptive forms of network control
globally.
A number of countries that are generally categorised as being democratic
also display relatively frequent usage of network disruptions, such as Germany
and Finland. Howard, Agarwal and Hussain (2011) explain that the majority
of disruptions in democratic countries are justified by referring to legislation
on child-pornography, and pornography in general. They describe the first
disruption in Germany in 1995, where ‘German prosecutors demanded that an
ISP block 4 million worldwide subscribers from reading sex-related informa-
tion’ (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011: 219).
The absence of disruptive activities across large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa
likely indicates the low levels of internet penetration across the region be-
fore 2010, prompting governments in this region to pay less attention to the
opportunities and potential dangers of the internet. It is important to note, how-
ever, that low levels of internet penetration should not be taken as a sufficient
indicator for the lack of government interest in surveilling and censoring its dig-
itally connected population. The Ethiopian case study presented in Section 4.2
demonstrates that states where only a very small minority of the population
is connected to the internet can still be highly motivated to heavily invest in
surveillance tools and censoring methods. More generally speaking, the digitally
connected subset of a country’s population is likely to be comprised of the
most affluent and educated individuals, an elite that is going to be critical for
a government’s longterm stability and survival (see Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003). Consequently, governments will be particularly interested in controlling
and surveilling this digital elite to foresee potential future instability.
Respect for physical integrity rights across countries and time
Comparing the respect for physical integrity rights across countries and time is
a challenging exercise, as reporting practices vary substantially on both of these
dimensions. The most accurate cross-national indicator currently available is
the dynamic human rights scores by Fariss (2014), which are based on dynamic
ordinal item response theory models (see also Schnakenberg and Fariss, 2014).
The human rights scores estimate a latent measure of a country’s level of respect
6The map was created using the cshapes and ggplot2 R packages (see Weidmann and Gleditsch,
2010; Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010; Wickham, 2009).
7Figure 1 in the Appendix provides a list of all countries highlighted in this map.
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for physical integrity rights by combining information from a multitude of
data sources capturing aspects of coercive state behaviour. These include the
Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999),
the Political Terror Scales (Wood and Gibney, 2010), as well as specific datasets
covering the prevalence of torture, genocide, and political executions (see Fariss,
2014: 302). Contrary to other human rights measures, the dynamic human rights
scores allow the standards of reporting to vary over time, making the scores
more comparable across the global sample, and over a period of time.
Common predictors of physical integrity rights protection
A number of standard variables that have been found to affect a government’s
willingness to enforce state-sanctioned violence are included (see, e.g. Poe
and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 2007a). The presence
of organised internal dissent is the most consistent and robust predictor for
increases in state repression, and is measured using the UCDP/PRIO measure
of armed internal conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013). An armed internal
conflict is defined as an incompatibility that ‘occurs between the government
of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention
from other states’ (UCDP/PRIO, 2014: 9), and that resulted in at least 25 battle-
related deaths (this variable is named civil conflict). I include an additional
binary variable that takes on a 1 where governments are involved in internal
conflicts that resulted in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year
(this variable is named major conflict), which is also based on Themnér and
Wallensteen (2013).
To account for the regime type of a country, I make use of the Unified
Democracy Scores by Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010), which provide
a continuous variable with a comparable range to the human rights scores,
where negative values indicate less democratic and positive values indicate
more democratic institutions. Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010) combine the
information provided by ten existing indicators for regime types and estimate a
continuous measure using a Bayesian latent variable model, which is similar to
the human rights scores by Fariss (2014). To account for size and wealth of a
country, the population size, as well as the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita are included as control variables.8
Lastly, the internet has only recently become a platform for interactive, peer-
to-peer communication. The earliest ‘proclamation’ of the so-called Web 2.0 goes
back to 1999, where DiNucci (1999) contends that ‘[t]he Web will be understood
not as screenfuls of texts and graphics but as a transport mechanism’ (DiNucci,
1999: 221). The potential for collective organisation provided by this new form
of digital communication is what governments are likely to fear the most. In
an effort to account for the period of static internet usage versus the period of
interactive usage, I include a binary variable that takes on a 0 for years up until
2000, and a 1 from 2000 onwards.
8Both measures are logarithmised to account for skewness, and are taken from Hunziker and
Bormann (2013), who have attempted to correct previously misspecified calculations.
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Figure 4.4. Government-directed internet disruptions, and human rights perfor-
mance, 1995-2010.
Table 4.1. Summary statistics, a global analysis of network disruptions and
violence state coercion
N Mean* St. Dev. Min Max
coercion (latent mean) 2,721 0.458 1.322 −2.738 4.693
disruption (count) 2,738 0.152 0.911 0 31
disruption (yes/no) 2,738 0 0.272 0 1
civil conflict (yes/no) 2,721 0 0.336 0 1
major conflict (yes/no) 2,721 0 0.175 0 1
regime type (latent mean) 2,720 0.253 0.907 −2.023 2.263
log population 2,564 15.934 1.653 12.288 21.004
log GDP p.c. 2,564 8.486 1.373 4.764 11.980
∗ median displayed for categorical variables
Table 4.1 lists the summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis.
The highest number of disruptions that were implemented in a country in one
year between 1995 and 2010 was 31 incidences.
4.3.2 Results
Figure 4.4 presents a timeline of the number of network disruptions between
1995 and 2010. The two lines distinguish between disruptions implemented
by governments that exercised a high level of violent coercion against their
citizens, and disruptions by governments that exercised a low level of coercion.
Since the human rights scores by Fariss (2014) are continuous, governments are
categorised as highly coercive in years where they fall below the average level,
and less coercive in years where they are above the average.
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Descriptive Evidence
Figure 4.4 demonstrates that until the beginning of the 2000s, network disrup-
tions were only rarely implemented in both rights-respecting and rights-abusing
countries. From 2003 onwards, network disruptions are implemented at a higher
frequency in general, but over the course of time until 2010, the number of dis-
ruptions in rights-abusing countries increases to become more than three times
as high as the number enforced by rights-respecting countries. The latent mea-
sure of physical integrity rights violations adjusts for changes in reporting over
time, and demonstrates that respect for these rights has in fact improved (Fariss,
2014). This means the substantial difference between rights-abusing countries
making use of network disruptions and rights-respecting countries cannot be
attributed to an artefact of the data.
The patterns presented in Figure 4.4 address a number of arguments put
forward in this dissertation. First, network disruptions have exponentially
increased since the 1990s, making them an issue of growing importance. Second,
the exponential increase has principally occurred in countries with weak human
rights records. Third, this increase commenced and has accelerated throughout
the change from the static Web 1.0 to the dynamic, interactive Web 2.0, and the
expansion of internet penetration across the world. Governments have evidently
become increasingly aware of the collective potential of the internet, and fear
the opportunities it offers its citizens to connect amongst themselves.
Multivariate Analysis
The descriptive evidence offers preliminary support for the notion that gov-
ernments engaging in network disruptions are also more likely to abuse their
citizens’ basic human rights. There might, however, be a number of confounding
factors that account for this observed difference. To address this concern, I
estimate a number of multivariate panel models that include the variables most
consistently found to explain human rights performance as control variables.
I estimate both fixed-effects models, that account for unobserved heterogene-
ity between countries, and only look at variation within individual countries,
and hierarchical random effects models. Table 4.2 presents the results, for the
statistical model that accounts for civil conflict, whether there was a major
conflict, the regime type, population size, wealth, and the binary post-2000 time
variable. Models 1 and 3 specify network disruptions as a binary indicator (with
Model 1 estimating a hierarchical model, and Model 3 a fixed effects model),
whereas Models 2 and 4 specify them as the number of disruptions per year
(again as a hierarchical and fixed effects specification, respectively). The results
demonstrate that network disruptions, across different measurements and model
specifications are significantly associated with lower levels of basic human rights
respect. In years where states purposefully disrupted their internet, they were
also significantly more likely to use state-sanctioned violence against their own
population.
To ease the interpretation of the estimated effects, Figure 4.5 plots the point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals of all explanatory variables in Models
2 and 4. Where the confidence interval includes 0 (highlighted by the dashed
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Table 4.2. Network disruptions and state repression, random effects models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 2.06∗ 1.95∗
[1.02; 3.09] [0.91; 2.99]
Disruption −0.03∗ −0.03∗
(count) [−0.05; −0.01] [−0.05; −0.01]
Disruption −0.12∗ −0.14∗
(yes/no) [−0.18; −0.07] [−0.19; −0.08]
Civil conflict −0.38∗ −0.38∗ −0.34∗ −0.34∗
[−0.45; −0.31] [−0.45; −0.31] [−0.41; −0.27] [−0.41; −0.27]
Major conflict −0.16∗ −0.16∗ −0.15∗ −0.15∗
[−0.26; −0.07] [−0.26; −0.07] [−0.24; −0.06] [−0.24; −0.06]
Regime type 0.57∗ 0.57∗ 0.54∗ 0.54∗
[0.51; 0.63] [0.51; 0.63] [0.47; 0.61] [0.47; 0.61]
Post 2000 0.07∗ 0.07∗ 0.01 0.01
[0.04; 0.10] [0.04; 0.10] [−0.03; 0.05] [−0.03; 0.05]
Log Pop. −0.26∗ −0.26∗ 0.43∗ 0.45∗
[−0.32; −0.21] [−0.32; −0.20] [0.22; 0.64] [0.24; 0.66]
Log GDP p.c. 0.29∗ 0.30∗ 0.22∗ 0.23∗
[0.24; 0.35] [0.24; 0.35] [0.14; 0.30] [0.15; 0.31]
Model random effects random effects fixed effects fixed effects
AIC 2385.07 2372.08
BIC 2443.50 2430.51
Log Likel. -1182.54 -1176.04
R2 0.21 0.22
Adj. R2 0.20 0.20
Deviance 2365.07 2352.08
N 2548 2548 2548 2548
N (groups) 172 172
∗0 outside the 95% confidence interval
horizontal line), the effect is estimated to not be significant.9 Figure 4.5 shows
that even when controlling for these main confounding factors, between 1995 and
2010, governments that implemented network disruptions were also significantly
more likely to exercise violent coercive force against their own population.
Confirming results from previous analyses, states are more likely to abuse basic
human rights when they are involved in a civil or a major conflict. Faced with
credible challenges to their political authority, states will be highly motivated
to increase coercive violence against their citizens in an attempt to regain their
previous status quo. Furthermore, the regime type of a government significantly
affects a government’s inclination to employ violence domestically: the higher
9The coefficients can be compared with respect to their direction, but not with respect to their
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Figure 4.5. Network disruptions and repression, global analysis. Point estimates
and 95% confidence intervals.
countries rank on the democracy scale, the more likely they are to respect and
protect citizens’ human rights.10
4.4 Summary
This chapter has presented case evidence and a global analysis for the argument
that governments integrate varying forms of network control into their repressive
strategies. The case evidence discussed in the first section of this chapter
exemplified how governments choose between strategies of censorship and
strategies of surveillance when faced with a perceived domestic threat, and how
these strategies are then extended to the realm of coercion.
The second section of this chapter systematically investigated the prevalence
and relevance of network disruptions with regard to human rights violations
across the globe. The global analysis does not capture the trade-off states make
when choosing between different repressive strategies, but it does offer substan-
tial support for the relationship between internet disruptions and heightened
state violence. State-implemented internet disruptions have heavily increased
over time, and this increase can almost exclusively be attributed to governments
that violate their citizens’ basic human rights. The cross-national analysis from
1995 to 2010 showed that even when controlling for the most important fac-
tors that affect human rights respect, governments that disrupt their domestic
internet are significantly more likely to abuse human rights.
To investigate the effect of varying forms of internet control on the nature of
state-sanctioned violence, the remaining chapters of this dissertation move to the
sub-national unit of analysis. The case under consideration is the Syrian regime’s
use of network control and strategic violence in the ongoing civil conflict. The
next chapter presents a new database on state killings in the Syria that will form
10The population measure demonstrates the difference between the fixed effects and the
hierarchical model: whereas highly-populated countries are more likely to abuse rights than less
inhabited countries (random effects model), changes in population size within a country do not
have this effect (fixed effects model).
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the basis of the systematic subnational inquiries into how variations in network
control affect strategies in violent coercion.
5
Integrated data on state killings in the
Syrian Arab Republic
5.1 Introduction
To investigate the more fine-grained dynamics between network control and
the nature of state violence, the theoretical and empirical investigations will
now move on to the sub-national level and analyse how variations in network
provision across the different Syrian governorates affects the regime’s strategies
of coercion. This chapter presents a new database on lethal state coercion
between March 2011 and April 2014 in the Syrian Arab Republic. It discusses
how the recent shift to disaggregated research on political violence makes
significantly higher demands on the quality of the information needed to test
empirical implications. Databases on violence tend to face two important
challenges, which are the over-counting and the under-counting of incidences. I
discuss how the first problem of over-counting violent events can be addressed
through record-linkage, to ensure that all violent events are only counted once.
The database on killings perpetrated by the Syrian regime that is presented
here makes use of five different sources, of which at least one actively draws
on media reports. The problem of duplicates in micro-level data on violence is
particularly pertinent when relying on media-based sources, which form the
basis for the majority of currently available datasets.
The new database on lethal state coercion in Syria therefore sets an important
standard in that it not only identifies each documented lethal incidence by name,
geographic location, date of death, and details on the circumstances of each
death, but it also includes information on which and how many sources reported
on every single event. The combination of geographic, temporal and situational
information, paired with information on the density with which events were
reported, makes the data suitable for more in-depth analyses of the patterns of
violence committed by the Syrian regime, over the course of the ongoing civil
conflict. The chapter concludes with a descriptive analysis of the data, and a
discussion of the dark figure of violent events that failed to be reported at all.
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Chapter 6 then presents one estimation solution to the problem of accounting
for this dark figure, before Chapter 7 and 8 proceed incorporating the data and
estimation strategy in their empirical analyses.
5.2 The problem of over-counting violence in event data
Research on political violence has benefitted greatly from a considerable increase
in nuanced theorizing and empirical testing of how, when, where, and why peo-
ple fight (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Whereas important research on repression
and conflict has focused on binary indicators, such as the absence or presence of
peace (see Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014), or ordinary measures, such
as the Political Terror Scales (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999), an expanding body of
literature is now also interested in understanding the motivation for and effects
of different types and intensities of violent patterns (Humphreys and Weinstein,
2006; Weinstein, 2007; Hultman, 2009; Stanton, 2009; Schutte and Weidmann,
2011; Sullivan, 2012).
Questions relating to the nature and dynamics of political violence are
indisputably policy relevant, but their empirical testing will crucially hinge on
the availability of high quality, micro-level information on violent incidences that
offer a representative picture of the subject of interest. Fortunately, academic
and human rights groups are doing their best to document violent events across
the world (Raleigh et al., 2010; Salehyan et al., 2012; Sundberg and Melander,
2013), and the recent advances in automatic event coding are producing an
ever-growing body of sources (King and Lowe, 2006; Schrodt and Idris, 2014).
Nevertheless, collecting detailed information on violent incidences, in particular
when perpetrated against civilians, is highly challenging, not least because
it provide proof of serious crimes having been committed. Conflict actors
and parties involved therefore have a general interest in hiding their atrocious
behaviour and overstating the responsibility of their opponents (Slim, 2007).
It is important to note that the cause of these issues does not necessarily lie
with data collection efforts, though different data projects may come to very
different results even when attempting to cover similar grounds (see e.g., Eck,
2012; Chojnacki et al., 2012). The majority of causes for over-and under-counting
violence are due to the nature of the underlying source material. Press releases,
lists kept by human rights groups, and government or military reports all cover
a certain snapshot of violent events. These snapshot views are aimed at fulfilling
certain internal organizational goals. The majority of data on violent incidences
remain dependent on journalistic sources, and ample research has demonstrated
that in general, media agencies tend to pursue their own agendas. Usually, this
does not involve providing a census of all violence occurring in contentious
situations (see, e.g. Earl et al., 2004; Davenport, 2010). Furthermore, journalists
working in highly unstable countries face extreme working conditions, and
oftentimes have to deal with life-threatening danger to themselves (Arsenault,
Himelfarb and Abbott, 2011). Changing security situations affect the accuracy
and completeness of real-time reporting, and can lead to ex-post corrections of
previously reported content.
Reflecting on the main problems of event data, which are generally based
on news sources, Schrodt (2012) highlights the problem of duplicate stories as
crucial in the case of both machine- and hand-coded data (for a comparison be-
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tween these two types of data, see Hammond and Weidmann, 2014). Duplicated
records can lead to serious over-counting of violent events. Schrodt (2012: 553)
distinguishes between five different situations in which duplicate records might
occur. First, smaller news agencies pick up the stories from large news agencies,
such as Reuters, and these can get counted as separate events. Second, journal-
ists might publish updates on the same violent incident as more information is
revealed. Third, previous accounts of an incident are corrected with regard to
the event size, date, and place, and these are mistaken for further events. Fourth,
the same incident is referred to under differing headlines and published as parts
of more general news briefings. Finally, different news agencies might report
on the same event and focus on a different angle of the story. Schrodt (2012)
concludes:
‘when trying to measure trends in “ground-truth” behaviour against
a baseline over a long period time, duplicates are a serious problem,
both across sources and within sources. Cross-source duplication
has probably changed considerably over the past 15 years due to
local sources putting increasing amounts of material on the Web,
and more generally with the globalization of the news economy
[...]. In-source duplication can change due both to changes in the
resources available to an organization [...] and editorial policies on
updating, corrections, and the production of summaries.’ (Schrodt,
2012: 553).
The database on lethal state coercion presented in the next section will therefore
explicitly account for duplicate reports through record-linkage.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Integrating multiple sources
To measure violent lethal coercion in the ongoing Syrian conflict, the data
from five organizations that have been continuously working since the outset
of the conflict, are cleaned and combined. It covers the time period from the
beginning of the confrontation in March 2011 until end of April 2014. The data
collection and integration process was conducted in collaboration with Megan
Price and Patrick Ball as part of a report for the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014). However,
the composition of sources used in the report differs from the data presented
in this dissertation in two important ways. First, the data presented in Price,
Gohdes and Ball (2014) includes killings reported by the Syrian government.
Since this dissertation focuses on victims killed by the government, the last-
mentioned records are excluded in the present version of the data. Second, the
data presented in Price, Gohdes and Ball (2014) does not include the records
provided by the Syria Shuhada website, while these records are included in the
present version of the data.
The five sources included in the analysis are the Syrian Center for Statistics
and Research(SCSR)1, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)2, the Syrian
1http://csr-sy.org/
2http://www.syrianhr.org/
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Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)3, the Syria Shuhada (SS) Website4, and
the Violations Documentation Centre (VDC)5. While the records collected by
Syria Shuhada consist of a combination of individually reported incidences,
and reports from news sources, the other sources are all human rights groups
working with local networks of informants on the ground, in order to obtain the
most reliable information on the details and circumstances of those killed by the
regime.
Defining lethal government coercion
The data used in this analysis include both combatant (such as belonging to the
Free Syrian Army) and non-combatant victims killed by the Syrian government
and pro-government forces. The data do not allow for an exact classification
of victims into these two categories; instead they are classified as ‘martyr’
deaths by the recording groups, indicating that state military, paramilitary and
other higher-ranking government officials are excluded. Since the object of
inquiry in the present study pertains to the study of violence perpetrated by
the government against whomever it deems threatening to its political stability,
this can include ordinary civilians, and those who have mobilised an armed
struggle against the government. From the position of the government, anyone
who is not in active support of its regime is generally seen as a threat and
treated as an anti-government combatant or collaborator, which is one of the
main ways states justify the killing of non-armed citizens during episodes of
civil conflict (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Slim, 2007).
5.3.2 Record-linkage
In order to assure the highest possible quality standards in combining docu-
mented evidence from different sources, records of fatalities are only included if
they are identifiable by full name of the victim, date of death and governorate
in which the death occurred.6 The records are available at a daily level for
each of the country’s 14 governorates; further geographical disaggregation is
not possible. All five data sources also provide auxiliary information on the
circumstances of the death, but this information is not used in the record-linkage
process.7
To create a complete and accurate list of documented killings these data
need to be processed in two different ways: first, duplicates within individual
lists have to be identified and removed. Fatality recording is conducted in the
midst of chaos and fighting, making it highly probable that the same victim
is recorded more than once by the same organization. This inflation of counts
is likely to be non-random, as more visible attacks might lead an increased




6For further details see: ‘Data Processing, Cleaning and Translation’ in Price, Gohdes and Ball
(2014: Appendix B).
7I use the details integrated from the different data sources to check the consistency of the
linked records once the record-linkage has been completed.
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to be linked across lists, in order to arrive at an overall number of documented
victims.8
The identification of duplicates within a given source is termed de-duplication.9
The identification of duplicates across different sources is termed record-linkage,
or ‘matching’. De-duplication and matching were completed in the same pro-
cess by compiling one list that includes all records from all five sources, and
searching for records that have the same information on the victim name, as
well as place and date of death. Where information on the age, sex, and date
and location of birth was available this was additionally used in the identifying
process. For the period from March 2011 to April 2014, the present version of
the data included 400,398 records from the five sources mentioned above into
the record-linkage process.10
To facilitate the task of de-duplication and matching, the overall list of
records was stratified by the governorate in which the individual was killed, as
well as the year of death.11 Each of these groups of records were then separately
examined and searched for duplicate records. All records that were identified as
referring to the same victim were then clustered. Each cluster thus represents one
victim. For each cluster, the data sources that identified said victim were noted.
The information on which data source identified which victim is a crucial part
of the integration process that provides important information on the reporting
process of the different organisations.12 Table 5.1 presents a random sample
of records from the integrated database to exemplify the structure.13 Record
14567 was only recorded in one data source (in this case source ‘A’), but record
78949 was reported in data sources C, D, and E. Each row in the integrated
data base thus refers to one victim, but entails information on the origin of the
information, and the number of sources that entailed this information. Note
that the ‘overlap’ information provided in this format only tells us in how many
different sources each record was found – it does not tell us how many times
this record was found in one source, i.e. how many duplicates were found in
one source. The reason for this is that the organisations providing the data all
have different standards of pre-processing their data prior to sharing it. While
duplicates within sources are problematic for further analyses, documenting
their frequency holds no additional value, that could inform our understanding
8Records from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights were not made available after April
2013. However, analysis of the matched data prior to May 2013 reveals that the contribution of
records that are only identified by this one source is approximately five per cent, making the four
source matching comparable that period where five sources were available.
9This description of the de-duplication and matching process is based on Price, Gohdes and
Ball (2014: Appendix C).
10The data in Price, Gohdes and Ball (2014) includes records by the Syrian government, but
excludes the data by Syria Shuhada, and reports an overall number of 318,910 records.
11In a second step of the process, cross-checking was conducted by comparing records from
adjacent geographical locations, and records that noted a date of death at the beginning or end of
a calendar year.
12If some of the auxiliary information on individual victims differs within a cluster, then the
most frequently reported value was saved. For example, if an individual is identified in three
databases by the same name, sex, and place of death, but two of the sources record the death to
have occurred on the 22. April, and the third source reports the 23. April, then the data of death
for this victim is recorded as the 22. April. In cases where two sources reported contradictory
dates, the value was randomly chosen from the two available.
13Notice that the name is anonymised and the table does not report the auxiliary information
on the circumstances of death.
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Table 5.1. Snapshot of the database (anonymised)
ID name* A* B* C* D* E* gov date_of_death sex
14567 [..] 1 0 0 0 0 Aleppo 2012-11-16 M
57860 [..] 0 0 1 1 1 Homs 2013-09-16 M
58673 [..] 0 0 1 0 1 Rural Damascus 2012-08-30 M
68900 [..] 0 1 0 0 0 Hama 2012-04-28 F
23456 [..] 0 1 0 1 1 Homs 2013-03-24 M
11239 [..] 0 0 1 0 1 Deir ez-Zor 2012-05-28 M
68900 [..] 0 0 0 0 1 Rural Damascus 2014-02-25 M
78949 [..] 0 0 1 1 1 Daraa 2013-03-18 n.a.
∗ anonymised
of where the data came from and how it was collected. The frequency of intra-
source duplicates is therefore recorded but published in the final version of the
integrated data.
The reliability the record-linkage procedure was checked by letting the
coders all code the same sample of records, and then testing the inter-rater
reliability (see Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014: Appendix C1 for details). The
coding conducted by the different human matchers was in agreement in over
97% of all records in the sample, indicating that the reviewers were highly
consistent in their assessments of the records. Of the more than 400,000 records,
203,781 were identified as unique incidences of lethal violence.14
5.3.3 Descriptive comparisons
The frequency of reporting of individual records across different data sources
can also be interpreted as the reporting density. The density of reporting can
change over time, and it can vary across different locations. It can also vary
across specific types of events or specific types of victims. The following graphs
offer descriptive comparisons of the reporting density. Since one of the five
sources, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, does not cover the entire
period, it is excluded from these descriptive comparisons.
Figure 5.1 plots the de-duplicated number of records recorded by each
sources over time, and compares them to the number of unique, matched
records integrated from all sources. The fact that the integrated number of
reported victims of lethal violence is higher than each individual source means
that the different sources are contributing records that are not found in other
sources – they are not mere replicates of each other. At a first glance, the overall
trend shown by all lines looks fairly similar. Reported violence across Syria
increases substantially in the summer of 2012, and spikes again in August 2013.
The distance between the blue line (the integrated data) and the grey lines is,
however, not constant. The number of unique records picked up by individual
sources seems to increase substantially during the second year of the conflict.
To achieve a better understanding of the exact reporting density over time,
Figure 5.2 shows the number of reported lethal violations for each month as bar
14The data in Price, Gohdes and Ball (2014) includes records by the Syrian government, but
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Figure 5.2. Density of reported monthly killings, Syria, March 2011 - April 2014.
graphs, but additionally shows how many of these violations were reported by
one, two, three, or four of the data sources. The darker the bars are shaded in a
given month, the higher the reporting density. Months where large parts of the
bar is yellow indicate that many of the killed victims were only recorded by a
single source.
Figure 5.3 breaks down the density of reporting for each Syrian governorate.
Rural Damascus has by far the highest number of reported government killings
in the period under consideration. Damascus and Deir ez-Zor have a similar
number of killings reported in two, three, and four sources, but Damascus shows
a larger number of killings that were only reported by one source.
A simple assumption might be that the reporting density of violent killings
is related to the number of violent killings that occurred in the first place. This
relationship is likely to be mediated by a number of important factors, such as
the timing, type, and location where the events took place, but in general, it is
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Figure 5.3. Density of reported killings, by governorate, Syria, March 2011 -
April 2014.
plausible to assume that the fewer data sources report on a certain number of
killings, the larger the number of killings that are missing. To give a related
example, let us assume that a group of four government agents are given the
task to provide a census of the number of protesters on a certain day in a capital
city. The four agents walk all around the city individually, and each does her
best to take a photograph of every protester. At the end of the day, the agents
get together to compare their pictures. If all four agents took pictures of the
same protesters, they can assume that the group of protesters is probably not
much bigger than those captured by all of them. However, if they compare
their pictures and realise that every agent has caught a significant number of
protesters on camera that none of the others saw, they will realise that the crowd
was much larger than any of them had anticipated. This will lead the conclusion
that had they employed a fifth or sixth agent, the number of new pictures would
probably have grown accordingly. In a similar way, the yellow sections of the bar
charts in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 indicate that a significant number of victims
killed by the Syrian government have not been documented.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented a new database on lethal violations perpetrated by regime
forces in the ongoing Syrian conflict. To address a fundamental problem of event
data on violence, which is the over-counting of individual records of those killed,
the database integrates information gathered by five different human rights
organisations working actively to document the atrocities being committed by
the regime. Under the leadership of President Bashar Al-Assad, government
forces have not spared the use of any gruesome actions to maintain political
control.
The five sources were combined through record-linkage, a process by which
duplicate records within each source, and across the different sources were
identified and integrated. The linked database presents the (currently) most
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accurate and complete list of documented state killings for the ongoing Syrian
conflict. The fact that each recorded killing can be traced back to the original
sources that documented it, makes it possible to investigate and model the
variation of reporting density across different time periods and locations. The
descriptive comparisons presented in this chapter show how the reporting
density changes over the course of the conflict, and varies across different
governorates. Although the temporal patterns of the individual sources look
comparable at a first glace, the frequency of reporting changes significantly
across time; this indicates that patterns of actual perpetrated state killings are
likely to differ from the pattern of observed killings. While the integrated
database tackles the problem of over-counting incidences in event data, it does
not address the issue of unreported violence, or the under-counting of victims.
This is the topic of the next chapter.
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6
Accounting for the dark figure:
unreported violence in event data
6.1 Introduction
Incomplete, unrepresentative data is a major problem for all research in the field
of political violence. It is therefore important to discuss how this obstacle limits
the inferences that can be drawn from empirical analyses based on the available
data sources. I introduce a solution to this problem, showing how multiple-
recapture models can be used to model the reporting process of multiple data
sources on violence, and then predict the number of violent cases that went
unreported. I demonstrate the reliability of the method by drawing biased
convenience samples from a simulated population of violent incidences, and then
predict how many cases were missed in the sampling process. The simulations
show how the method picks up varying levels of ‘missingness’ across time
and space, and works under conditions of both biased and unbiased reporting,
providing the researcher with a tool for assessing the different datasets at her
disposal. I then apply the method to reported state killings from the ongoing
conflict in Syria, using the database presented in Chapter 5.
6.2 Information access and the challenge of identifying
trends in event data
Research on the determinants and effects of political violence is generally inter-
ested in investigating variations in violent conflict behaviour. Some studies do
this by looking at the absence or presence of violent episodes where a certain
threshold of violence is fulfilled, such as 25 or 1000 battle deaths per year (for
an overview, see Sambanis, 2004). More recent research has delved deeper into
studying individual- or group-level dynamics of violence, thereby relying on
information on violence that is disaggregated geographically, temporally, and
by actors (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2007; Eck and Hultman,
2007). As established in the previous chapter, the majority of data sets build on
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incomplete sources, such as for example media data, and consequently suffer
from over-and under-reporting. While the question of over-reporting was ad-
dressed in the previous chapter, the question of under-reporting is the subject of
this chapter.
Baum and Zhukov (forthcoming) analyse the media coverage of the recent
revolution and conflict in Libya and find systematic evidence for both over- and
under-reporting of specific kinds of protest and violent events, depending on the
political context in which the media agencies are operating themselves. While
media reports originating from non-democratic countries tended over-report
the violence produced by the protesters, democratic countries disproportion-
ately focused on state violence. The results presented by Baum and Zhukov
(forthcoming) have two important implications for the use of media accounts as
sources for event data. First, the Libyan revolution received high media attention
around the world, not least because of the international intervention through
NATO members, which had been mandated by the UN Security Council. When
compared to instances of mass protest and state repression in other contexts,
such as, for example in Sudan or Bangladesh, the coverage rates should be
relatively high. Second, taking the numbers reported in media sources at face
value means running the risk of counting individual events more than once and
attributing them to the wrong perpetrator (see also Davenport, 2010).
Two recent studies by Weidmann tackle the problems of accuracy and bias
in media-based conflict data for the case of Afghanistan (Weidmann, 2014a,b).
Both studies compare the significant acts database of the US military (SIGACTS)
to data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme on casualties in
the Afghan war, which are spatially matched by events that occurred in 2008
and 2009. Analyzing the spatial accuracy of the media-based data, Weidmann
(2014b) finds that press sources tend to report the locations of violent events
more accurately if those events were larger in size, and if they occurred in more
densely populated areas. With regard to bias – the incomplete reporting of
violent events – Weidmann (2014b) presents simulations that show the damaging
potential of incomplete data, which might fundamentally change the size and
direction of estimated effects. For the case of Afghanistan, however, the levels
of bias are found to be too feeble to affect results significantly, which can most
likely be attributed to the strong international interest the conflict received.
Turning to a conflict that received significantly less media attention, Krüger
(2014) matches and compares five data sources on violence during the Sierra
Leone civil war, and finds that media-based databases report significantly fewer
incidences across the entire conflict, and generally suffer from a ‘capital bias’,
meaning that they under-report all events that occurred outside of the country’s
capital. She concludes that ‘[i]f five scholars were to conduct five case studies
on the dynamics of violence in Sierra Leone during the last five years of the
conflict, they would make different findings depending on which data source
they chose’ (Krüger, 2014: 45).
For studies that are concerned with understanding the substantial scale of
violence in conflicts, a census of all violent events – that meet the operational
definition of the research at hand – is required. Many theoretical questions do not
necessarily require a census of all events, but need data that are representative
of the census. For example, in investigating whether a certain violent actor has
perpetrated fewer or more atrocities over the course of a conflict, the percentage














Figure 6.1. An example of violence and reported violence, over time.
of reported violence would have to remain relatively constant across time. Two
problems arise from this: First, to obtain a representative sample of all violent
events, researchers would require data that were generated with a probability-
based sampling technique. In situations of extreme unrest and violence, this
type of sampling is highly challenging to conduct. Retrospective mortality
surveys that are conducted in the aftermath of conflict are another solution,
but the associated costs and logistical challenges are substantial (Brück et al.,
2010). Consequently, the second problem is that it is almost impossible to assess
the representativeness of non-randomly sampled data without having access to
the actual census. While meta-data and qualitative contextual knowledge on
how the data were assembled helps the researcher assess potential causes of
incompleteness, consistent representativeness across dimensions of interest to
the researcher (such as time, space, and perpetrator) cannot be established.
Researchers are therefore frequently left with one or more data sources on
violent events that tell incomplete, and sometimes even conflicting stories. The
patterns produced by these data generally represent the reporting process, not
the process by which violence itself was generated – in many cases leading
researchers to draw inferences based on reported violence, not actual violence.
Figure 6.1 exemplifies how the problem of incomplete data can affect the
inferential analysis of conflict dynamics. It shows a timeline of violence (the
lighter bars) across five months, where the actual number of violent incidences
steadily increases for three months, and then after that decreases. The reports of
violence (the darker bars) mirror the increase in violence for the first two months,
but then fail to cover the further increase in the third month. This type of change
in reporting frequently happens when organisations lose some of their staff
members, or when the situation on the ground turns particularly dangerous, or
when the perpetrating groups change their warfare tactics from public displays
to more clandestine operations. Following the month of reduced reporting, the
number increases again and continues to follow the trend of actual events.
Without knowledge of the changed nature of reporting in month three,
researchers using these data would be led to believe that violence decreased in
the third month of the conflict, and that changes in covariates of interest might









Figure 6.2. Violence, and three sources of reporting.
have been responsible for this. For example, if a rebel group changes its tactic
from overt fighting to guerrilla tactics, this might lead to an actual increase in
violence. If the groups reporting on the violence fail to immediately adapt their
reporting procedure to this change, then the trend of reported violence is going
to diverge from the actual trend. The inferences drawn from analysing these
data would be incorrect. Modelling the process of reporting can offer a way to
solve the problem.
6.3 Modelling the reporting of violence
One solution to getting at the number of victims that go unreported in conflicts is
to study how those that did get included in NGO reports, government statistics,
or press statements were recorded. In order to do this, two important pre-
requisites need to be fulfilled: At least three different sources on the same
conflict need to be available, and the incidences need to be recognizable across
all available sources. In the majority of conflicts, a multitude of organizations are
trying to keep track of events on the ground, although the motivation for doing
so is likely to differ. Depending on each organization’s partisanship, location,
resources and mission, it will have a different propensity to record atrocities,
and is likely to have access to a specific subset of the total population of victims.
If the number of reported violations can be modeled as a function of who
was reported by whom, then the same model should be able to predict the
number of violations that were not reported by anyone. The following example
demonstrates this basic logic. Figure 6.2 shows a bar chart of reported and actual
violence at a given place and time in conflict X. The entire number of killed
individuals is 178, but not all of them made it into reports: 71 were registered
by Source 1 (which might have been a morgue), 38 were recorded by Source
2 (which might have been a hospital trying to save these lives), and 156 were
included in a report by Source 3 (which might have been an NGO). The highest
number (the number ‘closest’ to the true value) is recorded by Source 3, but
it is still failing to account for 22 victims. Those missing 22 victims might be
included in the other two sources, but we do not know this (yet).



















Figure 6.3. Reporting density across
three sources.
Table 6.1. Example of individual and
multiplicative capture histories
Y x1 x2 x3 x12 x13 x23 x123
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
46 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
77 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
16 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
?? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Some victims are recorded by more than one source. The fact that different
sources tend to have overlapping information is the main reason why it is not
possible to just sum up the numbers of the individual sources: this would
lead to certain victims being counted more than once. In order to model the
reporting process, it is crucial to distinguish between the different reporting
groups. Figure 6.3 graphically depicts the overlaps: When all three sources are
matched against each other (and compared to the actual number of killed), 11
victims are found to be missing from all three sources. Six are only reported
by Source 1 (labeled s1 in the figure), 2 are reported by Source 1 and 2 (labeled
s1s2), 17 were reported by all three sources (labeled s1s2s3), etc. In a real
world case, the number of unreported victims is not known to the researcher,
but the reporting overlap, or density of reporting can frequently be extracted
from the reported data. Estimating a census from an incomplete contingency
table (which is what the reporting overlap provides) has been long discussed
in the field of biostatistics, and log-linear capture-recapture models offer a
powerful and flexible formalization for predicting the ‘missing cell’ of unreported
violence (Cormack, 1989; Fienberg, 1972). Different formalizations of the method
have been used to project populations of violent incidences in Kosovo, Peru,
Timor-Leste, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala (Lum, Price and Banks,
2013; Lum et al., 2010; Ball et al., 2003, 2002; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer, 1999;
Hoover Green, 2011; Manrique-Vallier, Price and Gohdes, 2013).
In order to accurately model the reporting process of conflict violence,
potential dependencies between the sources need to be taken into account.
Three different types of dependencies can be distinguished:
Positive dependencies
Some sources are more likely to cover the same sample of victims than others.
For example: media sources might be more likely to report on large, visible
events where the number of people killed was high. Or two human rights groups
contact the same people in rural regions in order to update their records of who
is being killed. Some groups might even work together to reduce their personal
risks where heavy fighting is occurring. Further dependencies might arise from
victim characteristics: middle-aged men and women might be recorded more
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frequently than the deaths of elderly or young victims. Reasons for positive
dependencies are myriad, and they all lead to the same outcome of having a
larger overlap in reported violence between two (or more) sources.
Negative dependencies
Political affiliations are likely to affect which victims end up being recorded by
which source. Groups that receive support by the government are more likely to
concentrate on victims killed by the challenger, and witnesses are more likely to
trust these groups if they are reporting a rebel-perpetrated killing. Groups on the
other side of a frontline might correspondingly have more access to information
on regime-perpetrated victims. Other types of negative dependencies might
be related to other victim characteristics, such as the gender, religion, age, or
ethnicity of the victims. Groups with negative dependencies are likely to have
less overlap in their data.
No dependencies
Two or more sources are independent in situations where all victims have
the same probability of being included in each source. For example, if two
organizations administered random sampling techniques, one could assume
their reporting processes to be independent of each other.
To model these dependencies, log-linear capture-recapture estimation ef-
fectively formalizes these interactions as additive multiplicative terms (Bishop,
Fienberg and Holland, 1975).1 It assumes that Y, (the overlaps, or reporting
histories) can be modeled as
log(Y) = α+ βX + e (6.1)
where X is a matrix of binary variables indicating the reporting history of
each overlap (xi, xj, xk), and multiplicative dependencies between the sources
(xij, xjk, xijk, etc.). Table 6.1 shows an example for such capture histories for three
sources, but the model is extendable to more sources.
Following the three-source example, there are eight different ways to model
the dependencies of the reporting processes. The first model assumes no
dependencies between the sources:
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 (6.2)
Second, there are three models that assume two lists are dependent:
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x1x2 (6.3)
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x2x3 (6.4)
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x1x3 (6.5)
1Log-linear multiple recapture analyses can easily be implemented in the R package Rcapture,
which was written by Baillargeon and Rivest (2007).
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Third, there are three further models that account for dependence between
two pairs of lists:
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x1x2 + β ∗ x2x3 (6.6)
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x2x3 + β ∗ x1x3 (6.7)
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x1x2 + β ∗ x1x3 (6.8)
Lastly, there is one model (the saturated model), accounting for dependence
between all lists:
log(Y) = α+ β ∗ x1 + β ∗ x2 + β ∗ x3 + β ∗ x1x2 + β ∗ x1x3 + β ∗ x2x3 + β ∗ x1x2x3.
(6.9)
Since Y represents a contingency table, it is usually modeled as a Poisson
distribution. To select the simplest model that best fits the reporting process
of the data, all models are estimated, and then assessed with respect to their
goodness of fit, generally determined through the BIC.
For the example presented in Figure 6.2, the model that best fits the reporting
process is the independent model, with:
log(Y) = 2.276− 0.398 ∗ x1 − 1.295 ∗ x2 + 2.018 ∗ x3 (6.10)
Since Source 3 records the largest number, it is not surprising that the coefficient
for x3 is large and positive.
The fitted reporting model is used to predict the number of unreported
incidences by setting all X = 0:
log(Y000) = α, (6.11)
so that exp(α) predicts the number of incidences when all X are zero. For the
just-mentioned example the exponential of the intercept is approximately 10.
Based on the best fitting model of reporting, the predicted number of incidences
that where missed is 10 (with a 95 confidence interval [3:18]). As shown in
Figure 6.3, the ‘true’ number missing is 11. The predicted population of violence
is therefore the number of observed + predicted unobserved, which in this case
would be 177 (with the true number being 178).
6.4 Simulations
To demonstrate more generally the potential of this basic method of prediction,
I simulate a population, or ‘context’ of violent incidences that have two defining
characteristics, which are the time and place where they occurred. Figure 6.4
visualizes the simulated population, which varies across eight time points, and
two locations – defined as urban and rural. In total, the population includes
5000 incidences that are distributed along these two variables of interest. Next, I
construct three types of hypothetical sources that collect incomplete information
from this population. The probability of each incident being included differs
between the sources, and is determined by the parameters of simple logistic
equation for each source:
pS1t p = logit
−1(.1+ .5xt − 3xp)













Figure 6.4. Simulated levels of violence in urban and rural regions.
pS2t p = logit
−1(.5− .3xt − .5xp)
pS3t p = logit
−1(−.2− .001xt + 2xp),
where pSit p is the probability of a violent incident being included in Source
i at time t, and place p. The probabilities are dependent on a constant, the
time the violence occurred (xt), and whether it occurred in an urban or a rural
location (xp). I simulate 1000 rounds for each source, drawing the samples
from a binomial distribution using the probabilities defined by the logistic
process. Figure 6.5 presents one round of simulated sources by time and place of
violence. When compared to the Figure 6.4, it is clear that all sources are missing
at least some information at some point, but that the degree of completeness
differs. Source 3 samples significantly more incidences that occurred in the
rural than the urban location. Analyses based on Source 3 would therefore
considerably over-estimate the proportion of violent incidences in the rural
location. Conversely, Source 1 captures a larger sample of urban incidences.
Source 2 changes its propensity to record incidences over time, providing a
very different temporal trend to the one in the actual population. Since the
degree of bias (and completeness) varies significantly across time and location
in all sources, the process of reporting is likely to vary by time and place as
well. For each of the 1000 rounds of source sampling, the reporting process
is modeled, and the level of underreporting predicted for each time and place
individually, producing 1000 estimates of underreporting for every time and
place combination, or stratum. Figure 6.6 visualizes the results of the simulations
for every stratum. The reported samples of violence by Source 1, 2, and 3 are
depicted in shades of blue. The estimated number of actual violations is depicted
in yellow, and the true number (in the simulated population) is marked at the
red line.
The simulation demonstrates that the predicted number of actual killings
converges with the true number defined in the population. Importantly, it is
designed to test how the method weathers under different sampling conditions
– all of which reflect probable real-world scenarios. Terrorist attacks in capital













Population Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
Figure 6.5. Example of simulated reporting of violence in urban and rural
locations.
present, whereas the death tolls produced by clandestine operations in the
countryside are likely to only partly show up in official statistics. For example,
the top left graph in Figure 6.6 shows the samples and estimates for all killings
that occurred at t = 1 and in urban locations p = urban. All three sources
underreport violence by at least 50 incidences; nevertheless the predicted number
converges with the true value. In other cases, such as at t = 7, p = urban, one
source reports almost all incidences. In such cases, the predicted number of
cases equally converges with the true number. Since the method works for
different degrees of incompleteness and bias of the source data, it can be used to
correct for missing cases and to check the consistency of the data over different
dimensions of interest.
In the following section, I demonstrate how the method can be used to
predict recent trends in conflict violence in the ongoing Syrian conflict. The
analysis shows how the scale and trend of violence differ profoundly between
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Figure 6.6. Simulations: reported and estimated violence.
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6.5 An example: control, contestation and violence in Syria
The following application is intended to demonstrate how the use of incomplete,
unrepresentative event data might affect an analysis of violent dynamics. The
example chosen here is not directly related to the theoretical argument put
forward in this dissertation; it does, however, make partial use of the new data
on state killings in Syria.
The Syrian civil war has just entered its fourth year and has forced millions
of Syrian civilians to flee their country to seek safety from the campaign of
violence that has been erupting between the regime led by Bashar Al-Assad and
a number of different opposition groups (see Lynch, 2013).
A central theoretical claim that has been put forward in recent research on
civilian victimization relates the severity of conflict to the level of territorial
control in a given location (Kalyvas, 2006). Kalyvas’ theory of selective and
indiscriminate violence contends that the degree of territorial contestation be-
tween two conflict parties principally determines to what extent perpetrators
will only kill selected civilian targets, and to what extent their strategy of warfare
will be indiscriminately atrocious against innocent bystanders. In essence, he
contends that higher levels of control lead to increased information about who
is supporting whom, which makes it easier for the warring party in control
to choose their targets selectively. Conversely, where control is contested, the
conflict parties have a harder time identifying their enemies, and civilians have
less incentives to denounce others, as the benefits are unclear where control is
unclear (see Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky and
Kalyvas, 2011; Bhavnani, Miodownik and Choi, 2011). Territorially contested
regions are therefore expected to produce substantially higher numbers of indis-
criminate killings than regions controlled by one conflict party. Focussing only
on the level of violence perpetrated by the government, the following empirical
expectation can be formulated to exemplify an analysis of violent dynamics in
civil conflict:
Empirical Expectation: Government forces will perpetrate higher levels of
violence where they do not possess full control of a territory.
To what extent is the level of civilian victimization in the current Syrian civil
war a function of territorial contestation? To study the impact of contestation
on the level of violence, I analyze two central locations of violence within Syria
that have witnessed different developments of territorial control over the course
of the conflict. At the beginning of 2012, both Damascus and Aleppo were
under full territorial control of the Syrian Regime. In both locations, rebel
forces challenged the government’s control in mid-July 2012. In Damascus, the
government successfully regained control of the majority of the city within less
than three weeks. In Aleppo, the contestation between different opposition
groups, including the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front, has continued
since its start in July 2012, and the city remains divided between the different
conflict parties (Holliday, 2013).
Based on the theory of territorial control and civilian victimization, the
empirical expectation would be that Aleppo and Damascus should both have
witnessed an increase in indiscriminate killings in mid-July 2012. Given the
quick regain of territory in Damascus by the government, the expectation would
then diverge between the two locations: we would expect to see a persistently























































Weekly reported violence, 2012
Source1 Source2 Source3
Figure 6.7. Weekly reported violence in Aleppo & Damascus, 2012.
high level of violence in Aleppo, whereas the number of fatalities should have
decreased to fewer and targeted individuals in Damascus.
Figure 6.7 shows the number of weekly de-duplicated reported state killings
that occurred in Damascus and Aleppo in 2012, and were collected by three
well-known sources, that are included in the integrated database presented in
Chapter 5.2 The sources show very similar conflict dynamics up until mid-July.
For both locations, the reports of violence show a marked increase in mid-July
(marked by the beginning of the yellow-shaded segment), when the uprisings
began in both localities. Reported violence, however, remains at a higher level
in Aleppo than reports of violence in Damascus. These patters offer preliminary,
descriptive support for the theoretical expectations – Aleppo’s contested territory
remains more violent than government-controlled Damascus.
But what about the data generating process of reporting? Might the reporting
patterns differ between Damascus and Aleppo, and do they change over the
course of the year 2012? Using multiple recapture modelling, I predict the
number of unreported incidences of violence by week, in order to investigate
whether the reporting patterns differ from estimated levels of conflict violence.
Figure 6.8 shows the same timelines as Figure 6.7, but includes the estimates of
projected weekly violence across time in Aleppo and Damascus.
Two important findings emerge. First, the change in territorial control affects
the reporting process in both locations: after the start of the uprisings in mid-July
both Damascus and Aleppo witness far higher levels of violence than were
reported. Second, with regard to the empirical testing of the theory, the level of
violence in government-controlled Damascus is predicted to have remained at a
substantially higher level than reported. Evidently violence did not decrease to
2For demonstration purposes I only present this analysis with three sources in this chapter, but
the results using four sources were essentially the same. The sources included in this analysis are
the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR: http://www.syrianhr.org/), the Syrian Center
for Statistics and Research (SCSR: http://www.csr-sy.org/), and the Violations Documentation
Centre (VDC: http://www.vdc-sy.org/).























































Weekly reported and estimated violence, 2012
Estimate Source1 Source2 Source3
Figure 6.8. Reported and predicted violence in Aleppo & Damascus, 2012.
pre-uprising levels in Damascus, even though the government regained control
of the city.
To analyze the effect of the uprising on the change in violence, I estimate
a time series count model for Aleppo and Damascus, and replicate the model
for all three sources, as well as the estimates. To account for the dependencies
across time, I use the Poisson Exponentially Weighted Moving Average model
by Brandt et al. (2000), where the level of violence at time t is modeled as a
moving average of previous violence. For both Aleppo and Damascus I include
a ‘Battle’ dummy variable that takes on a 1 in the weeks where the territory
was contested, and a 0 otherwise. Table 6.2 reports the predicted percentage
changes in violence during periods of contestation, as compared to previous
government control. For Damascus, I include a ‘post-battle’ dummy variable
that takes on a 1 for the period after the uprising, and a 0 otherwise. For Aleppo,
Table 6.2. Predicted percentage changes of violence during battle
Data Battle (Aleppo) Battle (Damascus) Post-battle (Damascus)
Estimate 467.9 % 640.5 % 242.7 %
Source 1 182.4 % 547.8 % 191.7 %
Source 2 188.9 % 572.8 % 181 %
Source 3 125 % 640.5 % 212.7 %
No Post-battle effect changes for Aleppo reported, as it remained contested throughout 2012.
the model with the estimated level of violence predicts that during the period of
territorial contestation, Aleppo fell victim to an increase in violence of almost
470%. The three individual sources all clearly predict a far lower increase of
merely 120-190%. The reported data therefore significantly underestimates the
change in the level of violence that occurred when the level of territorial control
changed.
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In Damascus, the change in violence throughout the period of territorial
contestation is predicted to be even higher than in Aleppo, with an increase
of over 640%. However, in the case of Damascus, Source 3 provides the same
predicted change as the model with the estimated level of violence shows.
Evidently, in some instances, the dynamics of violence are reflected correctly in
reported data. When looking at the predicted change in violence in the aftermath
of territorial contestation, we again see that the reported data underestimates
the level of violence.
The results offer important implications: They provide substantial empirical
support for the fact that changes in territorial contestation are likely to lead
to higher levels of civilian victimization. Importantly, the findings reveal that
reported data runs the risk of not being able to ‘keep up’ with recording
incidences in times of intense conflict, leading to empirical implications that
underestimate the actual effects of fighting. Furthermore, all data sources
included in the analysis publicly support the Syrian opposition. It is plausible
to assume that they face increased surveillance and additional obstacles in
recording casualties in areas controlled by the government, which might explain
why so many fatalities went unreported in the aftermath of the rebel uprisings
in Damascus in the summer of 2012. Modelling the reporting process and using
it to predict more reliable numbers reveals these challenges and shortcomings,
which would otherwise have gone unnoticed.
6.6 Summary
Understanding patterns of atrocious state behaviour is a crucial part of disag-
gregated research on political violence, which has gained increased interest
in recent years. Too often, however, empirical tests of theoretical explanations
suffer from incomplete and biased measures of violence.
I discuss a well-known solution to estimating hard-to-reach populations
when the only data available are convenience samples. Multiple-recapture
methods were first developed to estimate wildlife populations and have since
found their way into research on demography, epidemiology, and casualty
estimation (for a review, see International Working Group for Disease Monitoring
and Forecasting, 1995a,b; Manrique-Vallier, Price and Gohdes, 2013). Where
at least three data sources are available, I show that a model of the reporting
process of violence can be used to predict unreported incidences. To illustrate the
method, I draw multiple biased samples from a population with two covariates,
model the reporting processes and use this to predict the population size. The
simulations using artifactual data demonstrate that the population size is, on
average, predicted correctly both in cases where the samples are close to the
actual population, and in cases where the samples are extremely biased. I
then apply the method to data on violence collected in the Syrian civil war in
2012, and show how the predicted patterns of violence differ from the observed
patterns.
To date, researchers have not made use of the results obtained from multiple
recapture estimation to correct potentially biased data on violence used in con-
flict research. The implication is that the use of incomplete data for empirical
analysis, if not collected through a sampling method that guarantees representa-
tiveness, runs the risk of producing statistical estimates that describe the pattern
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of reported violence, not of the actual dynamics. In the next chapter, I make
use of this estimation strategy to compare variations in the reporting of state
killings prior to, and during, state-implemented internet outages.
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7
The military strategic value of national
network disruptions
7.1 Introduction
Governments fighting to maintain political control have an incentive to imple-
ment internet blackouts in conjunction with larger military offensives aimed
at restoring control. Regime forces are likely to utilize these shutdowns as a
tactical advantage when facing intense confrontation from violent opposition
groups. The reduced opportunities for short-term military coordination of at-
tacks is expected to improve government-aligned fighters’ chances of regaining
control previously challenged by anti-government fighters. If the shutdown
of all communication networks is implemented when repressively responding
to increased resistance, regime forces are likely to be involved in increased
fighting directly prior to, and during the period of the outage. One observable
consequence is therefore constituted by an increase in violence perpetrated by
regime supporters immediately prior to, and during such outages.
I empirically test this proposition using new data on reported daily inci-
dences of fatal regime violence in Syria, presented in chapter 5. I find that
government-induced network blackouts are accompanied by significantly higher
levels of violence, in particular in the governorates where government and
opposition forces are directly confronting each other.
An alternative explanation might be that governments do not anticipate
operational advantages by cutting connections, but instead implement blackouts
to commit atrocities that are hidden from international scrutiny. To test for this
cover-up hypothesis, I use log-linear capture-recapture models to estimate the
degree of underreporting of conflict fatalities during blackouts, and compare it
to the already existing levels of underreporting on days prior to network outages.
The evidence suggests that unreported violence does not systematically increase
during network outages, which is most likely attributable to the very short
disruption intervals. Instead, the increase in documented violence indicates
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that network outages are likely to form a part of the Syrian regime’s coercive
response strategy.
In the following two sections, recent research on censorship and blocking
of the internet as well as the relationship between network accessibility and
the potential for conflict is reviewed. I then discuss the theoretical motivations
and potential costs for governments who disrupt network services while being
challenged by armed opposition groups. Following a discussion of possible
alternative motivations, I formulate empirical expectations that can be tested
to uncover the predominant motivation behind implementing outages. The
empirical section introduces the data on regime violence and network outages in
Syria, and proceeds with the results of the analysis of documented violence, and
the variation in documentation patterns during outages. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of the results and potential avenues for future research.
7.2 Outages and operational advantages
The theoretical framework in Chapter 3 clearly shows that governments intent
on using modern communication technologies to their advantage in repressing
opposition groups have developed a resourceful set of tools to do so without
shutting down all virtual and mobile access for their population. Why then, do
so many countries experience purposefully implemented shutdowns? In theory,
there are two types of access denial: the long-term prohibition or restriction
of internet access, and shorter, infrequent intermissions of accessibility. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on censorship of the internet indicates that
content censoring usually happens over longer periods of time, and is principally
aimed at repressing collective organization and mobilization of disgruntled
citizens (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011; King, Pan and Roberts, 2013).
It is therefore plausible to assume that long-term outages implemented by
the government are intended to obstruct (or at least reduce) the mobilization
of anti-government sentiments. Where governments are already threatened
by organized groups, such pre-emptive shutdowns are likely to undermine
opposition preparations for collective attacks (see also Herreros and Criado,
2009), and should therefore occur prior to major episodes of state violence aimed
at deterring further rebellion. Whereas sustained outages might be an effective
tool to impede the long-term mobilization of opposition groups, they run the
risk of motivating dissatisfied people to join protests against this extreme form
of censorship.
In contrast to such widespread and enduring content censoring, empirical
evidence shows that most incidences of actual ‘blackouts’ cover a relatively
short timespan, not least because long-term outages affect a country’s reputation
and economic capacity (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011: 220). Since
short periods of denied access to the internet are not likely to affect sustained
opposition activity, it is plausible to assume that complete shutdowns are
implemented in anticipation of gaining temporary advantages over a violently
resisting opposition. Short-term shutdowns are therefore likely to be part of a
repressive response towards an already mobilized opposition, in order to impede
their capability to successfully implement, as well as the ability to coordinate,
larger attacks against the state. The following sections discuss in more detail the
incentives and costs associated with temporarily shutting down the internet.
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Incentives for temporary network outages
The first anticipated benefit of temporarily shutting down network services is
related to opposition groups’ capabilities to effectively carry out attacks against
the military. As discussed in chapter 3, highly sophisticated location-based
services, such as Google Earth and Google Maps are used by ill-equipped rebel
groups to locate military targets, and to calibrate weapons accordingly (Miller,
2012; Keating, 2013). Faced with an army that is superiorly equipped with
weapons, technology, and trained soldiers, opposition groups frequently conduct
asymmetric or ‘irregular’ warfare (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), where reliance
on all available means of combat is pivotal.
Secondly, the ability to coordinate personnel, material and last-minute strate-
gies via mobile phones and the internet is a vital channel by which opposition
groups are able to organize attacks and resistance against the government. The
presence of virtual communication channels, accelerated by smart phones, has
increased the value of disseminating information and using it as a ‘coordinating
force [...] dramatically’ (Shirky, 2008: 159). Additionally, ‘[b]logging, tweeting,
podcasting, and taking pictures and videos and uploading them to Flickr and
YouTube can all be done at near-zero financial cost (MacKinnon, 2012: 24)’, mak-
ing these tools available to anyone with a working internet connection. Recent
studies report that social networking may in fact lead to increased participation
in protest (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012), although these processes are less likely to
be permanently affected by short intermissions in access. The internet provides
a channel of communication that is fast, cheap, and harder to manipulate than
more traditional, centralized media types such as the radio or newspapers (see
Edmond, 2011: 25). A recent report interviewing members of the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) supports these findings, reporting that
‘[e]very fighter seems to have at least one mobile phone, used to
speak with families, Skype [...], and even advise Syrian soldiers how
to defect to the opposition. Some note the difference a generation
can make to the fate of their challenge against the government –
and providing video evidence of atrocities and war crimes that are
corroding the legitimacy of the regime.’ (Peterson, 2012).
The threat posed by the increased abilities to coordinate, disseminate infor-
mation, and even incite military soldiers to join the rebellion is likely to be
immediately apparent to authoritarian rulers who fear for their political survival.
In response, in a campaign aimed at repressing and possibly even eliminating
the opposition, shutting down these communication channels can constitute a
rational policy decision.
Where state-run mobile phone and internet services are generally accessible,
opposition groups are likely to make use of them. Longer periods without
access to state-provided network services should increase the probability of
rebel groups finding alternative means and services, such as satellite phones
and modems, network access via neighbouring countries, or dial-up connections
(when landlines are accessible).1
1Opposition groups might decide to reorganize entirely and banish mobile and virtual com-
munication from their coordination repertoire. In such instances, the anticipated benefits from
shutting down network services are likely to be low.
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The portfolio of surveillance and censorship methods to which state-run
connections can be subjected is diverse. However, compared to using alternatives
such as satellite networks, reliance on tools used by the majority of a country’s
population might still provide more security than using less broadly used
channels such as satellite connections. New research on IT security demonstrates
how satellite mobile devices produce traceable signals that allow governments
to simply locate users and trace messages (see Driessen et al., 2012).2 Locating
and targeting rebels who are communicating outside of conventional structures
offers a clear coercive advantage for the state when compared to their use of
ordinary network connections.3 Consequently, although opposition groups
might possess alternative ways of connecting via cell phone and internet, the
increased usage of satellite devices is likely to improve the regime’s capability
of identifying armed fighters among the civilian population.
The costs of network outages
Shutting down network services not only affects the opposition and its sup-
porters, it in fact affects a country’s entire population, not least due to losses
in economic revenues. As discussed in section 3.2, when Egypt shut down its
network access for only five days in 2011, the country’s economy suffered at
least $90 million loss in revenues (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011: 231).
Above all, as the theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation
stresses, governments pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in response to
political threats are highly dependent on information provided – willingly, or
unwillingly – by the civilian population (Lyall, 2010). Cell phone and internet
access considerably facilitate communication for civilians willing and able to
share crucial information on the location and activities of opposition fighters,
without said fighters noticing the correspondence. This “‘human intelligence”
mechanism (Shapiro and Weidmann, forthcoming: 5)’, should ultimately pro-
vide the state with an advantage over the rebellion. Furthermore, the Syrian
regime has a proven history of extensive and invasive internet surveillance,
which has allowed it to locate and target those deemed a threat on many oc-
casions (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). Internet surveillance, however, only works,
where the network accessibility is provided.
2Despite research in this field being comparatively new, news reports quoting researchers offer
support:
‘Radio direction finding and signals intelligence could easily be deployed in this
scenario to figure out where the opposition is communicating from,’ said John
Scott-Railton, a research fellow at the Citizen Lab, an organization at the University
of Toronto that focuses on Internet security (Perlroth, 2013).
Security researcher Jacob Appelbaum contends:
Satellite phone systems and satellite networks are unsafe to use if location privacy
or privacy for the content of communications is desired. These phone protocols are
intentionally insecure and tracking people is sometimes considered a feature. (Jacob
Appelbaum, quoted in York and Timm, 2012).
3The killings of two journalists in Homs in February 2012 support the notion that governments
are making use of this technology. Security specialists contend that the Syrian government is
likely to have directly targeted the houses from which they had traced the phones’ signals (York
and Timm, 2012).
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Given the incentives and costs for governments in shutting down their
networks, cutting all internet access is likely to be most effective in stifling
opposition capability when used on an infrequent, temporary basis. However,
‘overuse’ of this most extreme form of censorship is likely to be counterproduc-
tive: If network disruptions precede all forms of military actions and occur on a
regular basis, opposition groups will be able to use them as an ‘early-warning
system’. Following on from this, I argue that network outages are likely to be
consistently associated with increased fighting. Conversely, not all periods of
intense fighting are likely to be accompanied by a shut down networks. In short,
disruptions will consistently be part of larger military campaigns, whereas not
all military campaigns will entail disruptions.
Coercive response or cover-up?
Contemporary conflicts are being documented and simultaneously shared with
the outside world through the help of the internet (Diamond, 2010). An alterna-
tive explanation for outages in contentious situations could be the government’s
intention of covering up and hiding violent acts from international scrutiny.
Where a regime already receives increased international attention for repressing
its citizens, cutting network activities might be part of an attempt to limit the
extent of information leaving the country. Disruptions could present a chance
to commit more large-scale acts of violence against the population, attempting
to ‘drain [...] the sea’ (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 385) and elimi-
nating the opposition, without creating a national and international audience,
thereby potentially increasing the risk of sanctions, interventions, or even a
referral to the International Criminal Court. Although autocratic regimes fre-
quently engage in large-scale violence even when the international community is
watching, the less real-time information is available, the more likely leaders will
be able to plausibly deny responsibility for these atrocities (Mitchell, 2004).4 The
unprecedented number of journalists being killed in Syria demonstrates that the
regime is evidently not indifferent to coverage of the conflict. According to the
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Syria was the most dangerous country
to be working in as a journalist in 2012 and 2013, with at least 61 journalists
killed between 2011 and 2013 (Beiser, 2013). CPJ further reports on at least 60
kidnappings of press staff in 2013, as well as of journalists being tortured to
death (ibid).
The cover-up argument has been voiced by international advocacy groups,
such as Amnesty International, who has stated that:
‘[a]s fighting intensifies [...] we are extremely worried that the news
that internet and mobile phone services appear to have been cut
throughout Syria may herald the intention of the Syrian authorities
to shield the truth of what is happening in the country from the
outside world’.5
The intended effect of a disruption should therefore be an ‘unobserved’ increase
in government repression. Although more atrocities are occurring, the groups
4For coverage on the Syrian Regime’s plausible deniability of other events, such as the chemical
attack in Ghouta in 2013, see Beaumont (2013).
5Ann Harrison, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Deputy Director Amnesty
USA (Amnesty International, 2012).
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collecting and disseminating the details on these events might have reduced
access to their informants who usually provide evidence on individual victims.
The victims of violence during outages
Whether the victims of government violence change during internet outages
likely depends on the government’s motivation for the shut-down. Following
international law, the literature on state repression broadly differentiates between
combatant and non-combatant victims, while acknowledging that this distinction
is oftentimes intentionally or unintentionally ignored by governments (Downes,
2008). Threatened governments are likely to intentionally conflate the status of
combatants and civilians in irregular civil conflicts, where the organization of
the opposition is opaque and front-lines between groups are unclear (Valentino,
Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Balcells, 2010). As such, the Syrian regime has
conducted the type of atrocious campaign against both rebel fighters and non-
combatants that assumes anyone not showing explicit support is opposed to
them.
If the intent behind shutting down the internet is to cover up prosecutable
war crimes against unarmed civilians, it is plausible to assume that the com-
position of victims of government violence changes during outages, since the
explicit focus of these disruptions would then be to attack as many civilians as
possible. Empirically, a significant increase of - possibly unobserved - violence
that only occurs during outages should therefore indicate a higher proportion of
civilians killed.
With recent research indicating that censoring or blocking of the internet can
lead to an increased turnout of protesters taking to the streets, an alternative
reason for a higher proportion of civilian casualties would be if governments
decided to then violently crack down on these protesters. Empirically, a sub-
stantial increase in violence in the immediate aftermath of outages would offer
support for this scenario.
In this chapter, I argue that governments selectively implement outages
as part of particularly repressive responses to increased armed opposition
resistance. Where shutdowns are part of a concerted repressive response, the
most substantial increase in violence should begin prior to, and then continue
throughout, outages. In the midst of fighting, it is plausible to assume that
anyone deemed as belonging to the opposition - including armed fighters and
civilians standing by - are likely to be indiscriminately attacked.
7.2.1 Testable implications
If governments use network disruptions as a military tactic that forms part of
a concerted repressive offensive against opposition groups, a main observable
outcome is an increase in the activity of pro-government fighters during and
in the immediate time surrounding outages. Pro-government fighter activity
is measured by the number of people killed by the regime. According to the
theoretical expectations laid out above, I expect short, unexpected network
outages to be accompanied by significantly higher levels of military activity, and
thus significantly higher numbers of people killed. The number of actual people
killed is defined as the combined number of documented and undocumented
fatalities. In order to understand whether disruptions are linked to higher
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Table 7.1. Expected effects for network disruptions and violence
Empirical Documented % Undocumented Timing of increase
expectation violence violence in violence
Coercive
Response increase no change prior/ during disruption
Cover-up no change / increase increase only during disruption
No effect no change no change
levels of violence, it is crucial to account for changes in documented and
undocumented violence, since changes in communication technology might
have an effect on the documentation process. Actual levels of violence, meaning
documented and undocumented cases combined, are not directly observable. I
use the estimation technique presented in Chapter 6 to predict the number of
undocumented cases. The main empirical expectation, given that disruptions
are part of a state’s set of military tactics is:
Empirical Expectation: All else equal, periods of network disruption are
accompanied by a significant increase in actual conflict fatalities.
The main alternative explanation is that governments use disruptions to cover-up
their atrocities:
Alternative Expectation: All else equal, the proportion of undocumented
conflict fatalities increases significantly during network disruptions.
Whereas the number of undocumented cases is seldom zero, the alternative
explanation for why governments cut their networks is that they do this to
cover up their crimes, which means the dark figure of unreported cases should
increase disproportionately to the number of documented cases. A further
possible scenario is that governments intend to cover their tracks, but that they
are unsuccessful at doing so. An additional factor is therefore considered, which
is the timing of violence versus network disruptions. If governments care about
the news of atrocities travelling beyond the battle grounds, they are likely to
only commence with the violence once the network is disconnected. Starting
a campaign of violence and then shutting out the international community is
likely to raise more awareness than before. In short, cover-up campaigns should
show no signs of an increase of violence prior to the outage, and if successful,
should hide a large increase in undocumented fatalities during the disruption. In
contrast, increases in violence immediately preceding disruptions are consistent
with the coercive response hypothesis. I expect increases in military activity
prior to and during disruptions to indicate the strategic value of shutdowns
in government repression policy. Table 7.1 summarizes the expectation of the
main hypotheses and the alternative explanation for documented violence, the
percentage of undocumented violence, as well as the timing of violence prior to
and on days with network disruptions.
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7.3 Data and empirical strategy
Network outages in the Syrian civil war
Syria’s government has a demonstrated history in blocking content on the
internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2009; Deibert, 2008). Since the start of the civil
conflict, there have been two main types of internet disruptions: National, large-
scale outages, and smaller regional variations in accessibility. This chapter only
analyzes large-scale national incidences of complete network outages. Evidence
on the trajectory of these outages suggests that technical failures as the possible
cause can be ruled out (Gallagher, 2012). These outages have occurred at
irregular intervals, without being anticipated by either the international media
or the opposition groups.
Local intermissions generally occur in parts of the country that are already
controlled by opposition groups, most notably the Northern governorates Ar-
Raqqah and Al-Hasaka. These two governorates have experienced limits in
accessibility to the internet for most of the period under investigation. Syrian
security experts contend that these deteriorated connections occur in regions
where the opposition has taken control of territories, in an effort to withhold
public goods from a population that is ‘collaborating’ with the regime’s enemies.6
The country-wide outages for the period between March 2011 and September
2013 are determined through the information collected by the Google Trans-
parency reports on traffic disruptions in Syria since March 2011.7 Suspensions
of traffic that lasted between a few hours and three days occurred in June 2011,
July 2012, November 2012, January 2013 and twice in May 2013.8 To account
for the empirical expectations of the theory, I include three different treatments
for network outages. The first dichotomous variable takes on the value of 1 on
days where the traffic was disrupted, and a 0 for days of normal connection.
The second variables sets the treatment at t− 1, the day prior to the disruption.
The third variable looks at the time window of the disruption, and codes the
day prior to, the days of the disruption, and the following day as 1, and the
rest as 0. To control for decreasing or increasing effects over time, I include a
measure that accounts for the number of previous outages, as well as a variable
that measures the time since the last outage, as recent outages might positively
or negatively affect the dynamics of violence.
Documented conflict fatalities
Table 7.2 provides an overview of the documented daily fatality counts by
governorate. The highest number of fatalities are reported in Rural Damascus,
Homs, Aleppo and Idlib. Rural Damascus also witnessed the maximum number
of fatalities per day for the period from March 2011 to September 2013, which
doubles the number of any other governorate. The outer governorates of Tartus,
Ar-Raqqah, Al-Hasaka, Quneitra, and As-Suwayda all have comparatively low
6Personal communication with Dlshad Othman (Kurdish Syrian Activist and Internet Freedom
Fellow), Anas Qtish (Syrian Blogger, Electronic Frontier Foundation), and staff of the Syrian
Digital Security Monitor (https://syria.secdev.com/).
7http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/
8The fraction of normalized worldwide traffic in Syria is presented for a sample of outages in
the online appendix, Figures 2, 3, and 4.
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Table 7.2. Summary statistics, documented fatality counts
Governorate Min Max Mean St. Dev. ∑
Rural Damascus 0 645 24 34 22,155
Homs 0 265 19 20 17,823
Aleppo 0 255 16 19 14,665
Idlib 0 164 13 14 11,831
Daraa 0 185 11 13 9,898
Hama 0 168 10 13 9,100
Damascus 0 137 8 12 7,622
Deir ez-Zor 0 117 7 10 6,472
Latakia 0 66 3 5 3,203
Tartus 0 125 3 6 2,413
Ar-Raqqah 0 29 2 3 1,458
Al-Hasaka 0 31 1 3 1,141
Quneitra 0 42 1 2 786
As-Suwayda 0 8 0 1 433
numbers of documented violence, further supporting evidence that these areas
were not at the center of clashes between regime and opposition forces for most
of the conflict period under investigation. In the absence of consistent struggles
between the government and opposition, the expectation is that the effect of
network outages is likely to be less pronounced than in governorates such as
Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Idlib.
7.4 Analysis I: Network outages and documented killings
7.4.1 Descriptive evidence
The descriptive difference of documented daily killings during network outages
is presented in Figure 7.1, which maps the average difference in daily killings
between days where the internet is turned on, and days where the country
is disconnected. In the North-East of the country, opposition groups have
established quasi-administrative structures (MacFarquhar and Saad, 2012), and
consequently have been cut off from central government services, including the
internet, which means that national outages are likely to display little effect in
these regions. Evidently the effect depends on the degree of armed confrontation
between opposition and government groups, which means that sub-national
variations need to be taken into account in the analysis. The North-West of the
country, where Aleppo and Idlib are located, show more than 20 additional
fatalities on days where there is no internet across the country, compared to
other days during the period under investigation. The conflict hotspots of Rural
Damascus and Homs in the center of the country show an average daily increase
of more then 30 fatalities.
To further investigate the relationship between violence and disruption it
is useful to visually inspect the dynamics of violence and disruptions across
time. Figure 7.2(a) plots the daily counts for Hama from April to August 2011,
marking the disruption days in June in yellow. A sharp increase in violence on





Figure 7.1. Mean difference in daily killings between days with and without
internet, Syria, March 2011 - September 2013.
the first day of the outage is clearly visible in this graph. A different trend is
shown in Figure 7.2(b), which plots the daily counts for Rural Damascus across
May to August 2012. As can be seen quite clearly, the number of killings rises
substantially on the day before the blackout, decreases on the day concerned
to a still high number, and increases slightly on the following day. This visual
inspection indicates that the association between disruptions and increases in
violence moves beyond the mere outage days. As discussed above, network
disruptions implemented as part of a coercive response need not necessarily
be implemented prior to the commencement of fighting. Shutting down the
network amidst fighting is likely to constitute a role in a military strategy.
To further investigate the difference in violence with regard to the theoretical
predictions, Figure 7.3 plots simple difference of mean tests at the national
and the governorate-level for different ‘treatments’, by comparing all other
days with the day prior to (t − 1), the day of the outage (t), and the time
window(t− 1, t, t + 1) surrounding the disruptions. If the state is using violence
in response to a dispersion of protests, we should see the largest difference
on the day, and the day following the disruption. If the government plans to
cover up all violence occurring during the disruption, we should either see no
increase in killings during the disruption, or before or after the disruption, or
we should only see an increase during the disruption. All tests show that the
means are significantly different from zero, and the highest average difference
at both levels of aggregation can be found at t− 1, the day prior to the outage,
offering further evidence for the coercive response hypothesis.
7.4.2 National-level evidence
Since the outages occur at a national level, the first step of the multivariate
analysis examines the national effect with daily data from the 15th of March
2011 until the 30th of September 2013. In view of the fact that the conflict
in Syria has intensified over time, the number of killings follows a generally
increasing, non mean-reverting trend. To account for these dynamics, I estimate a
Poisson exponentially weighted moving average model (PEWMA), as formalized
by Brandt et al. (2000). The PEWMA is a structural time series model that
nests a Poisson model, where observed counts at time t are modeled as a
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l lGovernorate level National level
Figure 7.3. Difference of means tests for days with and without disruptions.
weighted average of counts at previous time points (Brandt et al., 2000: 827).9
9 The model estimates a hyperparameter ω that accounts for dependence in the event counts
over time, where values close to 0 indicate more dependence, and values approaching 1 indicate
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Table 7.3. National-level time-series model: Disruptions and violence










Last disruption 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ω 0.063 0.063 0.064
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 851 851 851
LLF -4,581.051 -4,582.848 -4,573.671
AIC 9,166.101 9,169.696 9,151.343
Poisson Exponentially Moving Average (PEWMA) Model.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Predicted percentage changes in italics.
Since the interpretation of the coefficients is not straightforward, I calculate the
predicted percentage changes in killings for the same three treatments used in
the difference of mean tests. Table 7.3 reports the results of the three models.
The model predicts that on average, the level of violence increases by 26.3%
on the day prior to an internet outage. During the actual blackout, violence
is predicted to increase by 8.6%, and when looking at the time window, the
average increase is predicted to be almost 47%. Although not all governorates
are affected by fighting in the same way, the aggregate national evidence offers
further support for the hypothesis that outages are preceded and accompanied
by significant increases in violence.
7.4.3 Regional evidence
Since the level of contestation varies substantially across different regions in
Syria, the degree to which states increase their offensives in conjunction with
the outages is likely to differ from region to region. To obtain estimates for each
region in Syria, I estimate a time-series cross section fixed-effects poisson model,
where the 14 governorates are the fixed units. I simulate the expected change
in the number of regime fatalities in each Syrian governorate between a day
where all networks are available and a day where they are shut down. Figure 7.4
shows all 14 governorates along the x-axis and plots the expected change in
few dynamics, and a data structure that could potentially be modeled with a conventional
Poisson model. I thank Patrick Brandt for providing the estimation code on his website: http:
//www.utdallas.edu/~pbrandt/pests/pests.htm.
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fatalities including the 95% confidence interval on the y-axis. The yellow lines
show the expected change on the day of network outages, and the blue lines
show the expected effect on the day prior to an outage. None of the confidence
intervals include zero, which means that the days with network disruptions
witness statistically significant higher levels of violence across all Syrian gover-
norates. In both models, the substantive effect varies clearly across governorates,
which is not surprising given the significant differences in the levels of violence
experienced. In Homs and Rural Damascus, days without internet (yellow lines)
experience at least three additional incidences of lethal violence when compared
to days with regular access. The effect of network outages on violence seems less
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l lDisruption Prior disruption
Figure 7.4. Expected change in daily killings, given network disruptions.
On days prior to internet disruptions, the estimated expected changes in
violence are substantially larger. The expected increase in conflict fatalities in
Homs, Rural Damascus, Aleppo and Idlib is above ten killings. Both models offer
support for the coercive response argument: Governorates in Syria experience
a significant increase in conflict deaths perpetrated by the regime on days
where the regime shuts down network services. Furthermore, a first substantial
increase in violence occurs one day prior, an increase we would not expect if the
regime were interested in covering up atrocities during blackouts, or cracking
down on a higher number of protesters as a result of the outages.
Due to the dynamic nature of conflict violence, it is important to test whether
the results are being driven by general conflict trends in the data. In addition,
I test whether the results hold when replacing absolute levels of documented
violence with the first difference, where the dependent variable only reports the
change in fatalities between two days. The first model in Table 7.4 tests for an
increase in violence on the days prior to disruptions, the second model tests for
the first day of actual disruptions, and the last model tests for the day afterwards,
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Table 7.4. First difference model: Network disruptions and changes in violence
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6








Last disruption 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Disruptions 0.384 −0.437 0.381
(0.376) (0.852) (0.376)
Difft−1 −0.599 −0.600 −0.600
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Difft−2 −0.273 −0.273 −0.273
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.281 0.280 0.280
Adj. R2 0.280 0.280 0.280
N 11,914 11,914 11,914
in order to investigate whether violence continues to rise. As expected, the most
statistically significant and substantive increase is found on the day prior to the
disruption. The effect on the actual days with outages is not as pronounced, and
there seems to be no enduring effect once networks are turned back on again.
7.4.4 Placebo Tests
Given the small number of ‘treatment’ incidences over the time period of three
years it is important to check whether these results might be due to chance.10
A useful way to do this is to use a placebo test (see Dafoe and Tunón, 2014).
In order to maintain the structure of the treatment variable, I create a series
of time-shifted placebos (see Reynolds, 2014; Dube, Kaplan and Naidu, 2011),
where the treatment is moved between t− 30 and t + 30 intervals, to account
for the time period one month prior to and one month following each outage.11
For each placebo, the national-level time-series count model is estimated, and
the predicted percentage change of violence on days with the treatment saved.
Figure 7.5 plots the predicted changes, as well as the actual treatments at t (the
disruption) and t− 1 (the day prior the disruption). The majority of all placebos
predict a change in violence that is negative, or less than +2%. Importantly, the
predicted change in the immediate aftermath of the outage are either zero, or
10Recent revelations by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden suggest that the November 2012
outage might have occurred due to a technical failure brought about by the NSA (Bamford, 2014).
11The placebos created were at t [-30,-25,-20,-15,-10-,-5,+1,+5,+10,+15,+20,+25,+30].


















































Figure 7.5. Time-shifted placebo treatment test.
negative, further confirming that governments are not responding to an increase
in protest during the disruption.
7.5 Analysis II: Network outages and documentation pat-
terns of violence
The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has led to one of the most sophisticated
real-time documentation efforts in the history of casualty recording with count-
less groups and organizations working to keep track on the violence. As in all
conflicts, however, it is impossible to determine the true population of conflict
fatalities via documented data. Human rights groups are doing their very best
to document all violence that is documentable, but for analyses such as the one
attempted in this study, it is of paramount importance to obtain an estimate
of all fatalities, not just of those documented. Studies examining the effect of
information technology on the intensity of violence are particularly sensitive to
potential biases in conflict data that might arise precisely because of changes in
said technology. This study is no different, and the cover-up hypothesis, which
assumes that the outages were implemented to cover-up state-led atrocities, even
supports this claim.
7.5.1 Variation in reporting before and during disruptions
One way to test for the cover-up hypothesis is to determine whether the level
of underreporting differed substantially on days without internet, compared to
days with network access. Since four datasets are de-duplicated and matched
for the entire observation period, the overlap structures of fatalities that were
recorded by 1, 2, 3 or 4 sources can be used to estimate the number of fatalities
that were not documented by any source, as described in Chapter 6. Log-linear
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capture-recapture estimation follows this simple intuition and has been used to
estimate fatalities in a multitude of conflicts (see Lum, Price and Banks, 2013).12 I
isolate the number of documented fatalities by governorate for the days without
internet, and estimate the number of undocumented killings for each of these
periods and regions separately. Since the degree of underreporting is likely to
vary across time and space, I select the fixed period of a week prior to each
network disruption and estimate the level of underreporting at the national
level, and for each respective governorate as well. I then compare the levels of
regional underreporting for the immediate time period prior to the disruption
with the underreporting during the disruption, in order to assess whether or
not disconnected days lead to systematic underreporting of violence.
For example, during the internet blackout on the 3rd and 4th of June 2011,
24 victims were documented in Aleppo. Only 7 of these victims are reported
in all lists, the remaining victims were reported by a combination of less than
all sources. Capture-recapture estimation reveals that it is highly likely that
42 individuals were killed in this period (with a 95% confidence interval of
[25, 150]), which means that 42.7 % of all victims went undocumented in those
two days. In the week prior to the June outage, 133 victims of regime violence
were documented in Aleppo, of which only 46 were known by all sources. The
estimated number of actual regime fatalities is 167 [c.i.: 146; 212], which means

















































































































l lOne week prior Disruption
Figure 7.6. Per cent of undocumented fatalities (of actual number) one week
prior to, and during disruptions, by governorate.
Figure 7.6 shows the level of underreporting for the week prior to, and
during internet outages at the national and governorate-level, including 95 %
12Log-linear poisson models for capture-recapture estimation are implemented in the R pack-
age Rcapture (Baillargeon and Rivest, 2007). Log-linear models are effective in dealing with
capture heterogeneity and list dependencies, two of the main challenges when estimating conflict
fatalities (see Manrique-Vallier, Price and Gohdes, 2013).
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confidence intervals. At the national level, the degree of underreporting is
almost exactly the same, and at the governorate-level, only Hama displays a
significant difference, but in this case underreporting was significantly higher
prior to the outage, which poses no problem for the validity of the results. The
results suggest that documentation patterns are not systematically linked to
network outages. Whereas variation in reporting across governorates is partly
visible, it is likely to be driven by other factors not addressed in this study. I
also estimate the level of underreporting for each outage separately, the results






























l lOne week prior Disruption
Figure 7.7. Per cent of undocumented fatalities one week prior to, and during
disruptions, measured for each disruption separately.
7.6 Summary
Censorship of the internet is nothing new: authoritarian regimes intent on
maintaining the status quo within their country have been relatively successful
at manipulating content in their favor (Morozov, 2012; Rød and Weidmann,
forthcoming). What has remained unclear to date, however, is to what extent
extreme forms of censorship - such as the cutting of all connections - have
the potential for constituting a tactic within larger military offensives. The
results of the analysis of network outages and daily conflict fatalities in Syria
suggest that regimes implement large-scale disruptions selectively and purposely
in conjunction with launching larger battles. Evidently, not all battles are
accompanied by outages, but when they are, they tend to be preceded by a
substantial increase in violence.
Even in conflicts that are under as much national and international scrutiny
as the current case of Syria, it is important to analytically distinguish between the
empirical implications for documented violence, and the empirical implications
for actual levels of violence: cases that are observed and those that are either
intentionally or unintentionally hidden from documentation. The theoretical
expectations advanced in this study clearly distinguish between implications for
documentation of violence, and violence in general. Distinguishing between the
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documented and the dark figure of violence improves the analytical leverage
of the study’s findings: the fact that undocumented violence in Syria is not
systematically affected by short disruptions offers important support for the
coercive response hypothesis.13 The comparison and testing of these competing
theories (military strategy vs. cover-up) would not have been possible without
an estimation of the unreported number of state killings. The dependency of the
observed data on information accessibility would not have been known. Esti-
mating the degree of underreporting, however, also demonstrates the variability
in documentation. Cases where more violence is hidden from view during
disruptions might turn out to be a welcome side-effect for governments seeking
to maintain international legitimacy and internal control.
This chapter has attempted to understand why governments might have an
incentive to include the disruption of internet and cellphone service in their
military strategy. I have argued that the scarce and sudden disconnection
from essential communication networks is likely to weaken opposition groups’
propensity to organise, but further research is needed in order to understand
whether this is in fact the case, and if so, what the exact underlying mechanisms
are that allow network failures to get in the way of effective information dissem-
ination. This analysis has analysed the effects of nation-wide outages. The next
chapter investigates how regional variations in the accessibility of the internet
affect strategies of violent state repression.
13Incidences where the shutdown lasts much longer might produce very different results.
8
Information, connectivity, and strategic
coercion
8.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how a government’s ability to censor and limit the
flow of information feeds into its choice of coercive tactics. I analyse how sub-
national variations in internet accessibility in Syria affect the government’s use
of repressive strategies. The Syrian regime has made use of a wide array on
surveillance measures to spy on its citizens, in particular all those it has deemed
threatening to its survival (see Galperin and Marquis-Boire, 2012; Galperin,
Marquis-Boire and Scott-Railton, 2013). Likewise, it has, at different points in
time, limited the accessibility of the internet across the entire country, and in
individual regions significantly. I commence with a brief overview of research
dealing with the effect of information control on coercion, and then theorize how
the trade-off between censorship and surveillance affects a government’s ability
to effectively repress those it deems threatening to its political stability. The
conditions under which surveillance will be more effective, as well as conditions
under which censorship will be more effective are discussed, and empirical
expectations for each condition formulated. The empirical part of this chapter
presents the survey data used to assess the degree of censorship in each Syrian
governorate between June 2013 and April 2014, and discusses the steps involved
in obtaining an accurate measure of targeted and untargeted repressive tactics
used by the Syrian government across the same period of time.
I use supervised machine-learning to analyze over 60,000 records of killings
perpetrated by the Syrian Regime in the ongoing conflict, and classify them
according to their event circumstances, to arrive at a categorization between
targeted and untargeted acts of repression. To account for variations in the
level of reported violence, I use capture-recapture methods to estimate the total
number of killings in both categories. This new indicator of strategic repression
is used in a beta-binomial regression to estimate the effect of varying levels of
censorship on the proportion of targeted (vs. untargeted) killings conducted
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by the government at a certain time and place. I find that higher levels of
information accessibility are consistently linked to an increase in the proportion
of targeted repression, whereas areas with little or no access witness more
indiscriminate campaigns of violence.
8.2 Information control and coercion
The relationship between violent state coercion and domestic dissent is both
theoretically and empirically well-established (Moore, 1998; Davenport, 2007a;
Conrad and Moore, 2010; Carey, 2010). Rulers weigh the perceived threat posed
by protesting citizens and/or opposition groups against their perceived strength,
and the likelihood of employing coercive policies increases as the imbalance
between strength and threat grows (Poe, 2004). State repression can take on
different manifestations in terms of scale, scope, and technical sophistication,
but the forms most generally identified with coercion are physical integrity
rights violations such as torture, imprisonment, killings, and disappearances.
The literature broadly distinguishes between targeted forms of repression,
which are directed against dissidents and opposition members, and repression
that is directed against large parts or the majority of the population (Wood and
Gibney, 2010; Krüger and Davenport, 2014). The distinction is not only theoreti-
cally important, as the effect of repressive actions is likely to vary depending on
the type and scope of violence directed against the population (Kalyvas, 2006;
Lyall, 2009; Zhukov, 2013). Faced with disgruntled citizens, governments have
to choose the level and scope of coercive measures to be used: whereas too light
a response against a few individuals might be ineffective at obstructing serious
attempts to challenge authority, too much violence might backfire by motivating
previously agnostic or uninterested bystanders to join the protests or resistance
movement. To maintain political control, rulers are likely to attempt targeting
those individuals deemed threatening to the status quo. Where governments
have identified large parts of their domestic population as a threat, repression is
likely to be wide-spread and indiscriminate (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay,
2004).
For state repression to effectively stabilize the position of the ruler, the strate-
gic use of censorship is critical (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). Traditionally,
more extreme forms of censoring information have been implemented by ban-
ning newspaper, radio and television stations and targeting journalists. Less
extreme forms have included the surveillance of news agencies and banning and
alteration of individual media content. In contrast to coercion, which is seldom
directed at all citizens, the intentional restriction and altering of information
flows indiscriminately affects an entire population (Wintrobe, 1998). As with
indiscriminate violence, overly zealous censorship has the potential for back-
firing, where citizens rate the absence of reporting as ‘bad news’ (Shadmehr
and Bernhardt, 2013: 26), and thus lower their support for the ruling elite.
Conversely, leaders fear that free and public criticism of their policies might
jeopardize their standing even more (Kim, Whitten-Woodring and James, 2014).
The rise of citizen journalists working independently of traditional news
agencies and providing content via internet platforms, and the sheer increase
of information generated and shared across social networks have changed the
repercussions and dynamics of censorship and rebellion considerably (Aday,
8.2 Information control and coercion 93
Farrell and Lynch, 2010). Communication via Skype, Facebook and Twitter,
in particular accelerated by the availability of smart phones, has increased the
value of disseminating information and using it as a ‘coordinating force [...]
dramatically’ (Shirky, 2008: 159). Additionally, ‘[b]logging, tweeting, podcasting,
and taking pictures and videos and uploading them to Flickr and YouTube
can all be done at near-zero financial cost’ (MacKinnon, 2012: 24), allowing
ordinary citizens to provide documentation of state actions in situations where
journalists have been expelled or arrested. Recent studies even report that social
networking opportunities may in fact positively affect the political awareness
of unsatisfied citizens (Reuter and Szakonyi, 2013), an attribute that is likely to
increase the pool of potential recruits of anti-government rebellions (Tufekci and
Wilson, 2012). Even when only looking at mobile phone connections, Pierskalla
and Hollenbach (2013: 210) find that opposition groups strongly benefit from
the availability of cheap communication tools, thereby increasing the incidences
of organized, violent rebellions.
While the decentralized nature of the internet has enhanced the toolkits
of activists and protesters, it has at the same time proved equally effective in
broadening the repertoire of surveillance for governments (see Youmans and
York, 2012), and forced leaders to adapt their censorship methods (Deibert,
2008, 2010; Roberts, 2014). Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) distinguish between
three generations of internet control, where the first generation presents the
most primitive form of blocking content, and the second and third generations
involve more subtle ways of warantless surveillance and normative campaigns
against critical information, intended to encourage self-censorship. With regard
to first-generation controls (see also Howard, Agarwal and Hussain, 2011), the
results presented in the previous chapter demonstrates that large-scale, short-
term network outages in Syria were accompanied by substantive increases in
government-directed violence, indicating that the shutdown might have been
employed strategically to weaken the coordination capabilities of the opposition.
Looking at more sophisticated forms of censorship, King, Pan and Roberts
(2013) demonstrate that the Chinese government has taken the mobilizing
potential of the internet seriously, by showing that significantly more content
inciting collective organization is censored than other types of content – even
content that explicitly criticizes the ruling party. Both China and Russia provide
fully supervised domestic ‘cyberspaces’ to their citizens, allowing them to
engage relatively freely with each other online, and go to great lengths of only
censoring what is – in their eyes – necessary to avoid internal unrests (Deibert
and Rohozinski, 2010; King, Pan and Roberts, 2014). The combination of full
surveillance on the one hand, and sophisticated censorship on the other hand
has proven to be highly successful in both cases (MacKinnon, 2012). The effort
made to maintain these systems speaks volumes about the trade-off modern
rulers face. Allowing citizens to converse openly provides the ideal grounds for
surveillance, but the proven potential for collective mobilization means there is
risk involved as well.
Not all governments have sufficient resources to manually supervise and
filter their domestic webspace, in the way China or Russia has done. Less
expensive methods are revealed by recent research demonstrating the extent and
ease of implementing warantless surveillance. Marczak et al. (2014) document
extensive spyware and trojans used by the governments of Bahrain, Syria, and
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the United Arab Emirates for ‘eavesdropping, stealing information, and/or
unmasking anonymous users’ (Marczak et al., 2014: 1).
Obtaining information about the opposition does not necessarily require
spyware: if a sufficient proportion of the population support the government,
sharing knowledge on the location and planned activities of dissidents or insur-
gents is likely to occur via cell phones or anonymous tips online. Shapiro and
Weidmann (forthcoming) analyze cell phone usage in Iraq and find that insur-
gent violence is significantly lower where increased mobile communication is
available, which they argue is due to the civilian population sharing information
with the government.
In conclusion, the majority of research intent on understanding censorship
has therefore focused on how variations in media restriction might quell or
instigate unrest. The informational value generated by the free exchange of
information has remained somewhat neglected. Although the threat of collective
action resulting from increased communication flows is evident, the exponential
increase in user-generated content has provided important incentives for rulers
to surveil their entire domestic population (Deibert, 2010; MacKinnon, 2012). The
following section theorizes about how the control and limitation of information
flows is likely to be linked to different strategies of government coercion.
8.3 Surveillance, censorship, and ‘effective’ repression
I assume that from the position of the government, a repression tactic is effective
if it manages to eliminate or at least mitigate the threat posed, for example, by
an insurgency, mass uprising or even smaller-scale protest. Ideally, such a tactic
would involve identifying those individuals or organisations that are genuinely
challenging the authority’s position, as opposed to the neutral bystanders, and
eliminating them, for example through arrest, expulsion, disappearance, or even
violent death. To do this, leaders need identifying information (Kalyvas, 2006;
Condra and Shapiro, 2012), and the opportunities for obtaining such information
by surveilling online communication are immense.
Where citizens are able to access the internet and converse with others freely,
they generate vast amounts of information that can be used by governments.
Information gained via these services is used to create nuanced models of inter-
action, perceptions, location, intention, and network of collaborators for each
citizen. Public and private events organized and distributed via social media,
email, and other channels can easily be anticipated. Prospective participants
of such events can be predicted and also placed under even closer surveillance.
Each individual’s friends, followers, call logs, newsletters, subscriptions and text
messages can be used to obtain an understanding of how resistance movements
are organized, and who constitutes the central actors. Once these particular
‘threats’ are identified, location-based services can aid in isolating and targeting
them.
The use of surveillance to facilitate targeted arrests and elimination of threats
to the political survival of regimes have long since been a part of the repertoire of
coercive tools used by governments. The German Staatssicherheit was famous for
its meticulous approach towards surveilling citizens in the German Democratic
Republic, by listening in on phone calls, positioning staff in next-door homes,
and getting neighbours, family and friends to spy on each other. Targeted arrests
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based on the information gathered were then oftentimes conducted at night,
making the disappearance of individuals less obtrusive.
In short, the free flow of information allows governments to effectively
surveil citizens, and extract information needed to identify perceived central
threats with relatively high levels of accuracy. The main tradeoff leaders face
is, however, obvious: for surveillance of ‘critical’ information to work, critical
information needs to be exchanged, which in turn can further strengthen those
opposed to the central political authority. This fear led the Iranian government
to limit access to the internet during the national elections in 2009. It also led the
Sudanese government to disconnect its citizens from the internet in 2013 when
protests sparked over fuel prices. In early 2014, it led the Turkish government to
ban Twitter for two weeks. It led the Chinese government to block Instagram
during recent mass protests in Hong Kong (Olesen, 2014). And it has led the
Vietnamese government to continuously surveil and arrest bloggers.
Thus, in limiting the free flow of information, government are following the
classic understanding of censorship: restricting criticism and calls for collective
organization in order to maintain control and stability. This stability comes
at the price of information loss (see also Lorentzen, 2013) and, if overused,
loss of public support (Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2013). I will now proceed to
hypothesize under which conditions free (or freer) access to information, and
under which conditions a more restrictive access to information will be more
effective for governments intent on countering a domestic threat.
8.3.1 Incentives for surveillance
The ability to closely surveil the free flow of information will be particularly
useful in situations where governments do not perceive the threat as coming
from the overwhelming majority of the domestic population. In a first assess-
ment, pending further information, leaders evaluate the extent of the challenge
to their status quo. For example, if the source of unrest has already been traced
back to a particular group – such as a student group, or a small ethnic minority
– the surveillance benefits of permitting unrestricted information exchange will
outweigh the costs. In this scenario, full surveillance allows governments to
learn even more about their opponents, information that increases their chances
of successfully putting an end to the anti-government activities. Equally impor-
tant, it allows for a close supervision of public attitudes towards the dissidents,
which could range from disapproval to sympathy, and ultimately to willingness
to participate in the resistance. Under these conditions, full access (and thus
surveillance), paired with a highly selective coercive campaign directed against
the core dissidents is likely to be most successful.
Shutting down or limiting all access to information and communication
would prove ineffective for multiple reasons. First and foremost, it would
weaken the government’s ability to target the dissidents responsible for generat-
ing a threat. However, there are other far-reaching repercussions: restrictions
or bans on (social) media generate substantial negative press that is likely to
draw more attention to the cause of the dissidents, thus making it harder for the
government to quietly clamp down on the unrest (see, for example Tufekci, 2014).
Lastly, public support from those originally in favor of the status quo is likely to
suffer where basic access to network services is curtailed. In consequence, where
governments plan on conducting repressive campaigns that are targeted against
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certain individuals, groups, or organizations, the free exchange of information
is likely to be more advantageous than the limitation thereof.
Empirical Expectation 1: Government provisions for the free exchange of
information are likely to be positively correlated with a targeted coercive
response tactic.
8.3.2 Incentives for censorship
In situations where the source of the threat is unclear and/or a substantial
proportion of the population is deemed threatening to the government’s political
authority, the trade-off between surveillance and censorship produces a different
solution. Assuming that, for example, the majority of the population is known
to be in favour of an alternative ruling power and is willing to mobilize against
the status quo, the repressive response required by desperate government is
likely to aim at signalling strength and resolve (Downes, 2007). Put bluntly,
where everyone is seen as a potential threat, no nuances in the surveillance of
individuals or groups is required, as the whole population has been identified
as a potential target, regardless of their online activities. On the contrary, a free
exchange of information would mean providing a free infrastructure for the
opposition to organize their rebellion effectively via the internet.
In situations where the most effective strategy of repression is anticipated to
be an extreme scorched-earth-policy (see Downes, 2007), governments will reap
the highest benefit from restricting access to communication and information. In
situations where the government cannot afford to implement such an extreme
policy, but nevertheless perceives its position of power to be so severely threat-
ened that forceful, untargeted retaliation is attempted, restricting information
access offers yet another form of indiscriminate punishment.
Empirical Expectation 2: Government restrictions on the free exchange
of information are likely to be positively correlated with a less targeted
(more untargeted) coercive response tactic.
8.4 Data and empirical strategy
8.4.1 Regional network accessibility in Syria
To measure regional network accessibility in Syria, I make use of survey data
collected by the Syria Digital Security Monitor (SDSM), a project funded by
the Ottawa-based SecDev Foundation. Since June 2013, SDSM has surveyed all
Syrian districts on a biweekly1 basis in order to establish the degree of digital
accessibility across the country. The survey asks respondents to separately rate
their ability to use the internet (distinguishing between ADSL, 2G, 3G), landlines
and mobile phones on a four-point scale, where 1= general availability, 2 =
available often, 3= intermittent availability, and 4 = no availability. To ensure
comparability, SDSM attempts to survey the same set of respondents in every
wave, but also makes use of social media sources.2 To obtain a standardised unit
of analysis, the accessibility measures are aggregated to the governorate level,
1For some months, only one survey is available, not two.
2Personal communication with SecDev Foundation staff.
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Figure 8.1. Internet (DSL, 3G, and 2G) accessibility by Syrian governorate, June
2013 - April 2014.
measured in biweekly intervals. I test the effect of connectivity using the three
measures for internet connectivity, which are access to DSL-internet, as well
as mobile access to 2G and 3G networks. As the availability of mobile phone
networks has been the subject of recent research, I run additional test with
this measure (Shapiro and Weidmann, forthcoming; Pierskalla and Hollenbach,
2013), but do not expect a significant effect here. The theoretical expectations
formulated above hold no prediction of the effect of landlines, as these long
predate the internet era. I therefore expect no significant effect between the
availability of landline telephone access and repressive strategies.
Figure 8.1 plots the level of internet accessibility (DSL, 3G and 2G) by
governorate for the time period of this study, June 2013 - April 2014. Where the
lines spike, no or only little internet access is available. It is important to note
that – with exception of Al-Hasaka and Ar-Raqqah – all regions that witness
temporary inaccessibility throughout this time period, regain connectivity. If
reductions in internet access were tied to technical failures stemming from
irreparable damage by destruction, the loss of access would be irreversible
and no return to access would be discernible. Instead, we see that in the
most contentious regions (among others: Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Homs)
connectivity varies considerably over time.
8.4.2 Classifying targeted and untargeted repression
Quantifying variations in a government’s repressive strategy is challenging, in
particular when the objects of interest are patterns that move beyond scale. The
operational definition for targeted and untargeted violence used here builds on
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Figure 8.2. Assembling information on record details.
work by Kalyvas (2006), Steele (2009), and Wood (2010). In this context, state
violence is defined as targeted if the victim was killed either due to individual
(dissident, defector, critical journalist) or collective (party, ethnicity) character-
istics. All incidences where the victim was not selected based on individual
or collective characteristics are assumed to be untargeted violence. Since it is
impossible to measure intent, I rely on descriptive information regarding the
circumstances of violence to infer the probable intent. I use supervised machine-
learning to classify over 60,000 aggregated reports on individual killings that
were committed by the Syrian Regime (and pro-government forces) between
June 2013 and April 2014 (see Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014).
To arrive at an accurate number of reported killings for the period concerned,
I combine information on lethal violence in Syria collected by different human
rights groups, as presented in Chapter 5. The groups’ records were pooled to one
large dataset. Each record in this ‘pool’ was then compared to every other record
in order to identify records that match across name, date of death and location
(governorate)(Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014). De-duplicating and matching differ-
ent data sources on violence offers two important analytical advantages: First, it
reduces the probability of over-representing violent events covered by multiple
groups, a known problem of event-data sources, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Second, it allows for the triangulation of all auxiliary information that comes
with each of these records. Figure 8.2 presents a model of this triangulation
process for an individual record: Assuming that a violent event was documented
by three of the four groups, we can combine the notes on death circumstances
from these three sources to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of how
(and possibly why) this person was killed by the government. These combined,
or ‘aggregated’ texts form the basis on which the classification of records is
conducted.
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Based on a training set of 2,000 randomly selected records I classify by hand,3
the model is trained to classify each record as either a targeted killing or an
untargeted killing. A third category was classified which includes all victims
killed by non-government forces. These are predominantly attributed to ISIS
(Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) forces, and a few were also attributed to
PKK/PYK (Kurdish) forces. All records in this final category were dropped
from the analysis.
In the hand-coded training set, records are classified as targeted killings if
the circumstances described in the aggregated report 1) indicate that the victim
was selected based on his/her specific characteristics (e.g. ‘killed because he refused
to [...]’, ‘targeted while protesting [...]’, ‘dissent’ ) and/or 2) indicate that the method
of killing was of a selective nature (e.g. executed by sniper, hanging, beheading,
set afire), and/or 3) the method of killing was accompanied by other violations
of a selective nature (e.g. arrest, detention, prison, ‘found with hands/legs tied’).
Records are classified as untargeted killings if the circumstances described in
the aggregated report 1) indicate that the victim was not selected based on
his/her specific characteristics (e.g. ‘stepped on a landmine’), and/or indicate that
the method of killing was not selective (e.g. explosion, bombing, shelling, mortar,
chemical, toxic cases), and/or 3) the method of killing was not accompanied by
other targeted violations.
The results presented here use the support vector machine (SVM) learning
algorithm (Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000; Feinerer, Hornik and Meyer,
2008).4 Figure 8.3 presents a summary of the classified records. Of the 60,904
records, 825 could not be classified because no additional information was
available from any of the sources. 1780 of the recorded killing were perpetrated
by either the PKK or ISIS. The unidentifiable records and those perpetrated
by PKK and ISIS were omitted from the analysis. The majority of the records
collected by the four human rights groups indicate untargeted violence, and
more than 8000 are classified as targeted instances of state repression. For each
location and time point, I establish the number of targeted killings targit, and the
number of untargeted killings untargit, which together form the overall number
of regime fatalities nit.
8.4.3 Estimating reliable levels of targeted and untargeted killings
Variations in reporting can be a serious problem when using ‘raw’ event
data (Weidmann, 2014b), in particular when attempting to compare patterns
of categories of violence that occurred under different circumstances. As such
there are two important reasons why this study cannot make use of simple
event counts. First, the likelihood that targeted and untargeted violent events
are reported with a different probability is high. Second, the main variable of
interest - variations in information accessibility - is likely to heavily influence
the ability to report, which by consequence would lead to reports of violence
being endogenous to the level of information accessibility.
3The information provided by the four human rights groups was translated from Arabic into
English using Goslate, a Free Google Translate API for Python.
4The classification process was performed using the RTextTools package written by Jurka et al.
(2012). A variety of different algorithms were tested, including Random Forest, maximum entropy
and glmnet, and the results were all comparable. The SVM algorithm consistently provided the
highest overall accuracy, which is why I only use the SVM classifications in this chapter.



















Figure 8.3. Summary of classified records.
Using multiple recapture estimation, as introduced in Chapter 6, I predict
the number of unreported targeted and unreported untargeted killings for
every governorate, for every time period covered by an SDSM survey (see also
Baillargeon and Rivest, 2007; Gohdes, 2014). Instead of using the counts in each
category generated from the classification, I use the estimated count for both
targeted and untargeted violence, for each observation of accessibility in each
Syrian governorate between June 2013 and April 2014. Since the survey was
conducted on a bi-weekly basis and there are 14 governorates, I arrive at an
N=350.
To account for uncertainty in the estimation process, I repeat the empirical
analysis with the upper and the lower bound of each estimated count (also know
as the 95% confidence intervals). The analyses are reported in the Appendix in
Figure 5 and Figure 6. The results are comparable.
8.5 Results
The analysis defines a government’s coercive tactic to consist of two components,
which are the number of targeted and the number of untargeted killings. To
account for both scale and proportion between the two, I fit a beta-binomial
generalised linear model which is generally used for clustered data with the
form {n, m}, where n is the size of the entire cluster, and m is defined as the
number of successes in n, so m ≤ n (see Lesnoff and Lancelot, 2013: 3-7). In this
study, nit is the number of overall fatalities committed by the regime at a given
time and place (targeted + untargeted), and mii is the number of those fatalities
that were targeted killings. The dependent variable is defined as y = mn . For a
given observation (n, m), the model is
m|λ, n ∼ Binomial(n,λ), (8.1)
where λ follows a Beta distribution Beta(a1, a2). I opt against a conventional
fixed-effects approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity that might result
from the panel structure of the data, since the descriptive statistics suggest that







































Figure 8.4. Expected proportion of targeted killings, given internet accessibility.
interest. To account for heterogeneity, I estimate separate dispersion parameters
for each governorate. Initial comparisons of AIC/BIC model fit criteria indicate
that the heterogeneous dispersion models provide the best model fit.
Figure 8.4 presents the simulated expected proportion (with 95% confidence
intervals) of targeted killings (in %) for each degree of connectivity, by type
of connection. The left panel presents the effect of access to regular internet,
where the expected proportion of selectively targeted killings by the government
is more then 20% (with a confidence interval of 16.5% and 26.9%). According
to this model, one in five victims are purposefully selected to be killed by
the government where access to network services is allowed. As the level of
connectivity decreases, this proportion drops significantly. Where access to
the internet is fully censored, the model predicts that only about 8% (with a
confidence interval of 7.2% to 10.6%) of all victims have been targeted based
on individual or collective characteristics, which means that 9 out of 10 killed
have been indiscriminately attacked. This large and significant difference in
coercive strategies offers empirical support for the expectations formulated in
this study: The strategy of government coercion varies significantly with the
level of internet connectivity provided. The other two measures of internet
accessibility offer similar results. Anecdotal evidence from Syrian citizens
suggests that the restrictions placed on their telecommunications system are
commonly understood to be a part of ‘mass-punishment’ by the government,
which is becoming increasingly desperate to regain control over ‘lost’ parts of the
country.5 Figure 8.5 presents the effect of mobile phone and landline accessibility
on varying strategies of state repression. Mobile phone connectivity seems to
follow the same pattern of internet connectivity, but, as expected, the accessibility
of landlines bears no significant relationship with the government’s coercive
strategy. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, Figure 8.6 presents the
simulated expected change (in percentage points) in the proportion of targeted
killings, when moving from no access to full connectivity. Where the 95%
confidence interval does not include zero, the expected change is significant. The
5Personal interview with two Syrian activists, and staff of the Syrian Digital Security Monitor.





































































Figure 8.6. First difference: change in percentage of targeted killings (no access
to full connection).
first-difference graph improves the illustration of the findings: as the availability
of internet access moves from none to full, the percentage of victims that were
purposefully targeted increases significantly for all types of connections, except
(as expected) for landlines. Where connections are restricted, the government
follows a coercive strategy that is significantly more indiscriminate.
8.6 Summary
This chapter provided the most rigorous test for the overall theoretical argument
of the dissertation: governments spatially and temporally vary their strategies
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of internet control and adapt their violent repressive strategy accordingly. The
analysis provides solutions for a number of challenges to measuring both state
control of the internet and variations in the strategies of state repression. Survey
data on the level of accessibility of the internet was used to gauge the state’s
implementation of network controls. The Syrian government has a demonstrated
history of using different techniques of digital surveillance to spy on its own
population, which is why it is plausible to infer that where the internet is
accessible, it is using it to monitor the opposition. Limits to accessibility in
turn indicate strategic restrictions, not least because the level of connectivity has
strongly fluctuated over time and regions, indicating that lack of access is likely
to be due to technical failures.
To measure repressive strategies, I used supervised machine-learning algo-
rithms to classify over 60,000 records of state killings according to their event
circumstances. Capture-recapture models were then used to estimate the total
number of killings in both categories for each governorate and time period
in the dataset on network restrictions. The analysis of the effect of varying
levels of network control on the proportion of targeted (versus untargeted) state
killings reveals that higher levels of connectivity are significantly related to an
increase in the proportion of targeted repression. In contrast, little or no access
to the internet is significantly linked to indiscriminate campaigns of violence.
These results offer systematic support for the central theoretical arguments
presented in this study. A discussion of the implications of these findings, and
the findings presented in previous chapters, is delivered in the final chapter of
this dissertation.
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9
Conclusion
The digital revolution presents governments who fear for their political survival
with a dilemma. On the one hand, the exponential increase in ‘private’, user-
generated online content offers seemingly endless possibilites for surveillance,
making the spying, tracking, profiling, and ultimately the isolating and targeting
of individuals deemed threatening to the regime cheap and efficient. On the
other hand, civilian uprisings from Damascus to Cairo have shown that social
media has the potential for collectively mobilizing protesters and spreading al-
ternative views on political actions in a way that was previously neither possible
nor foreseeable. When the citizens of Hong Kong took to the streets in Septem-
ber 2014, smartphones were the central medium by which their movement was
organised, promoting a common spirit, coordinating events, and ensuring the
availability of basic necessities, such as food, water and sanitation (Shirky, 2014).
Digital images of hundreds of thousands of protesters holding up illuminate
smartphone screens instead of candles travelled around the world. The Chinese
government responded by censoring any references to the protests on its social
media platforms to prevent the spread of information to the mainland, but
has so far refrained from actually cutting internet accessibility (Olesen, 2014).
Pro-democracy websites were found to have malware embedded that compro-
mised the computers and phones of those visting them, thereby facilitating full
digital surveillance (Adair, 2014). Along with increased digital empowerment of
ordinary citizens, states have also increased their own abilities to tamper with,
and temporarily limit, centrally-provided network services, by making use of
increasingly sophisticated technology.
The evidence presented in this dissertation clearly shows that internet control
is pervasive and unmistakably linked to states’ larger repressive strategies. The
global analysis of network disruptions and states’ abuse of physical integrity
rights presented in Chapter 4 shows that even when taking into account the
main predictors of state repression, disruptive internet controls are significantly
and positively associated with increased state terror. The case examples demon-
strated the variability in network controls and the subtle ways in which both
internet censorship and surveillance are used to inform states’ coercive strategies.
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Indeed, even in countries like Ethiopia, where only a small fraction of citizens
make use of the internet, governments have installed pervasive controls of the
digital sphere. The quantitative case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 provided
extensive and disaggregated evidence for the instrumental value governments
ascribe to controlling internet accessibility in times of civil conflict. The results
discussed in Chapter 7 suggest that the Syrian government implemented full-
blown blackouts of the internet in conjunction with larger military offensives
against the opposition and civilians supporting the opposition. Through the use
of a number of innovative statistical methods, I was able to eliminate important
competing explanations for this empirical association, such as the plausible
alternative explanation that shutdowns were intended to hide atrocities from
the outside world. Chapter 8 revealed that the nature of state violence is linked
to variations in network accessibility, when comparing the level of targeted and
untargeted lethal violence used by the Syrian regime in different regions of the
country.
In the concluding section, I will now briefly summarise the main theoretical
and empirical implications that this dissertation provides, and discuss the
broader ramifications for policy makers and society at large.
9.1 Theoretical contribution
9.1.1 Surveillance, censorship, and violence after the digital revolu-
tion
This is the first study to theoretically link the use of purposely-implemented
internet controls to the type and scale of state-sanctioned violence repression.
The availability of intelligence, and the manipulation of information access
have both featured prominently in theories of state repression and authoritarian
rule (Kalyvas, 2006; Kern and Hainmueller, 2009; Davenport, 2010; Kim, Whitten-
Woodring and James, 2014). The rapid shift in the nature, access to, and
producers of information in the digital age call for theoretical approaches that
account for these changes. This study adds to our understanding of how
online information access and the power of digital intelligence gathering via
surveillance, inform states’ opportunities and willingness to respond to domestic
unrest with violent repression. Future data collection efforts on states’ use of
digital surveillance tools will be required to test these mechanisms at a global
level, and will provide important insights into specific types and applications of
surveillance in different political contexts.
9.1.2 Network control and military warfare
Evidence presented in Chapter 7 demonstrates the potential of network re-
strictions to constitute a tactic within larger military offensives. The analyses
of internet shutdowns and state killings suggest that regimes use large-scale
disruptions selectively and purposely in conjunction with concerted repressive
offensives against the opposition. Not all military offensives are accompanied
by outages, but when access is denied, there is a significant rise in the number
of lives lost.
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Syria represents the first conflict that has been meticulously followed and
fuelled by a vast online audience: by the opposition fighters and supporters,
by regime forces and their supporters, and by the outside world at large. The
increasing importance of establishing control over online content and access to
the internet, is likely to exert a growing appeal for regimes eager to adjust their
repertoire of repressive tools in dealing with new digital threats to the status
quo.
9.2 Methodological contribution
9.2.1 Integration and classification of high-quality data on govern-
ment coercion
The new database on state killings in Syria presented in Chapter 5 addresses
the problem of over-counting in the collection of event data on political violence.
Linking records provided by five different sources on the occurrence of lethal
violations committed by the regime, ensures that every incident is only counted
once. The fact that each record can be traced back to the original sources in which
it was found provides a number of opportunities for researchers to gain a deeper
understanding of how the data were collected, and how this process varies
over temporal and spatial units. Linking information from multiple sources
also allowed me to combine detailed evidence of all sources on circumstances
under which the killing was perpetrated. The circumstantial evidence was used
to classify victims with the help of supervised machine-learning algorithms,
according to the nature of their death. The classification into targeted and
untargeted state killings provides an improved methods of measuring strategies
of repression, and demonstrates the great potential machine-learning approaches
offer for the empirical analysis of political violence.
9.2.2 Addressing bias in documented event-data
This dissertation could not have answered the question of how internet control is
linked to repression without accounting for potential bias in observable measures
of state violence. In general, research on the relationship between varying forms
of information control and conflict is likely to suffer from endogenous measures
of information access and violence, as our knowledge of violence depends
on the availability of information. The statistical solution presented in this
dissertation has already been used in a variety of other scientific fields, ranging
from demography to epidemiology, but has to date found few applications in
the social sciences. The analyses presented in this dissertation are among the




Evidence presented here shows clearly that governments use internet control
to inform their use of violence against their own citizens. This has impor-
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tant ramifications for policies aimed at protecting human rights and ensuring
accountability for those who abuse them.
Foreign governments and the international community should begin to
understand state-led disruptions of internet accessibility as a serious signal; they
should strongly and swiftly condemn any such occurrence. Disruptions should
simply be viewed as a means of stifling the opposition’s ability to communicate.
They should be understood as a clear signal of repressive intent by a government
set on maintaining its political power at all costs.
On a more hopeful note, the rise in alternative means of obtaining internet
accessibility, for example by using satellite connections or connections from
neighbouring countries, means that it has become increasingly difficult for
governments to impose true isolation on a whole population. A recent study
by Dyn Research (formerly Renesys) demonstrates that countries with a cen-
tralised telecommunications sector are at a much higher risk of being subject to
internet disruptions, as the central structure requires far fewer steps in order
to disconnect all digital entry-points to the domestic cyberspace (Cowie, 2014).
The report finds that countries with fewer than 10 internet service providers
are particularly vulnerable, including Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, and Rwanda.
Countries with more than 40 different service providers, such as the United
States, Germany, or France, are highly unlikely to suffer a full blackout (ibid.).
Policy makers should therefore actively encourage the diversification of the
telecommunications market in countries with a known history of state terror.
With the increase of surveillance software being used by governments to spy
on their citizens, the opportunities for identifying dissidents and willingness to
eliminate them has risen dramatically. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the
majority of surveillance software used by despotic governments is exported from
companies located in the European Union and the United States (see e.g. Raoof,
2011; Wagner and Guarnieri, 2014). State abuse of digital surveillance software
should give policy makers in democratic countries serious reason to consider the
careful regulation of exports on these types of software. Analogous to policies
restricting the export of arms to governments known to turn these weapons
against their own population, policy reform is needed to address the growing
abuse of digital spyware and malware. Initiatives such as the Coalition Against
Unlawful Surveillance Exports1 and the Global Surveillance Monitor launched
by Privacy International2, as well as the Open Rights Group3, are already actively
pursuing this topic.
9.3.2 Security implications for citizens and activists
If we move away from the perspective of repressive governments, the findings
of this dissertation offer important implications for citizens and activists caught
in the process of challenging the political status quo. Reliance on the internet
to collectively organize sustainable campaigns and resistance movements offers
many advantages, but it is clearly a double-edged sword: digital fingerprint –
from emails to call histories and Facebook likes – mean that activists are liable





publicly known. The acquisition of sophisticated knowledge of ways to securely
communicate, work, live, and travel without leaving a clear ‘paper-trail’ is no
longer simply recommendable to a select number of clandestine dissidents. It
may well become a matter of survival for all members of an opposition, because
the findings of this study suggest that where a government does allow the free
exchange of information, it is more likely to be engaged in selective targeting
and killing of its citizens. The defence of every individual’s basic rights to
privacy and confidential communication has never been more essential than in
the current digital age.
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Figure 1. Major government directed internet disruptions (full and partial
disruptions).
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Network disruptions documented by google traffic
Graphs were created and copied from https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
traffic/. All rights belong to Google.
Figure 2. Disrupted Google Traffic, June 2011.
Figure 3. Disrupted Google Traffic, Nov/Dec 2012.
Figure 4. Disrupted Google Traffic, May 2013.
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Figure 5. Expected proportion of targeted killings, by Syrian governorate, using
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Figure 6. Expected proportion of targeted killings, by Syrian governorate, using
the lower bound of estimated killings.
